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Abstract 
 
 
MILLENNIAL LIBERTARIANS: THE REBIRTH OF A MOVEMENT AND 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF U.S. POLITICAL CULTURE 
 
By 
 
Kaja Tretjak 
 
 
Adviser: Professor Leith Mullings 
 
This dissertation examines the contemporary resurgence of libertarianism in the U.S., 
exploring a rapidly expanding, transnational network of hundreds of thousands liberty movement 
participants connected through student groups, community organizations, and established 
institutions, as well as through social media and a vast array of online forums. Grounded in 32 
months of ethnographic fieldwork and over 200 interviews, it documents the rise of a profound 
disenchantment, particularly among millennials, with state-based solutions to pressing 
contemporary problems and, more broadly, with the nation-state project itself. Drawing on first-
hand accounts ranging from elite boardrooms and think tank conference rooms, to political 
demonstrations and direct actions, to student reading groups and gatherings of cryptoanarchist 
communities, the dissertation situates the ethnographic study within the broader framework of a 
reconfiguration of U.S. populism in the era of the security state.  
The project examines how established libertarian organizations, a key component of the 
longstanding U.S. conservative coalition, have helped infuse libertarianism with renewed 
relevance for a substantial part of an entire generation deeply disheartened by a world embroiled 
in economic crisis and heavily militarized systems of governance. Through the consolidation of a 
libertarian wing of the Republican Party, parts of the liberty movement are presently shaking up 
the very conservative coalition that helped usher forth the movement’s revival. But 
 v 
libertarianism’s resurgence is also powerfully reshaping U.S. political culture beyond formal 
political processes, giving rise to a proliferation of libertarian spaces that expressly reject effecting 
change through electoral politics and policy in favor of changing “hearts and minds” by 
promoting libertarian principles and social organization. Simultaneously, growing numbers of 
millennials influenced by the liberty movement increasingly challenge its dominant trends, 
focusing on the experiences of vulnerable and marginalized groups — from urging the 
integration of libertarianism with a broader socioeconomic critique as well as antiracism, 
feminism, mutual aid, and labor solidarity, to revisiting the ideas of 19th century U.S. 
individualist anarchists. Thus, while the libertarian political establishment is likely to continue to 
expand over the coming years and secure a firmer place in the Republican Party, the movement 
simultaneously serves as a siphon — growing numbers of millennial libertarians are presently 
breaking from the political right and moving closer to various forms of left libertarianism, market 
anarchism, mutualism, and even social anarchism. The project thus illustrates the centrality of 
cultural formations beyond policy and electoral politics to the largest popular movement 
motivated by distinctly libertarian ideas in the postwar period, as well as to reconfigurations of 
U.S. liberalism. 
The dissertation contributes to a burgeoning literature on the resurgence of antistatist 
theory and organizing in the new millennium. Scholars and activists alike continue to document 
especially the revitalization of social anarchist traditions permeating numerous contemporary 
struggles, tracing how the resuscitation of social anarchist thought and activism informs 
important parts of extant insurgency across the globe. The U.S. liberty movement presents 
another key but understudied aspect of the present antistate moment. The dissertation also builds 
on longstanding anthropological approaches to understanding the complex processes through 
 vi 
which political ideologies are shaped and constituted. Through an ethnographic lens, it 
interrogates how deeply ingrained U.S. ideologies of freedom, individualism, and even liberalism 
itself are interpreted, contested, and reappropriated to both challenge and reinscribe relations of 
power. The libertarian resurgence represents a crucial struggle over the very meaning and 
direction of U.S. liberalism in our historical moment. 
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Introduction 
 
2011 was the second year in a row that I traveled to Washington, D.C. for the 
Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC), the country’s largest conservative gathering. 
But throughout the three-day affair, the predictable CPAC crowd of pudgy middle-aged men 
and pearl-clad women in business attire intermingled with a colorful cast of characters less likely 
to be associated with the nation’s largest annual conservative convergence. Sporting dreadlocks, 
sleeve tattoos, face piercings, and pink hairdos, representatives of groups from the Ladies of 
Liberty Alliance to various chapters of Students for Sensible Drug Policy joined other college-
aged young people in, for the second year in a row, bringing now former Texas Representative 
Ron Paul victory in the CPAC presidential straw poll — once seen as a key indicator of which 
presidential hopefuls were favored by movement conservatives.  
This project began as an ethnographic study of present-day conservatism in the U.S. As 
part of my broader interest in the role of ideas in social change, I was at that time focused on the 
production and dissemination of knowledge by conservative movement elites. In familiarizing 
myself with the movement’s disparate projects and varied intellectual traditions, I attended 
dozens of events organized by conservative think tanks, grassroots political organizations, and 
university centers spearheaded by conservative academics. But CPAC 2011 was markedly 
different. It ultimately became known as “the libertarian CPAC takeover” among attendees and 
observers across ideological lines. 
During my first afternoon at D.C.’s Marriott Wardman Park Hotel, I entered the back of 
a packed auditorium as former Vice President Dick Cheney presented former Defense Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld with the CPAC Defender of the Constitution Award. Slowly making my way 
through the animated crowd, I found myself quickly surrounded by young people shouting “War 
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criminals!” and “Terrorists!” amidst loud booing and hissing. While some attendees retaliated 
with loud chants of “USA! USA!,” the event’s vibe felt much more akin to an antiwar 
demonstration than the nation’s largest conservative gathering. “Anti-war! Anti-hate! Together 
we will smash the state!” a group of roughly a dozen college-aged agitators promptly struck back 
at the patriots, several waving a huge black and yellow flag, bisected diagonally. “End the drug 
wars!” bellowed someone across the convention hall. In front of me, a tall, gangly young man 
wearing a red bowtie and slightly awkward-fitting suit chimed in with a shrill “Burn the 
Constitution!” to emphatic cheers and pats on the back. 
I would have readily assumed that some kind of left activist group had infiltrated CPAC 
in protest, had it not been for the expressions on the sea of faces in the crowd. While several 
seemed equally perplexed, many bore the irritated expression of someone confronted, yet again, 
with a familiar and intensifying nuisance. For some, at least, the uproar was neither unexpected 
nor entirely out of the ordinary.  
Event organizers removed a handful of particularly vocal hecklers. A group of people clad 
in Ron Paul gear rose and walked out en masse. An older gentleman standing nearby muttered, 
partly to me and partly to himself, “Wow. Cheney and Rumsfeld aren’t even safe at CPAC 
anymore. What is going on here?”  
What is going on? Who are the hundreds of thousands of libertarians pouring energy into 
the liberty movement, as the rapidly escalating formation is termed by participants? Why is this 
phenomenon only now gaining widespread popularity, when established libertarian institutions 
date back many decades? And of what significance are these dynamics for U.S. political culture? 
This is the story of how participants in the liberty movement that first swept across the country in 
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the early 2000s are presently constructing disparate visions of possible futures, interpreting, 
contesting, and reconfiguring the U.S. liberal tradition. 
 
Millennial Libertarianism 
 
The nation-state system is presently in the midst of a metamorphic crisis, the full extent 
and particularities of which remain to be fully grasped. Departing from earlier debates about the 
end of the nation-state in the current era of globalization, scholars continue to interrogate 
processes from the rising power of multilateral agencies such as the IMF and World Bank; an 
increasing “privatization” of the state in various forms, in some parts of the world coupled with 
violence on the part of non-state groups (cf. Appadurai 2002); as well as the appropriation of 
governance by social movements and NGOs, the explosion of which in the postwar era has led to 
the emergence and intensification of “cross-border activism” through a wide range of 
“transnational advocacy networks” (Keck and Sikkink 1998).   
The new millennium in the U.S. commences in a post-hegemonic moment across 
ideological lines, prompting diagnoses of “the waning of the utopian idea” as a fundamental 
historical and political symptom (Jameson 2004:36). A bleak dejection, indeed a desperation, 
haunts many spaces in the Marxist and related traditions. Debate continues as to what extent the 
crimes of actually-existing socialism, and the corresponding delegitimation of its attendant 
intellectual lineages, have disabused these traditions of utopian imperatives, leaving their 
foremost thinkers seemingly unable or unwilling to articulate political programs beyond social 
democratic reformism. Meanwhile, the global financial crisis of the late 2000s and resulting 
economic developments worldwide make a cruel joke of the visions promised by market-
valorizing advocates of existing political economic arrangements. Since the early 1970s, the sharp 
shift away from public social provisioning has been peddled in the name of a laissez faire ideal of 
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highly limited government across the board — with the exceptions of government protections for 
corporate behemoths, global military adventurism, rapidly intensifying surveillance, escalating 
militarization of law enforcement, and mass incarceration. Through a wide range of analytical   
frameworks, a vast literature on neoliberalism1 analyzes this transition from the welfare state. 
Anthropologists have taken the lead in continuously highlighting “the contingent, contradictory, 
and unstable character of neoliberal processes” (Tretjak and Abrell 2011:29), challenging 
totalizing views of neoliberalism that see it as a unitary, monolithic force acting everywhere upon 
the world. Rather than identifying the unifying strands of neoliberalism across disparate contexts, 
Clarke suggests understanding neoliberalism as a “social-political project that attempts to conform 
the world to its logic” (2001:10). 
It is in this context that, in the late 2000s, the resurgence of libertarianism2 in the U.S. 
erupted in “the largest popular movement motivated by distinctly libertarian ideas about war, 
money, and the role of government we’ve seen in the postwar period” (Doherty 2009). While 
libertarian figures and institutions have aimed to mobilize a popular movement for decades, it 
was only recently that Ron Paul gained “rockstar status” among young people who routinely 
pack stadiums by the thousands for his speeches. Simultaneously, youth libertarian organizations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 As is well known, neoliberalism as a political economic process aims to promote human well-being through an 
institutional framework comprised of ostensibly free markets, free trade, and private property rights guaranteed by 
the state, the actions of which beyond this ought to be highly limited. Contemporary policies under the neoliberal 
rubric include deregulation of private industry, privatization of public services, and reduction of public expenditures 
for social provision. The rise of neoliberalism is associated with the economic restructuring of Pinochet’s Chile under 
U.S. influence during the 1970s, and, subsequently, with the regimes of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan 
more generally (Harvey 2005). Among other important contributions, analysts have theorized the different moments 
and changing forms of neoliberalism throughout its ascent to global prominence (Peck and Tickell 2002) as well as 
the potential transcendence into a post-neoliberal era (MacDonald & Ruckert 2009); the role of state action in 
neoliberalism (Bourdieu 2003; Sassen 1996); and neoliberalism’s ideological and political dimensions (Comaroff and 
Comaroff 2000; Klein 2007).  
2 In this book, the term “libertarian” reflects a particular usage popularized in the U.S. and referring to a tradition 
heavily influenced by mainstream classical liberal political thought. It should not be confused with the meaning of 
“libertarian” in many other contexts, where the term is associated with social anarchist approaches that generally 
challenge private ownership of the means of production. 
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have grown dramatically: By 2013/14, Students for Liberty’s (SFL) global campus network has 
expanded to 1,369 student groups since its inception in 2008, while Young Americans for Liberty 
(YAL), also established in 2008, boasts a network of about 162,000 youth activists and over 500 
student chapters across the U.S. Mises University, an intensive seminar billed as the world’s 
leading instructional program in the laissez faire Austrian school of economics, began in 1986 with 
a mere handful of attendees, but now draws hundreds of students from around the globe to the 
Auburn, Alabama-based Ludwig von Mises Institute (LvMI) each summer. Further, the liberty 
movement increasingly transcends borders. In 2013/14, two new SFL Regional Executive 
Boards in Africa and South Asia joined existing Regional Executive Boards in North America, 
Europe, Brazil, and the Spanish-speaking Americas. In July 2014, 47 attendees gathered in 
Melbourne for the first annual Australia-New Zealand SFL Conference. European SFL spans 
campuses in 28 countries, and organized ten regional conferences across the continent in 
2013/14; 560 attendees from 28 countries gathered in Berlin for the third annual European-wide 
conference in March 2014. African SFL unites 35 student groups across the continent. In July 
2013, over 350 students gathered at the University of Ibadan in Nigeria for the first West African 
Regional Conference; 26 students from Ghana who raised funds to rent a bus to the conference 
were denied entry at the Nigerian border, unable to pay the bribes demanded by border guards. 
While much recent attention to U.S. conservatism has focused on the tea party 
phenomenon, the liberty movement, whose participants do occasionally overlap with the tea 
party, is a distinct, largely unexplored assemblage frequently heavily critical of the tea party — in 
the words of one longtime libertarian in his late twenties, largely for its “rampant nationalistic 
and xenophobic” tendencies. Liberty movement participants in fact come from a broad range of 
political backgrounds. A substantial number joined the movement after supporting Barack 
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Obama in 2008, feeling intensely betrayed by that administration’s subsequent policies especially 
on war and civil liberties. Further, the movement increasingly attracts veterans of the Iraq and 
Afghanistan wars, with groups such as Veterans for Ron Paul playing an important role in 
disseminating the libertarian message.  
FIGURE 1: Ron Paul at the University of Texas, Austin, April 26, 2012, and at California State 
University, Chico, April 3, 2012. Photographer unknown. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2: Ron Paul at the University of California, Los Angeles, April 4, 2012. When capacity 
was reached with hundreds still waiting outside, students climbed trees surrounding the venue to 
watch Paul’s speech. Photos by http://www.otogodfrey.com/. 
 
Libertarianism presently holds a renewed relevance for a substantial part of an entire 
generation gravely disenchanted by a world embroiled in economic crisis and heavily militarized 
systems of governance, youth who share a deep-seated suspicion regarding the capability of state 
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action to meet the challenges presented by any number of contemporary dilemmas. While 
libertarian misgivings regarding state involvement in fiscal and economic affairs are well-known, 
approaches vary greatly within the strikingly multifaceted movement and draw upon disparate 
intellectual lineages. The single set of issues that presently unites the vast majority of U.S. liberty 
movement participants across ideological divides is a critique of state-sponsored violence: 
vehement opposition to U.S. imperialism and military action abroad, and corresponding outrage 
at civil liberties encroachments and intensifying surveillance at home alongside the war on drugs 
and systemic police abuse. Thus, profound esteem for former Congressman Paul’s lifelong 
commitment to non-interventionist foreign policy and outspoken critique of both parties on these 
fronts is nearly universal among the movement’s younger participants. Regardless of their, or 
Paul’s, other views, these young libertarians repeatedly tell me, his truly uncompromising antiwar 
advocacy is far and away from what they have seen in nearly any other politician. They are, they 
say, accustomed to panderers, careerists, and opportunists — in their life experience, the entire 
political system holds very little credibility.  
In the present era of the security state, a significant segment of an entire generation sees 
state-based solutions as much more likely to exacerbate than resolve problems, and looks to the 
libertarian tradition in envisioning alternative modes of social organization. Largely born to baby 
boomers roughly between the late 1970s and early 2000s, these liberty movement participants 
are overwhelmingly socially progressive, particularly as regards support of LGBTQ communities. 
Their world is the post-9/11 U.S., marked by the war on terror and corresponding crusade 
against “domestic terrorism” that transcended the George W. Bush presidency into the Barack 
Obama administration. Their debates, driven by increasingly militarized systems of governance 
in the name of national security and public safety, focus on the extent to which the U.S. is, or 
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could become, proto-fascist or worse. Eyes glued to laptops, tablets, and smart phones, they 
intensely follow the ongoing whistleblower revelations of worldwide government corruption that 
further implicate the U.S. in torture and civilian deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan, using social 
media and online forums to dissect in detail each emerging piece of leaked information — from 
WikiLeaks publications to former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward 
Snowden’s release of classified information documenting the agency’s global surveillance 
apparatus. Their cynicism mounts as they struggle with why such concerns are not the domain of 
either political party. Today, more Republicans than Democrats oppose the NSA’s 
collection of phone and internet data as part of anti-terrorism efforts.3 In January 2014, the 
Republican National Committee nearly unanimously passed a resolution condemning the NSA’s 
domestic surveillance programs, drawing fire from many GOP officials. While almost certainly 
related to the present control of the White House by the Democratic Obama administration, 
such developments nevertheless fuel young liberty movement participants’ skepticism of 
Democrats as a serious alternative to the war hawkishness and disregard for civil liberties 
associated with Republicans. Most cannot recall a time when the U.S. was not at war. They are 
millennial libertarians. 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 A January 2014 Pew Research Center and USA Today poll found Democrats more supportive of NSA 
programs, with support decreasing across party lines. Of the 1,504 adults surveyed, 53 percent opposed the NSA’s 
data-collection practices while 40 percent were supportive, with 37 percent of Republicans and 46 percent of 
Democrats backing these efforts. The partisan gap is smaller than in June 2013, when 45 percent of Republicans and 
58 percent of Democrats supported the measures. At that time, 50 percent of those polled supported such practices 
and 44 percent were opposed (Pew 2014).  
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FIGURE 3: Libertarian Longhorns Anti-War Rally. April 15, 2011. Austin, TX. Author’s 
photograph. 
 
 
FIGURE 4: Austin Alliance for Peace Rally. April 14, 2012. Austin, TX. Author’s photograph. 
 
 
Libertarianism and Conservatism: Ruptures and Continuities  
 
The import of the current historical moment notwithstanding, libertarianism’s resurgence 
could not have materialized on the present scale without the robust foundations built by 
libertarian and conservative institutions over the latter half of the 20th century. A key component 
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of the longstanding U.S. conservative coalition that marked the U.S. political landscape for much 
of the post-New Deal era, libertarian figures have aimed to mobilize a popular movement for 
decades, consolidating a humbling infrastructure of organizations and a robust intellectual 
foundation largely with the funding and support of conservative behemoths. Yet libertarian ideas 
have only recently gained widespread traction, particularly among youth. Today, movement 
participants sometimes joke that if you put two libertarians in a room, you get three theories of 
libertarianism. While this is of course somewhat of an exaggeration, the sentiment encapsulates 
the wide range of thought and values currently permeating the movement. Its various spaces, 
large and small, span a wide range of ideological commitments as well as rigorous — and often 
competing — intellectual lineages. A flourishing and rapidly expanding, transnational network 
connects thousands through student groups, grassroots community organizations, and established 
classical liberal institutions alike, as well as through social media and a vast array of online 
forums. Together, established libertarian and traditional conservative organizations have helped 
infuse libertarianism with renewed relevance for a generation both eager to challenge existing 
political economic arrangements and wary of formal political processes.  
Paradoxically, libertarianism’s revival is at present rocking the very political coalition that 
helped bring this resurgence about. Many libertarians differ sharply with traditional 
conservatives on cultural and civil liberties matters while decrying the nationalistic bravado 
pervading tea party and neoconservative circles. These dynamics have shaken the Republican 
Party as Liberty Republican caucuses form across the nation and the rise of the libertarian 
“Rand Paul Republican” wing divides the GOP.  Many of the ideas that have inspired the 
growing libertarian political establishment remain articulated in their most severe formulations 
by Ron Paul himself. In addition to a moratorium on the Transportation Security 
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Administration’s (TSA) airport searches, Paul has called for an immediate end to bailouts; an 
eventual end to the federal income tax; a trillion-dollar cut to the federal budget; the abolition of 
the Departments of Commerce, Education, Energy, the Interior, and Housing and Urban 
Development; as well as the repeal of the Patriot Act and the repatriation of U.S. troops stationed 
overseas. Paul remains one of the fiercest critics of the Federal Reserve, calling for the dissolution 
of the central banking system and a return to the gold standard — Austrian economic theory, 
which drives Paul’s critique of the monetary system, attributes “boom and bust” business cycles 
to state credit expansion, including the printing of additional notes by central banks and the 
ensuing devaluation of currency, a topic addressed in further detail in the final section of chapter 
three. 
Despite antigovernment sentiments, however, much of the libertarian political 
establishment presently on the rise remains “system-supportive” (Diamond 1995:6), bolstering 
moral traditionalism and economic hierarchies through government — especially via policy 
efforts framed in the discourse of laissez faire and the support of predominantly Republican 
candidates who spew populist, market-oriented rhetoric. And despite their challenge to the 
current Republican establishment, many key liberty movement figures remain the familiar 
advocates of “limited government” of the sort that ushered forth the tax revolt of the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, recently termed “one of the great libertarian victories of the past few decades” 
by David Boaz, executive vice president of the Cato Institute, a longstanding libertarian think 
tank. Libertarians may quibble about fiscal policy and disagree about precisely where and how 
much public spending is permissible, but at the end of the day any budget cuts are a welcome 
blow to the power of the leviathan — even if, as is often the case in practice, such triumphs 
remain limited to the dismantling of services for low-income families and individuals.  
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But in another paradoxical twist, a rising trend presently thriving among millennial 
libertarians threatens the logic of limited government in significant ways — albeit, as critics 
would have it, with something far worse. Put another way by a young libertarian highly critical of 
the conservative/libertarian political coalition, “unintended consequences are a bitch.” She was 
referring to the blow dealt to the Republican political establishment by the liberty movement. 
But her observation is an equally apt account of developments beyond the arena of electoral 
politics and policy. As millennial libertarians take up the libertarian tradition on their own terms, 
their interpretations increasingly challenge the limited government framework of much 
libertarian thought. Today, a rapidly growing approach dominates the movement’s radical 
spaces and is particularly popular among youth: anarcho-capitalism or libertarian anarchism.4 
Advocates of anarcho-capitalism promote social and economic arrangements grounded entirely 
in private law and “genuinely free markets,” devoid of any entanglements with the state. In this 
view, the state is unique in its fundamental monopoly on the legitimate use of force and is thus 
incompatible with a truly free society. Focused on the state as the primary obstacle to freedom, 
many in this tradition commonly ignore matters ranging from corporate power and structural 
poverty to cultural politics, including exclusion from civic life as well as the hierarchies of family 
structures and private institutions. This approach differs profoundly from the strategies of 
competing lineages aiming to hammer the nails in the coffin of neoliberalism, which reach 
outside of the liberal tradition itself and ardently highlight its consistent failure to deliver on its 
promises. Key anarcho-libertarian figures reinterpret the classical liberal tradition to frame their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For clarity and consistency I retain the movement’s own term “anarcho-capitalism” in referring to libertarian 
support for social and economic arrangements entirely devoid of the state. Movement participants also use the term 
interchangeably with “libertarian anarchism.” Both are particular usages stemming from the U.S. context, and 
many social anarchists reject the libertarian claim to the anarchist tradition in light of the strong libertarian 
commitment to a private property rights framework. 
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interventions as the logical extension of liberalism, even as they call for a departure from the liberal 
democratic state — a subject explored in greater detail in chapter three. 
The black and yellow flag waved by the chanting detractors of Cheney and Rumsfeld was 
the flag of anarcho-capitalism. Replacing the red associated with social anarchism, the yellow 
represents gold or, more broadly, means of exchange unhampered by state intervention. 
Anarcho-capitalists insist that imposing limits on state action has never worked to secure true 
freedom, in this view bundled inextricably with private property and unfettered market 
exchange. This was what the young man wearing the bowtie meant in shouting, “Burn the 
Constitution!” during CPAC’s presentation of the Defender of the Constitution Award. He was 
not making a symbolic statement to the effect that contemporary politicians are corrupting the 
vision of the country’s founders, a familiar sentiment in circles that seek to restore an idyllic U.S. 
past and return to a bygone era prior to the intrusion of Big Government. In his view and that of 
countless other libertarian anarchists, the metaphoric call to “burn the Constitution” represents a 
rational progression beyond the liberal democratic state, seen as the logical conclusion of the 
classical liberal trajectory. Paradoxically, then, the liberty movement — which attained its 
present central role in U.S. political culture through a longstanding coalition with traditional 
conservatism — is today not only destabilizing the Republican political establishment, albeit in 
uneven ways, but increasingly fosters a turn away from engagement with the state and formal 
political processes. As we will see in the following section, however, anarcho-capitalism is not the 
sole antistate approach embraced by liberty movement youth. 
The libertarian resurgence has also emerged hand in hand with the peer-to-peer (P2P) 
revolution. Libertarian anarchists in particular have long been among the foremost champions of 
decentralized, distributed P2P network structures. Countless libertarian forums apply Austrian 
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economics in support of the distributed digital currency and P2P payment system Bitcoin, at 
times to the chagrin of established movement institutions. Bitcoin uses the secure communication 
techniques of modern cryptography applied by countless other emerging initiatives — for 
instance, the anonymous internet browser Tor and the online black market Silk Road — to 
defend against surveillance, evade censorship, and engage in counter-economics. In the view of 
many libertarian anarchist millennials, cryptographic communities both embody libertarian 
social organization and demonstrate its desirability — enabling secure communication as well as 
unregulated, consensual economic exchange absent any central authority or intermediaries. 
The bowtie-wearing heckler was himself an avid participant in cryptographic 
communities. His name was Scott, at the time an undergraduate student in his last year at a large 
public university. He was from a small midwestern town, the son of a lab technician and an 
elementary school teacher. While he received a college scholarship, it was not enough to cover all 
of tuition and expenses, even combined with his part time jobs at the university library and 
admissions office. Like many of his peers, he accumulated thousands of dollars in student loan 
debt. And like many others seeking work upon graduation at the close of the new millennium’s 
first decade, he found himself struggling in a tough market saturated by many qualified 
applicants — in his case, the marketing and public relations industry. After the event, I 
introduced myself and explained that I hoped to learn more about contemporary libertarianism 
for my dissertation project. As was the case with many people I spoke with throughout my 
fieldwork, he was at first somewhat reluctant to talk further but ultimately agreed, bringing along 
his friend Alex.  
“This is the guy who introduced me to anarchism!” he smiled, pointing to Alex as we 
waited in an endless coffee line that wove throughout the bustling hotel lobby. Growing 
	   15	  
increasingly animated, Scott recalled meeting Alex on an online libertarian discussion forum 
several years earlier. Before college, Scott didn’t have a particularly strong political identity. 
Although his dad on occasion listened to conservative talk radio and both parents consistently 
voted Republican, politics was not a central focus of life at home. He grew up attending church 
every Sunday with his family, who he described as “your typical small town conservatives. They 
didn’t go to rallies or meetings or anything like that.” One of his earliest childhood memories was 
helping his dad pick out a U.S. flag and display it on their front yard.  
While attending a small, predominantly white public high school, he made a handful of 
good friends and spent his free time reading fantasy novels and playing video games. “But I got 
more and more interested in things happening in the world. I mean, things were messed up! The 
housing crisis and unemployment and everything. And the constant wars, militarization 
everywhere. Even years and years after 9/11, none of it seemed to be getting better.” In his 
senior year of high school, two friends moved across the country when their parents lost their 
jobs due to downsizing. Scott’s parents had to take out a second mortgage; they stayed up late at 
night talking about mounting bills and making things work. A fellow high school student who had 
joined the Army returned largely paralyzed from the neck down, having suffered a combat injury 
in Afghanistan.  
 Scott entered college looking for answers. “I wanted to get involved and learn about what 
people were doing about all this. For a while though all I found was the campus Republicans and 
Democrats and nothing they were saying struck me as very interesting or relevant. A lot of the 
same old, same old. We have the ISO (International Socialist Organization) too. I went to a 
meeting one time, my first year!”  
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“You what?” Alex laughed at him. He was teasing, but there was warmth in how he 
spoke to Scott, like a caring older brother. We had finally reached the café counter, and Alex 
bought our coffees.  
“Yeah man, I told you! It was an anti-war speaker, it was good so I stayed for the 
discussion after. That was weird. It was all about how capitalism is evil, but there wasn’t any 
economic analysis there. They ended up talking for an hour about whether anything would 
change if people used violence to get rid of the elite. And who would count, and the ethics of 
that. It just seemed stupid.” Scott went on, “It just struck me as out of touch, kind of like a 
conservative meeting I went to on campus. That was all about how gay people are ruining the 
country. Whatever, it was like four people there,” he rolled his eyes. 
Scott first encountered libertarianism that year. “I saw flyers up everywhere around 
campus. They said something about how both the left and right are wrong.” Through the 
campus libertarian organization, he became immersed in libertarian philosophy and Austrian 
economics. He read voraciously, from the classics of the Austrian school to the daily columns on 
the websites of organizations like Cato, the Foundation for Economic Education, and the Mises 
Institute. He attended libertarian conferences, carpooling to nearby towns with his new 
community of college friends, and engaged in countless online exchanges late into the night on 
forums such as the one through which he met Alex. 
Alex was a libertarian anarchist, and had identified that way for years. “He always said 
that there’s nothing the government does that’s worth doing that can’t be done better through 
people freely associating with each other. He really gave me a lot to think about,” Scott told me. 
He described his extensive chats with Alex during years of “wrestling with this idea that you need 
some kind of state for society to function. I wasn’t interested in small-scale DIY communities. I 
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wanted to know if this thing is really a necessary evil for a complex society with technological 
innovation.”  
For Scott, here was no turning back “from the logical conclusion” after reading the work 
of Murray Rothbard, the intellectual godfather of libertarian anarchists credited with furnishing 
then-nascent libertarianism with its first cohort of twenty-somethings in the 1950s (Doherty 
2007:251), as well as with coining the term “anarcho-capitalism.”  
“I was always talking to people and reading about the particulars of how this or that 
could be handled in a libertarian anarchist society. I read histories that showed how time and 
time again state involvement hurts people, even when it’s supposed to help. Yet we’re all still 
hoping that somehow it can be salvaged. For a long time I couldn’t bring myself to abandon the 
state idea altogether, no matter what the facts showed. Which is that it’s precisely the state that 
oppresses people and gets in the way of a prosperous world, a harmonious world, and it has since 
the beginning.” 
Scott repeatedly noted how all of the thinkers and writers from whom he learned so much  
— from Ludwig von Mises to Milton Friedman to F.A. Hayek — stopped short of abandoning 
the liberal state. “It was Rothbard who spelled anarchism out for me intellectually, even though it 
took a while to sink in. For him it was the only logical conclusion, the logical extension of laissez 
faire and the classical liberal tradition. We’re the real liberals!” 
Throughout Scott’s intellectual and political journey, Alex wasn’t just a mentor and 
constant source of information; he provided daily support when Scott’s newfound interests began 
causing tensions at home.  
“One of the biggest things that kept fueling all of this for me was the wars. My parents 
didn’t get it. They thought I came back from college some kind of leftist hippie. I tried explaining 
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to them that if they were serious about all the limited government stuff, they need to see the full 
implications of that. Stop listening to all these conservative pundits and founding fathers 
worshipers. There was never some golden age of freedom in this country, and there never will be 
as long as the state is around, with the corporate and government elite at the top throwing the 
rest of us some crumbs every once in a while. I mean, look around. Economic devastation 
everywhere and the assholes at the top jet-setting all over the world. Meanwhile the rest of us 
can’t get jobs or are getting laid off, foreclosed on, even though we did everything right. Or 
worse, coming back from the Middle East in body bags.” 
He caught himself becoming louder and his voice trailed off. After a few moments, Alex’s 
somber tone broke the silence. 
“We’ve been lied to.” 
Drawing encouragement from his quiet friend’s input, Scott went on, increasingly 
impassioned. “How many times did church start with prayers for our troops? Every Sunday we 
prayed for them. I walked around everywhere with those yellow ribbons, the whole 
neighborhood we covered with them. But what about everyone else dying in Iraq and 
Afghanistan? All those kids. No one ever mentioned that at church. No one ever talked about 
why any of it is necessary. It’s the duty of all Christians to condemn this carnage instead of 
getting in bed with the state propaganda machine.” 
As it turned out, Scott was highly inspired by Norman Horn, the founder of the blog 
LibertarianChristians.com, who I came to know well during my fieldwork. Norman, who holds a 
master’s degree in theology, was finishing his Ph.D. in chemical engineering at the University of 
Texas in Austin while serving as the music minister at a local Church of Christ congregation. 
Scott described poring over the blog articles, even sharing several with his dad. 
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An outspoken critic of the war effort, Norman had drafted “An Open Letter for Peace,” 
which appealed to church leaders to lead prayers for those suffering wrongfully from the war: 
“We rarely, if ever, hear prayers for the innocent people in Iraq that die on a daily basis, either 
from indiscriminate killing by our own military or civil unrest that results from a country torn 
apart by war,” read the letter. It proposed “that if a church bulletin includes prayer request for 
‘Family Members in the Military,’ that it should also include mention of the innocent and 
oppressed in Iraq and Afghanistan, especially our Iraqi and Afghan brothers and sisters in Christ, 
and for an end to war. Second, we propose that the church leaders take the lead in consistently 
mentioning the same in prayer with the congregation on Sunday mornings. If the prayers of the 
righteous are powerful and effective, then surely instituting this practice will do good both for 
these victims and for our own spirits.” 
Scott hoped his church would embrace the proposals, engaging in numerous 
conversations with the church leadership on his visits home from college. The church leaders, 
however, were not sympathetic. He ultimately distanced himself from the institution, continuing 
his spiritual journey and pursuing his interests in theology on his own. 
“This has probably been the one thing that’s caused issues between me and my family. It 
wasn’t a rejection of Christian teachings, or even a real break with conservatism. The economic 
elements of conservatism in this country, the only ones my family’s really concerned with, come 
from classical liberalism, and what I was telling them about was the ultimate realization of that. 
But that dogmatic patriotism just completely blinded them. I didn’t understand before how 
powerful those ideas are. I mean, I did in the abstract but it was really hard to accept how my 
parents, my family, everyone around me couldn’t see through it.” 
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Amidst these developments, Scott’s full embrace of Rothbard’s “logical extension” 
ultimately arrived. His recollection bore a resemblance to “the click moment” described by some 
feminists in recounting an awakening of their feminist consciousness, the moment when the 
interrelation of their own freedom with the broader women’s liberation movement became clear. 
“I was driving to my parents’ house for the holidays. It was on this residential road. A dad was 
walking behind a little kid riding a tricycle. Other people were walking around, a lot of families. 
Some people were throwing snowballs. It just kind of hit me. None of these people are doing 
anything because of the state right now. They’re having their own conversations, thinking their 
thoughts, planning their futures. If, let’s say, that little kid rode his tricycle into the road at full 
speed, the state wouldn’t be there to do anything. It would be other people — the dad, the 
drivers, maybe the other people right by him — that could jump in. Anarchism is here, it’s us.”  
He went on, “The basic premise isn’t some theoretical abstraction. It surrounds us all the 
time, every day. I messaged Alex from my car, right when I pulled into my parents’ driveway. I 
said, ‘I think I’m an anarchist.’” 
  As we were parting ways several hours later, he asked whether I know about or happen to 
have bought bitcoin. I had, some time before at the suggestion of an Austin libertarian friend for 
a few dollars per bitcoin. “Hold on to it. We should really talk about that more . . . People are 
always thinking about libertarian anarchism as though some transition could happen overnight 
where all governments just disappear. And then they ask about everything insane that would 
happen after that. The future of libertarianism is cyberspatial.” 
We kept in touch and met up again over two years later at a libertarian conference. He 
recalled out conversation at CPAC, and had been thinking about it lately. He told me he didn’t 
think he had quite the right words to describe his experience on that drive to his parents’ house. 
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And he had read something recently that he wanted to share, a few paragraphs in particular, 
because it conveys his experience very well. The selection was from a short piece by Jeffrey 
Tucker, the tech-savvy libertarian anarchist whose shrewd analysis, coupled with a playful, 
accessible style, has made him an icon in the eyes of young acolytes across the globe — some 
even donning his signature bowtie look. (Scott had, by that time, abandoned his bowtie. “I 
realized it looks a lot better on Tucker,” he grinned).  
In the passages Scott showed me, Tucker (2013) described his own journey toward 
libertarian anarchism: 
 
What I gradually discovered in the course of my daily life is that anarchism is all 
around us. The State does not wake us up in the mornings, make our beds, weave 
our sheets, build our houses, make our cars work, cook our food, cause us to work 
hard, produce the books we read, manage our houses of worship, give us clothes, 
keep the time, choose our friends and loved ones, play the music we love, produce 
the movies we watch, care for our kids, tend to our parents, choose where we 
vacation, dictate our conversations, make our holidays beautiful, or much of 
anything else. These are all things we do ourselves. We shape our own world. 
Through the exercise of human volition, we all work to make the world around us 
orderly. . .  
 
We are on the ground floor of institutions like 3-D printing, alternative currencies, 
and cloud-based civilizations capable of giving us more movies, books, art, and 
wisdom than any human being in past ages could have acquired in several 
lifetimes. This newly emerged world is transforming our lives. Take notice: No 
State did this, no State approved this, and no State is guiding this. 
 
Finally, let me admit that my anarchism is probably more practical than 
ideological—which is the reverse of what it is for the most well-known anarchist 
thinkers in history. I see the orderliness of human volition and action all around 
me. I find it inspiring. It frees my mind to understand what is truly important in 
life. I can see reality for what it is. It is not some far-flung ideology that makes me 
long for a world without the State but rather the practical realities of the human 
struggle to make something of this world though our own efforts. 
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Breaking from the Right: Libertarianism as Siphon  
 
 The economic hardship wrought by global structural transformation has profoundly 
impacted every facet of life in the U.S., including ushering forth unprecedented downward 
mobility in the middle classes (Storper 2000). Coupled with rapidly escalating militarization, the 
current political economic climate powerfully affects people like Scott. Even though he “did 
everything right,” the just deserts to which someone like him was duly entitled, the American 
dream of prosperity and endless opportunity brought about by hard work, if they ever existed at 
all, have vanished. 
 The themes permeating his account are evocative of Benson’s (2012:21) concept of 
“plighted citizenship.” Building on Berlant’s “imperiled privilege” (1997), Benson develops the 
concept to describe the prevalent model of an ideal citizen unfairly damaged but inherently 
worthy, one whose situation of disadvantage and misfortune does not index blameworthiness. 
This vernacular form of the politics of victimhood, which Benson examines in the context of U.S. 
tobacco farmers facing industrial restructuring, stems from a social context rife with assessments 
of who is deserving and who undeserving, of when compassion and pity are warranted and when 
indifference is acceptable. In this modality of citizenship, particular assumptions about the moral 
worthiness of certain types of people underlie how valuable to the nation as a whole they are 
perceived to be.   
 In part, this book explores the terrain on which such politics of betrayal and victimhood 
play out and take on new forms. These themes have been engaged extensively, for instance, in 
the context of fraught masculinity (Faludi 1999) and numerous studies of white working and 
middle class protest. Scott’s reflection upon his situation, reminiscent of a familiar populist 
politics, invokes the notion of “plighted citizenship” — much like the accounts of many liberty 
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movement participants. Yet the politics of millennial libertarians on these fronts manifest less in 
demonizing particular groups deemed responsible for “taking our jobs” or unfairly benefiting 
from status-conscious policies, although this certainly occurs. Rather, liberty movement 
participants much more commonly embrace “colorblind” and related individualist perspectives, 
although they are certainly not alone in this; an extensive scholarship interrogates the ideology of 
colorblindness in other contexts, highlighting, in part, “the transformation of practices and 
ideologies of racism to a configuration that flourishes without official support of legal and civic 
institutions” (Mullings 2005:677; Bonilla-Silva 2003; Harrison 2000; Wade 1997; Winant 2001). 
While standard libertarian analysis takes (some) dynamics of power and domination extremely 
seriously, other existing hierarchies and forms of subordination are erased through the imposition 
of a shared plight. In the liberty movement, this occurs through deployment of the “individual vs. 
the state” framework: we the people are being unjustifiably oppressed and exploited by state action. 
This “individual vs. the state” account, even in its most radical libertarian formulation, has 
important limitations. As some libertarian anarchists themselves routinely highlight, it is expertly 
harnessed to promote specific political and business interests in the current system. But it further 
acts to erase the particular impacts of broad-based political economic transformation upon those 
differently situated across axes of race, class, and gender. As explored in chapter two, the 
understanding of (state-based) oppression as a uniform condition both further entrenches and 
helps reconfigure existing forms of subordination and stratification across such axes. In a twist of 
irony, a hyper-individualist framework — by essentializing and privileging a certain form of 
subordination — in fact serves to mask the highly particular experiences of differently situated 
individuals. 
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 Yet these points are not lost on many millennial libertarians. Paradoxically, the 
resurgence of libertarianism — facilitated in great part through the support of expressly 
conservative institutions — has also ushered forth a revival of left libertarian traditions centered 
on the experiences of vulnerable and marginalized groups. Small but rapidly expanding parts of 
the movement and fellow travelers are extremely critical of “vulgar libertarian” apologism 
(Carson 2007:142) for existing economic hierarchies, urging the integration of libertarianism with 
a broader socioeconomic critique as well as antiracism, feminism, mutual aid, and labor 
solidarity. Many consciously reject the term “capitalism,” opting instead for the moniker “market 
anarchist” to draw a sharp distinction between the market form and the economic features of 
actually-existing capitalism. Such approaches critique “vulgar libertarians” for imagining the end 
of state control as “freeing business to do much what it had been doing before, rather than 
unleashing competing forms of economic organization, which might radically transform market 
forms from the bottom up” (Chartier and Johnson 2011:6). Further, millennial libertarian efforts 
ranging from the blog Thoughts on Liberty to the Libertarian Anti-Racist Alliance challenge 
status-blind approaches and promote understandings of both privilege and structural inequality, 
all the while retaining as central the concepts of the individual, market exchange, and, in most 
cases, classical liberal understandings of private property.  
 While not limited to anarchist perspectives, many of these approaches are presently at the 
forefront of resuscitating the ideas of 19th century individualist anarchists, a widely under-
researched topic.	  Individualist anarchism, a term deriving from 19th century anarchist thought 
and primarily associated with the U.S., refers to a loose set of philosophies highlighting the 
primacy of the individual will over external formations such as the community, custom, the state, 
morality, and religion. Profoundly influenced by French theorist and organizer Pierre-Joseph 
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Proudhon, U.S. individualist anarchists of the time included William Greene, Benjamin Tucker 
and Josiah Warren, as well as Ezra and Angela Heywood, imprisoned for disseminating birth 
control information. Moses Harman may have been the first to publicly attack marital rape in 
print in the 19th century, through his anarchist/feminist publication Lucifer the Lightbearer; his 
daughter Lillian refused to change her name following her non-state wedding (Presley 2014). 
This individualist anarchist tradition was throughout the 20th century largely supplanted by, on 
the one hand, various forms of social anarchism associated with activists such as Emma Goldman 
and, on the other, by the Austrian school individualism that predominantly informs the liberty 
movement’s anarcho-capitalism today. While the individualist anarchism of the 19th century 
drew on both the classical liberal and socialist traditions, contemporary individualist anarchists 
largely remain grounded in the Austrian school of economics. 
 Increasingly, however, libertarians and fellow travelers engage the limitations of Austro-
libertarianism through reviving the individualist anarchist lineage of the 19th century, even 
writing new translations of works by the writers and organizers of that time (cf. Wilbur n.d.-b). 
Through these practices, they make their own claims on parts of the liberal tradition. In 
reimagining “the individual,” these trends point to ideological connotations that have been 
grafted onto the concept through subsequent developments, and that serve to rationalize existing 
inequities — for instance, the prevalent explanation of racial and gender disparity as a matter of 
“individual failure” in a meritocratic society where all are free to determine their own destiny.  
These are crucial development in U.S. political culture: The libertarian resurgence borne 
of the libertarian/conservative political coalition has created the opportunities for many to 
engage libertarian thought on their own terms and reorient it in new directions. In turn, a 
strikingly notable trend marks the personal and political journeys of growing numbers of young 
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liberty movement participants: Their enthusiastic encounter with libertarian thought, often 
fueled by Ron Paul’s challenge to the political establishment, leads to heightened involvement in 
the proliferating labyrinth of libertarian organizations, especially student groups. From there, 
many embrace anarcho-capitalism as the only reasonable alternative to the pitfalls of the tainted 
political process and violence of the security state. But over time and through a range of life 
experiences, growing numbers of movement participants become frustrated with the lack of 
attention to corporate power, structural inequality, dismissive attitudes toward race and gender-
based hierarchies, and related elements prevalent in mainstream libertarian and anarcho-
capitalist spaces alike. In turn, many gradually become more and more oriented toward various 
forms of left libertarianism, mutualism, and social anarchism again on the rise in the era of the 
security state. As philosophy professor and LvMI affiliate Roderick Long (2012) noted in his 
review of the 1971 libertarian classic It Usually Begins with Ayn Rand, “Perhaps nowadays it usually 
begins with Ron Paul — though it often ends someplace very different.” 
 
The Antistate Moment 
 
 This book builds on contributions to understanding emerging forms of social mobilization 
and political culture under neoliberal governance by focusing specifically on the rapidly 
escalating resurgence of U.S. libertarianism, a predominantly white, male, and middle class 
movement home-grown in the U.S with its own — at times contradictory — series of claims 
upon the liberal tradition. The findings contribute to accumulating analyses that highlight the 
growing significance of an increasingly salient trend across liberal democracies in the new 
millennium, an era marked by pronounced suspicion of state action across ideological 
boundaries: Proliferating understandings of formal political institutions as ultimately protecting 
elite power and privilege at the expense of everyday people, intertwined with an acute 
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commitment to the self-determination and autonomy of communities and individuals. In the 
U.S. context, these dynamics arise simultaneously with a renewed focus on the local in terms of 
social relations — from the mantra of “supporting local businesses” to booming interest in self-
sufficient, sustainable living through community gardening, family farms utilizing wind and solar 
power, food preservation techniques, crafts, and countless related homesteader skills — even as 
“local” sites entail porous boundaries across multiple spatial scales, as many scholars have 
highlighted.  
Yet the terrain on which these developments occur is not a coherent, unitary landscape. 
People understand their situations and circumstances in radically disparate ways, and strategize 
accordingly. In turn, the grounded expressions and concrete outcomes of the antistate turn — in 
both social imaginaries as well as material realities and actual struggles — vary substantially in 
both degree and kind. Although the liberty movement serves as one central site of the antistate 
turn in the present historical moment, the trend is by no means limited to the movement. On 
what is today broadly understood as the U.S. political left, emerging developments increasingly 
question the liberal left’s reliance on state institutions in striving for genuine equality of access 
and opportunity for all. Even among supporters, from the committed to the grudging, the 
petitioning of formal government institutions — to, for instance, alleviate sharply rising rates of 
poverty, unemployment, and inequality and meet the mounting needs for housing, education, 
health, and other critical resources — increasingly appears as a matter of cynical pragmatism 
driven by a lack of meaningful alternatives; a “lesser of two evils” scenario where the high stakes 
and occasional limited victories demand engagement with the existing political process, but with 
increasingly dissipating passion and little genuine hope for any meaningful, lasting 
transformation. Such engagement may be easier to muster for those who recall the much more 
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robust welfare state of the pre-1970s that, for all of its exclusionary aspects along axes of race, 
class, and gender, nevertheless gradually provided a degree of economic security for the poor and 
the middle classes. Millennial libertarians have no such recollection. Indeed, they have very little 
reason to believe that, even if desirable, that past is today even remotely attainable. 
 Beyond the liberal left, insurgent mobilizations too continue to make a range of disparate 
demands upon the state — often accompanied by similar notions of pragmatism and concession. 
But apace these dynamics, we live amidst a powerful resurgence of antistatist theory and 
organizing. Both scholars and activists themselves have extensively documented the revitalization 
of social anarchist traditions permeating numerous contemporary struggles. Alongside this 
mobilization and direct action has evolved a robust body of anarchist thought that nuances and 
extends the historical legacy of anarchist traditions, dating to the 19th and early 20th centuries (cf. 
Amster and DeLeon et al. 2009; Lynd and Grubačić 2008; Scott 2012). For instance, writers 
have traced how the global resuscitation of social anarchist thought and organizing informs 
important parts of extant insurgency across the globe: from the Zapatista struggle for 
autonomous communities in Mexico (Vodovnik 2004) and massive global justice mobilizations 
(Bevington and Dixon 2005; Graeber 2009) to the uprisings of the Arab Spring (Douglas-Bowers 
2013; Gelderroos 2013) and Occupy (Bray 2013; Schneider 2013), as well as decentralized 
protest tactics and mutual aid communities from Bolivia (Bjork-James 2013) and Brazil (Brooks 
2013) to the Balkans (Grubačić 2010), among numerous others. Social movement analysis and 
theory extends far beyond the academy, a development that itself reflects the themes of 
decentralization and horizontalism that suffuse much of social anarchist thought. Some of the 
most salient nodes of social movement theorizing today exist not in the hallowed halls of 
academe but in independent online spaces — in vast networks of websites, blogs and discussion 
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forums that enable movement participants worldwide to share and debate both tactics and 
strategy as well as underlying philosophies and disparate approaches to social change (Bevington 
and Dixon 2005).  
 To be sure, suspicion of — and opposition to — the state and formal political processes 
from various standpoints is not in and of itself a novel phenomenon, having long informed social 
thought and mobilization across time and space. A gamut of contemporary formations — from 
revitalized social anarchisms to the liberty movement — extensively draw on those legacies. This 
book situates the rise of millennial libertarianism as one significant piece of the present-day 
antistate moment, the particularities of which vary greatly — a dynamic profoundly visible even 
within the movement itself. It thus seeks to turn a critical ethnographic lens on processes 
presently powerfully reshaping U.S. political culture, interrogating how deeply ingrained 
ideologies of freedom, individualism, and even liberalism itself are interpreted, contested, and 
reappropriated by emerging publics and counterpublics to both challenge and reinscribe 
relations of power. 
 Anthropologists studying processes of democratization and regime transitions across Latin 
America, Africa, Eastern Europe and elsewhere have drawn on the ethnographic method to 
investigate local meanings, contestations, and forms of power outside of official political 
institutions and formal regime shifts. Yet Povinelli notes that “Democratization as an ongoing 
failed or semi-successful or imaginary project in the middle of the arch-typical democracies [is] 
seldom the object of analysis. When [it is] . . . we are talking about the internal limits, 
contradictions, and tensions in democracy as they manifest in multicultural (or postcolonial) 
projects of material distribution” (Paley 2002:470). This book contributes to such anthropological 
approaches in the contemporary U.S. context, where formal systems of government have not 
	   30	  
been subject to overt institutional change. Through an ethnographic study that situates the 
libertarian resurgence in a broader historical context marked particularly by economic crisis and 
the rise of the security state, alongside the rejuvenation of antistate politics and organizing, the 
book underscores the historical multivalence of U.S. liberalism — highlighting the constitutive 
elements of emerging struggles over what, precisely, liberalism is and should be. Further, it traces 
how these developments shape the imaginaries of and strategies for a post-liberal future.  
 What began as a study of U.S. conservatism and transformed into conventional place-
based ethnography of several millennial libertarian communities in Austin, TX — one central 
hub of libertarian activity — over time evolved into something much more akin to an 
ethnography of political ideologies and their implications. It explores how participants in a 
burgeoning youth movement across disparate locales and virtual spaces struggle with the 
quintessential notion of freedom at the core of western political thought; negotiate 
understandings of the state, the market, the individual, and the social; and wrestle with dilemmas 
of status, privilege, and structural inequalities. These processes occur not only through 
conferences, meetings, webinars, and online debates, but during late-night conversations over 
drinks, at rallies and demonstrations, and through collaborations on local activist projects, even 
among virtual communities promoting a range of cryptocurrencies, systems of distributed, digital 
means of exchange — the rise of distributed P2P network structures championed by libertarian 
anarchists, among many others, itself signals the advent of a new, emerging form of governance. 
 But at issue are not merely floating discourses and disembodied narratives. Rather, the 
processes explored herein themselves constitute U.S. liberalism through an array of disparate 
claims upon and refashioned understandings of the powerful concept that remains the basis for 
social and political legitimacy in the U.S. Historically, a series of ideologies and movements have 
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staked claims to or within its auspices, some aiming to transcend it altogether. Many of their 
legacies have profoundly shaped material reality and actual, lived experiences: Liberalism has 
been a force for both inclusion and exclusion at different moments in U.S. history, serving the 
cause of egalitarian and inegalitarian efforts alike. The story of millennial libertarianism is the 
story of the processes and practices at the heart of one such struggle — one that may well prove 
to be the quintessential struggle over the meaning of U.S. liberalism in the present historical 
moment.  
 
Outline of the Book 
Funded by the Wenner-Gren Foundation Dissertation Fieldwork Grant and the CUNY 
Graduate Center, research is grounded in 32 months of ethnographic fieldwork centered in 
Austin, TX — a university city in Ron Paul’s home state informally known as the libertarian 
capital of the U.S. due to its thriving, multifaceted libertarian community tightly networked with 
other libertarian hubs regionally, nationally, and beyond. Research further encompassed 
libertarian communities in Washington, D.C., New York City, as well as national and 
international events, conferences, and numerous intensive, week-long seminars for libertarian 
students held throughout the country; over 200 unstructured and semi-structured interviews as 
well as ten life history interviews; and countless hours of informal day-to-day interactions with 
movement participants across the country. Pursuant to professional ethical standards for 
qualitative research, the study protects the confidentiality of study participants who did not wish 
to be identified, with the exception of public figures. The names of study participants identified 
by first name only are pseudonyms, with minor changes made to any identifying information. 
 The first chapter explores the unraveling of the conservative/libertarian political coalition 
that dominated the U.S. political landscape for much of the post-New Deal era. Established 
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conservative and libertarian institutions may appear to be ho-hum regular fixtures on the 
political scene, all but devoid of purpose in light of the ostensible success of the market agenda 
under neoliberalism. Nothing is further from the case. Such institutions have played a central 
role in facilitating the libertarian resurgence, with substantial funding from the conservative 
movement’s flagship foundations. Yet, paradoxically, libertarians presently use many of the ideas 
popularized by movement conservatives against that movement itself, destabilizing the political 
coalition that brought it to power. 
 Many in the libertarian political establishment that began to coalesce through Ron Paul’s 
presidential bids are far from abandoning the political process altogether, aiming instead to 
consolidate a libertarian wing of the Republican Party. This project is proving substantially more 
successful than the attempts of traditional conservatives to interest liberty movement participants 
in their vision of a reinvented Reagan revolution. Despite having largely soured on the tea party 
phenomenon they see as thoroughly coopted by mainstream Republican operatives and 
politicians — an often overlooked generational divide between the tea party and the liberty 
movement — many millennial libertarians enthusiastically embrace the newly revived menace to 
the Republican establishment embodied in Ron Paul’s presidential runs. Thus, hundreds of 
thousands of millennial libertarians inspired by Paul build political efforts to restore a 
constitutionalist republic rooted in “personal responsibility,” notably through tax and fiscal 
reform as well as curbing runaway spending on “entitlements” alongside militarization and 
surveillance efforts in the name of security and safety. Through an ethnographic lens, the second 
chapter explores the role of millennial libertarians in the consolidation of this libertarian political 
establishment. But millennial libertarians are a multifaceted bunch. Many remain heavily 
skeptical of their peers’ political project, with criticism proceeding roughly along two lines. First, 
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many millennial libertarians point out that libertarian support of candidates with anti-
government economic platforms entrenches social conservatism in government, since libertarian 
supporters overwhelmingly ignore the social conservative positions of these candidates (and many 
candidates downplay). Second, numerous millennial libertarians skeptical of the political process 
and the nation-state project broadly reject “the idea that we’re now supposed to put our trust in a 
new order of limited government politicians.”  
Chapter two further examines the roles of the movement’s largest youth-based 
organizations — Young Americans for Liberty (YAL) and Students for Liberty (SFL) — in these 
developments, as well as notes the rise of increasingly multifaceted millennial libertarian 
communities as movement participants create their own independent, informal spaces. The 
chapter then grounds these contemporary developments in the history of the libertarian tradition 
throughout the latter half of the 20th century, particularly with regard to longstanding strategic 
questions around working within existing political processes. Finally, it situates the rise of 
millennial libertarianism within the present-day intricacies of established libertarian institutions, a 
labyrinth that reflects a dizzying amalgam of views on cultural politics, political economy, and 
civil liberties, as well as militarization and foreign policy — often in unlikely combinations. 
 Chapter three ethnographically traces the disparate personal and intellectual journeys of 
millennial libertarians outside of formal political processes. While these trajectories often begin 
with Ron Paul — who has supplanted novelist Ayn Rand as the primary entry point into 
libertarianism — they frequently lead to rather different spaces and approaches, the range and 
influence of which has exploded in light of the movement’s resurgence. From Austrian economics 
and libertarian anarcho-capitalism to “bleeding heart” libertarianism, left libertarianism, “free 
market anti-capitalism,” and mutualism, millennial libertarians are seeking ways to unpack and 
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ground their disenchantment with politics and state-based solutions — shared across various 
backgrounds and disparate life experiences. Through these journeys, millennial libertarians are 
increasingly challenging and reconfiguring key libertarian concepts and their implications. The 
chapter underscores the emerging struggles over the meaning of “freedom” and “the individual,” 
central to classical liberal and libertarian thought. It engages the increasingly disparate 
libertarian approaches to the economic constraints that, for many across the globe, presently 
render libertarian freedom into a meager handful of equally poor alternatives. Incorporating 
commitments to labor solidarity and highlighting how the current system promotes elite and 
corporate interests, millennial libertarians increasingly struggle with understandings of “the free 
market” as developed by key figures in the lineage they have inherited, revisiting the relationship 
between “the market” and “the state.”  
They further wrestle with questions of status, privilege, and structural inequalities, all but 
absent in most libertarian spaces until rather recently. The chapter illustrates how most 
movement spaces systematically fail to engage contemporary scholarship on the structural 
elements of poverty, the processes that entrench and continually reproduce it, and its racial and 
gendered aspects. Interviews and fieldwork reveal both the widespread lack of familiarity with 
this work among libertarian youth, as well as the challenges inherent in communicating 
understandings of complex structural inequalities that persist absent formal institutional support. 
At the same time, small pockets of young libertarians are gradually challenging the 
“colorblindness” and related ideologies that pervade the movement, adopting antistatist 
approaches toward the historical and contemporary dynamics that limit individual autonomy 
particularly across class, race, and gender lines — interventions frequently met with dismissal and 
hostility. The chapter as a whole engages what some young participants term the movement’s 
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“PR problem”: Negative public perceptions of libertarians as unconcerned with the plights and 
lived experiences of everyday people broadly, and traditionally marginalized groups in particular 
— a theme interrelated with growing discussions among millennials as to why the movement 
remains disproportionately white and male. It concludes by examining how some millennial 
libertarians negotiate the implications of their economic analysis. 
 Chapter four explores the projects of the many millennial libertarians who have 
abandoned formal political processes, building efforts expressly and consciously situated outside 
of political frameworks and the purview of the state. Reviving the philosophy of agorism, long 
dormant within the movement, they focus on strategies such as direct action, entrepreneurship, 
and self-sufficiency — from grassroots police accountability activism fostering communities that 
“protect and serve each other” and regional webs promoting self-sufficient living, to emerging 
technologies grounded in decentralized, peer to peer networks. Although millennial libertarians 
see these efforts as consistent with their philosophical and political economic analysis, they 
transcend ideological and political boundaries and none is the exclusive domain of libertarianism 
as such. While some such projects arise from expressly libertarian spaces and then expand, others 
represent arenas where libertarians have simply played a role.  
 Chapter five situates the resurgence of libertarianism in a broader historical context, 
providing an overview of the intellectual lineages that inform the present-day movement’s 
various approaches and tracing the multifaceted traditions that have, over time, both contested 
and drawn on aspects of classical liberalism. The chapter next reviews more recent debates on 
the nature of U.S. liberalism and political identity, beginning with Louis Hartz’s seminal “liberal 
society” thesis and the criticisms and reconfigurations thereof — from the “multiple traditions” 
and “liberalism as exclusion” theses to the most recent “liberal multiplicity” approach. It then 
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introduces anthropological work on democracy to build on these debates. Specifically, it draws 
on these anthropological contributions to further inform the theoretical approach that treats U.S. 
liberalism as an inherently contested, protean concept constituted through political debate and 
struggle. 
 The conclusion offers some reflections on the implications of the contemporary liberty 
movement, both with respect to the U.S. political arena and, more broadly, for understandings of 
U.S. liberalism and the present crisis of the nation-state. It also identifies several potential 
avenues for further research. 
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Chapter One: A Political Coalition In Turmoil 
 At CPAC 2010 — the year prior to the heckling of Rumsfeld and Cheney — several 
hundred attendees packed an auditorium for a panel entitled “Two-Minute Activist: Saving 
Freedom Across America.” While the liberty movement’s presence still paled in comparison to 
what would occur at CPAC the next year, this particular session made liberty movement history. 
The event included a brief talk by Alexander McCobin, executive director of the then-nascent 
Students for Liberty, who graduated college in 2008 and is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in 
philosophy. McCobin thanked CPAC for welcoming GOProud, an organization representing 
gay conservatives, as a conference co-sponsor — the group’s inclusion had caused intense 
controversy in conservative circles and led some organizations to boycott CPAC altogether. The 
talk was followed by Ryan Sorba, then-chair of California’s chapter of Young Americans for 
Freedom, a conservative organization founded in 1960 and widely credited with shaping the late 
20th century political scene.1 Sorba, a 2007 college graduate and author of the self-published Born 
Gay Hoax, launched into an anti-gay tirade, condemning CPAC for including GOProud and 
denouncing libertarian groups, shouting “the lesbians at Smith College protest better than you 
do!” when faced with massive booing from the crowd. While Young Americans for Freedom 
members spent the evening frantically explaining that Sorba does not represent the 
organization’s views and Sorba ultimately left the group to chair the Young Conservatives of 
California, the video of the panel went viral and remains a frequent reference point for young 
libertarians who bristle at any association with the conservative movement. 
 By 2011, the CPAC “libertarian takeover” — as both self-identified conservatives and 
libertarians referred to the milestone event — was undeniable. The conference overflowed with 
                                                
1 For more on the history and significance of Young Americans for Freedom, see Schneider (1998) and 
Thorburn (2010). 
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libertarian-themed panels, with attendees packed alongside ballroom walls, sitting on floors, and 
gathering in doorways, straining to hear the presentations. Youth-centered sessions drew 
hundreds of students. Ron Paul’s Campaign for Liberty organized nearly two-dozen events. Well 
before the commencement of Paul’s formal address, the roaring crowd could be heard 
throughout the hotel lobby and outside the auditorium, chanting “End the Wars!” and “End the 
Fed!” During the previous night’s Liberty Forum, featuring Paul and his son Senator Rand Paul, 
among others, the 1,200–seat Marshall Ballroom, set up theater-style for the event, exceeded 
capacity. A youth libertarian group had arranged discounted student rates in shared hotel rooms, 
but these quickly sold out and many students resorted to a nearby hostel, some sleeping on floors 
and couches due to lack of space.  
 During the conference, I attended the panel “How Political Correctness is Harming 
America’s Military” with a campus libertarian group leader who first became involved with 
libertarianism through the war issue. She had witnessed first-hand the devastating impact of war 
on friends and acquaintances returning from military service in Iraq and Afghanistan, two of 
whom had committed suicide. Having voted for Obama in 2008 out of her antiwar commitments 
and feeling profoundly betrayed by ensuing developments, she rapidly became disillusioned with 
both parties. At the panel, she grew increasingly horrified as former Marine Ilario Pantano, two-
time GOP candidate for Congress in North Carolina, passionately declared that the ultimate 
founding document of the U.S. is the Bible and our problems stem from a refusal to recognize 
that the country was meant to be a Christian nation. The military must be grounded in God’s 
truth, he continued, attributing the thousands of U.S. veteran suicides to the “God-shaped hole 
in our hearts,” a consequence of chasing Jesus out of schools and courtrooms and allowing agents 
of communist, atheist regimes to infiltrate the country’s key institutions. Presenting his case for 
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the divide between east and west boiling down to Christians and non-Christians, Pantano 
declared, “What are the Chinese afraid of? It’s not capitalism, it’s not Google, it’s not Wal-Mart, 
it’s not Boeing, it’s not Islam. They’re afraid of Jesus Christ.” Appalled, she called out loud 
enough to turn more than a few heads, “I’m afraid of you!” 
 Another evening panel, entitled Freedom’s Rising New Leaders, drew an animated, 
cheering crowd of several hundred for a range of libertarian speakers who forcefully condemned 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and spoke virulently against the conservative-perpetuated 
culture of fear in the name of national security, the Guantanamo Bay detention camp, and 
repression of civil liberties at home. Simultaneously, the Young America’s Foundation, an 
organization dedicated to supporting conservative youth which also preserves Ronald Reagan’s 
California ranch, co-sponsored a celebration of Reagan’s birthday centennial, featuring a cake in 
the shape of a cowboy hat-wearing former president and attended by a much more subdued and 
significantly older crowd.  
 “The warmongers are having a birthday party down the hall!” announced a group of 
college-aged attendees who had apparently paid a visit to the Reagan festivities en route to the 
libertarian New Leaders panel, half-running toward the ballroom where the event was taking 
place and giddily waving paper plates laden with cake in the air. The amused crowd of thirty or 
so milling about the ballroom entrance quickly seized the opportunity. A 20-something woman 
looked up from her cell phone: “Ugh, neocons. They might as well ship that to Iraq. Let them 
eat cake!” Her friend quickly chimed in, “What? No, those aren’t bombs dropping. That’s the 
sound of freedom falling from the sky!” Banter about conservatives’ historical support of the 
warfare state, ever-increasing U.S. militarization, blowback, and the unprincipled spinelessness of 
both political parties continued the entire way to the libertarian afterparty at a nearby three-story 
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bar, which soon expanded throughout the surrounding Adams Morgan neighborhood when the 
inundated venue, so packed with conference attendees that the crowd clogged the stairwells and 
prevented traffic flow, could no longer accommodate the onslaught of new arrivals that showed 
no sign of ceasing.  
 
Conservative Coalition in Crisis 
 
The conservative/libertarian coalition grew out of the opposition to the New 
Deal, but it has long outlived its usefulness, if it ever had any. The relationship 
between conservatives and libertarians is like the relationship of an abusive 
husband and a spouse with Stockholm Syndrome. 
—Daniel Krawisz, libertarian anarchist and University of Texas, Austin graduate 
student 
 
 As recently as 2009, historian Kim Phillips-Fein could posit, in the epilogue to her 
compelling work grounding the rise of the modern conservative movement in the reaction 
against the New Deal by conservative businessmen, that “the very success of the market agenda 
has rendered the old political register of their rhetoric obsolete” (268). Today, some of the 
conservative businessmen’s early institutions continue to exist, but “seem to have lost their 
purpose in the world they helped to create, their urgent, embattled tone an echo of an earlier 
time” (265). In this view, conservative and libertarian organizations, once voices in the 
wilderness, have transformed into regular fixtures on the D.C. circuit while the businessmen’s 
early institutions such as the Foundation for Economic Education and the Mont Pelerin Society 
stubbornly, if somewhat tediously, regurgitate their founding principles of economic freedom. 
 The recent libertarian resurgence tells a radically different story. Anything but obsolete, 
established organizations key to the longstanding U.S. conservative coalition have played a 
crucial role in facilitating current dynamics. Infusing libertarianism with renewed relevance for a 
large part of an entire generation, their work has paradoxically sown the seeds of internal 
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upheaval. Millennial libertarians have taken up libertarianism on their own terms, imperiling the 
very political coalition that enabled its popularity — the topic of this chapter. But these 
developments are impacting U.S. political culture well beyond the Republican Party. They 
further present problems for the libertarian establishment, itself a multifaceted assemblage 
comprised of opposing values and worldviews. As millennial libertarians make their own series of 
claims to the liberal tradition, some adopt approaches to power and inequality that challenge 
those of dominant liberty movement figures and organizations as well, but from disparate 
perspectives and with a range of implications — dynamics explored further in the following two 
chapters.  
 
U.S. Conservatism: New Twists in an Old Tale 
 Historically, both scholars and the public at large have understood libertarianism in the 
U.S. as little more than a subset or impulse within conservatism. The implications of a 
substantive distinction between present-day conservatism and libertarianism extend far beyond 
an abstract terminological point or academic debate. Rather, this distinction is the cornerstone 
for understanding crucial contemporary developments. In building an account of how various 
parts of the liberty movement are at present reshaping U.S. political culture, it is helpful to first 
examine the fluid constituent parts within the once-robust conservative coalition and their 
current predicaments. 
 The prevailing view that sees libertarianism as fundamentally intertwined with 
conservatism stems from the longstanding coalition between these and other political formations 
that dominated a significant portion of the 20th century. Familiar to students of U.S. conservatism 
is George H. Nash’s (1976:xvi-xvii) now classic formulation of the movement as comprised of 
three distinct schools of thought consolidated, over time, through a range of organizations and 
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journals: libertarianism, traditional conservatism, and anti-communism. To be sure, tensions 
abound among these strands and the history of the conservative movement is in part a history of 
the negotiation of these tensions. Perhaps most famously, National Review editor Frank S. Meyer 
(1960) aimed to articulate a consensus between traditional conservatives, concerned with virtue 
and an organic moral order, often as understood by particular forms of Christianity, and 
libertarians, committed to a vision of the autonomous individual and an economy unfettered by 
state action. In Meyer’s view, conservatives must reject a perceived antithesis between these two 
“tragically bifurcated branches of the Western tradition” and draw on both tradition and reason ( 
359-360). Despite the visceral critique of Meyer’s work that followed, fusionism, as the synthesis 
of conservatism and libertarianism became known, won out, at least in the practical sense of a 
longstanding political coalition.2 Nash, whose own affinities lie with conservatism, suggests this 
occurred not because of a common acceptance of a worldview, but because traditional 
conservatives and libertarians, weary of increasing factionalization, recognized the need for 
practical collaboration to facilitate the growth of their movement. Further, they were unified by a 
common foe, bound together by “the cement of anti-Communism” (Nash 1976:179). Put another 
way by libertarian anarchist Murray Rothbard, “fusionism is a ‘myth’ in the Sorelian sense, an 
organizing principle to hold two very disparate wings of a political movement together and to get 
them to act in a unified way. Intellectually, the concept must be judged a failure” (1981a:363). 
 Nash’s profoundly influential schema of conservatism as a “big tent” balancing act has 
long informed social movement literature on the topic, far outlasting competing definition 
attempts.3 Yet as Jennifer Burns notes in her insightful retrospective on the seminal work, “while 
Nash intended his book to be a study of conservative intellectuals, historians have used it as a 
                                                
2 Meyer himself objected to the term “fusionism.” See Meyer (1962). 
3 For an overview of various earlier understandings of conservatism refuted by Nash, see Burns (2004).  
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synecdoche for right-wing phenomena of all kinds” (2004:455). Indeed, scholars across disciplines 
ground their analysis in his contribution. Increasingly proliferating treatments of the conservative 
movement ranging from studies of elites and national organizations to grassroots activists and 
everyday actors owe a great debt to Nash’s work, widely deemed “the indispensible starting point 
for any examination of the making of contemporary conservative ideology” (Himmelstein 
1990:217 n.1).4 Even scholars who reject the term “conservative,” such as sociologist Sara 
Diamond who prefers “right-wing” or “rightist,” note that “Libertarianism, anticommunist 
militarism, and traditionalism have been the pillars of the U.S. Right,” with each “right-wing 
movement” ranking its priorities in distinct ways (1995:6-7). In this view,  
What has unified the Right is a consistent set of principles in three realms of social 
endeavor: the economy, the nation-state in global context (military and 
diplomatic), and the moral order of behavioral norms and hierarchies on the bases 
of race and gender . . . these three realms correspond to the preoccupations of 
right-wing movements with protecting “free market” or “libertarian” capitalism; 
promoting anticommunism and, generally, U.S. military hegemony over much of 
the rest of the world; preserving traditional morality and supreme status for 
native-born white male Americans and for the nuclear family. 
(Diamond 1995:6-7) 
  
 The subject of Nash’s book, as he himself noted, was “conservatism as an intellectual 
movement in America, in a particular period,” that is from 1945 to the book’s original publication in 
1976 ( xv). Yet the work’s very success in articulating crucial developments of the time — 
particularly how libertarians and traditional conservatives negotiated key differences to forge a 
powerful movement that profoundly shaped the cultural and political landscape for decades to 
come — has entrenched a particular understanding of U.S. conservatism. Today, treatments of 
                                                
4 See also, e.g., Andrew (1997:238 n.1), describing Nash’s book as “the best study of postwar conservative 
growth.” Burns (2004) identifies a partial listing of well over a dozen works on U.S. conservatism citing 
Nash. 
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this topic generally presume a robust, if somewhat tense, conservative/libertarian coalition. The 
libertarian resurgence requires rethinking the present-day utility of this paradigmatic framework.  
 
Blinded by the Right: Overlooked Feuding 
 At the core of conservative disunity in the 1990s lay the “great neo-paleo feud,” the 
ongoing power struggle between neoconservatives, committed to ostensibly promoting U.S. 
interests globally through military might and an assertive, interventionist foreign policy who were 
to gain popular notoriety during the second Bush administration, and self-identified 
paleoconservatives, successors to the Old Right and staunch, overwhelmingly Christian 
traditionalists who oppose neoconservative foreign affairs efforts as imperialistic and their views 
on social issues as impermissibly liberal.  
 A key episode in the neo-paleo strife that troubled the conservative movement for years 
was the Persian Gulf war, the first U.S.-led military action against Iraq. The antiwar faction 
formed the short-lived Committee to Avert the Mideast Holocaust, comprised of several 
paleoconservatives and libertarians, including the Cato Institute’s William Niskanen, 
aforementioned libertarian anarchist professor Murray Rothbard, Ron Paul, and writer and 
publisher Lew Rockwell, Paul’s close associate and former congressional chief of staff (Diamond 
1995:287). It would take nearly another two decades for Paul to become enthusiastically 
embraced by thousands of young people who routinely pack auditoriums for his speeches, 
organize community gatherings, marches, and rallies in support of his unmatched consistency, 
and dedicate entire months and sometimes years of their lives to volunteer for his campaigns; and 
for Rothbard’s anarcho-capitalism to gain a “fan culture”-like reverence among youth, with 
millennial libertarians sporting shirts featuring a severe-looking Rothbard emblazoned with the 
slogan “Enemy of the State.” These figures would prove central to popularizing the tradition that 
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in the 2000s erupted onto the public stage, confounding observers with its blend of commitments 
and ideologies that do not easily map onto the political spectrum as conventionally understood. 
Yet the mainstreaming of any set of ideas often leads to unanticipated consequences. As this book 
aims to illustrate, the broad complex of values and philosophies held by liberty movement 
participants is striking. It should thus be noted that Ron Paul’s brand of libertarianism — and, 
and various parts of his life, Rothbard’s — that flirts with if not embraces paleoconservatism is by 
no means the only libertarian lineage permeating the resurgent movement. As noted in the 
introduction, the single set of issues presently uniting the vast majority of movement participants 
across ideological boundaries is fierce opposition to U.S. imperialism and military action abroad 
coupled with indignation at civil liberties encroachments and intensifying surveillance at home, 
alongside the war on drugs, police abuse, and related forms of state-sponsored violence. In turn, 
“Dr. No,” as supporters sometimes affectionately refer to obstetrician Ron Paul, commands the 
utmost respect for his uncompromising views on these fronts. Even when they disagree with him, 
movement participants routinely note his consistency and integrity. Paul, they observe, is a truly 
principled antiwar advocate — and has been throughout his entire career, even in the decades 
when few were listening. The years following Barack Obama’s 2008 presidential win saw large 
numbers of young antiwar Democrats join libertarian ranks over the President’s military and 
related actions. And thus, the millennial libertarian at-first-glance curious embrace of a rather 
conventional-seeming, socially conservative former Congressman in his 70s.  
 The rumblings of trouble for the conservative coalition on these fronts abounded for 
decades. I suspect that most of the hundreds of liberty movement participants I have spoken with 
over the nearly three-year course of my fieldwork would agree with the sentiment behind 
Diamond’s observations that, the libertarian ideal of state nonintervention notwithstanding, most 
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of the right has supported de facto state intervention that benefits elites as well as “the Pentagon 
system” (1995:8). At the heart of even the more moderate liberty movement participants’ 
rejection of the right and the Republican Party lies what is routinely described as conservative 
hypocrisy. Although many draw the line at various historical moments, commonplace in 
libertarian circles are observations similar to Reason editor Nick Gillespie’s that “At least since the 
election of St. Ronald Reagan, self-styled conservatives have repeatedly revealed themselves to be 
the biggest frauds or most delusional suckers in American politics,” disingenuously espousing 
commitments to meeting human needs through free markets and voluntary associations while 
centralizing power in Washington and printing and spending money “like LBJ on a bourbon-
fueled bender” (2012).  
 At the time of Diamond’s writing in 1995, the “small number of purist libertarians” ( 8) 
strongly opposed to massive military spending and protectionist trade policies were little more 
than an afterthought. In turn, she was able to propose that “to be right-wing means to support 
the state in its capacity as enforcer of order and to oppose the state as distributor of wealth and 
power downward and more equitably in society,” non-controversially including libertarianism 
among other such tendencies ( 9). Rather than engage with the then relatively small number of 
“purist libertarians” and their increasingly disintegrating relationship with conservatism, scholars 
turned their eye to the mobilization of Christian evangelicals, observing how, in light of 
conservative infighting in the early 1990s, evangelicals were best positioned to mobilize a popular 
following, establishing themselves as both a successful faction within the Republican Party and a 
formidable grassroots movement throughout the decade.5  
                                                
5 See, e.g., Diamond (1995:289-312) and (1998).  
 47 
 Yet other developments of the time signaled a brewing phenomenon that would not come 
to the forefront for years to come. Noting the marked increase in support for third political 
parties in 1995, the Chicago Tribune reported, “The distinguishing characteristic of these potential 
independent voters — aside from their disillusionment with Washington politicians of both 
parties — is their libertarian streak. They are skeptical of the Democrats because they identify 
them with big government. They are wary of the Republicans because of the growing influence 
within the GOP of the religious right” (Broder). By 2001, the GOP had a serious “libertarian 
problem,” with Libertarian Party office-seekers hurting the prospects of Republican House and 
Senate candidates (Miller). Conservative talk show host Michael Medved condemned the “purists 
and oddballs” who cost Republicans seats in the 2002 midterm elections by voting for the 
Libertarian Party as “losertarians” (2002). 
The aftermath of September 11, 2001 fueled further divisions, with heated arguments 
between conservatives and libertarians around civil liberties and the Patriot Act. The ensuing war 
on terror and related global military operations inspired all-out revolts against George W. Bush 
and “the neocon warmongers” throughout libertarian circles, with libertarians such as 
Libertarian Party co-founder Gene Berkman and Julian Sanchez of the Cato Institute and Reason 
stating they would vote for antiwar Democrat Howard Dean if he were to win the 2004 
presidential nomination (Shachtman 2003). The National Review, the staple of conservative news 
and commentary founded in 1955 by “the lion of the right” William F. Buckley, hemorrhaged 
contributors and supporters who rejected Bush-era approaches to foreign policy and civil liberties 
— many of whom later highlighted the similarities of Barack Obama’s administration on these 
fronts. In 2003, Liberty magazine editor R.W. Bradford called for an end to the libertarian-
conservative alliance, observing that conservatives, once securely in power, have abandoned their 
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“claimed love of liberty and opposition to ever more powerful government” and become “the 
greatest advocates of an imperial foreign policy, of massive defense spending and of invading 
people’s homes in the names of the Wars on Crime, Drugs and Terrorism” (16). That year, Pat 
Buchanan co-founded the American Conservative as a platform for the Old Right nationalist 
tradition critical of interventionist foreign policy, but the magazine quickly took on a unique role, 
gaining much libertarian attention and “a devoted following as a sharp critic of the conservative 
mainstream” (Salam 2009). The publication has warmly embraced Ron Paul, who first 
galvanized youth with his 2008 bid for the Republican presidential nomination. All the while, the 
ostensibly tiresome established institutions were steadily promoting their ideas among young 
people, particularly college students, through free seminars, literature, organizing trainings, 
career development, and other resources. But until youth support for Ron Paul exploded onto 
the scene in the 2012 primary contest and Paul overwhelmingly swept the under-30 vote on a 
regular basis, few observers took notice.  
 
Millennial Libertarianism’s Institutional Roots 
 At CPAC 2010, the year prior to Cheney and Rumsfeld’s troubled reception, the liberty 
movement made its first stand. Hundreds of lively Ron Paul enthusiasts, many college-aged, 
swarmed the halls of the Washington, D.C. hotel venue, engaging passers-by in conversations 
about the bloodbath ensuing from U.S.-led war efforts and the Federal Reserve’s destructive 
impact on currency and inflation. High-spirited and occasionally boisterous, the energetic bunch 
ensured their candidate swept the CPAC straw poll. That year Paul captured nearly one third of 
the vote in the highest straw poll turnout in CPAC’s 37-year history, with almost half the poll 
participants indicating they were students (Martin 2010b; Stein 2010). CPAC attendance was 
also markedly higher — up to 10,000 from 8,500 in 2009 — leading the Guardian to ask David 
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Keene, chair of the American Conservative Union, which organizes CPAC, for comment (Lott 
2010). “He said it wasn’t due to an increase in advertisement. He instead chalked it up to good 
fortune and a backlash against the policies of President Obama. Both of Keene’s answers are true 
but not sufficient to explain the increase. Much of it had to do with a fight about a future for the 
right, and this year’s CPAC is where Paul chose to demonstrate his growing organisational 
strength.”  
 Circumstances aside, the libertarian resurgence could not have exploded on the present 
scale without the vast institutional support of organizations promoting limited government ideas 
over many decades. Underlying the liberty movement is an intellectualism grounded in a vast 
network of publications, conferences, online lectures, and trainings supported by such 
institutions. These efforts often share funders with conservative movement strongholds; for 
instance, the conservative Heritage Foundation found a significant funding source in the family 
foundations established by the billionaire Koch brothers, who also pour millions into projects 
focused exclusively on curbing government involvement in fiscal and economic affairs. In 
addition to academic contributions to economics and philosophy, the literature produced 
through this complex consists of literally hundreds of articles and books where readers can find 
an array of libertarian takes, and usually fierce debate, on virtually any issue. Just a few 
prominent topics span the brutal consequences of war, its interrelation with the state, and the 
bloodshed wrought by the U.S. war on drugs; credit expansion and the Federal Reserve; the 
impact of regulation on various economic sectors; and environmentalism absent state institutions. 
Increasingly, writers take on heavily antistatist questions, such as how private court systems and 
security forces, as well as voluntary institutions broadly, would function in a stateless society, or 
one with highly limited state intervention. Indeed, it is beyond the capacity of a full-time 
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ethnographer to entirely keep up with the literature and commentary that regularly pours forth 
from various spaces within the liberty movement, especially the internet, and spans policy 
debates, theoretical developments of libertarianism across academic disciplines and philosophical 
lineages, as well as movement strategy and tactics. Further, both classic and contemporary 
libertarian contributions can be accessed in a wide array of formats — from original economics 
texts downloadable in full online, to synthesized position papers, to highly accessible bullet-point 
outlines targeted toward youth and high school audiences.  
 Many of these contributors and their readership come together at various gatherings 
sponsored by established libertarian institutions such as the Ludwig von Mises Institute (LvMI), 
which organizes the annual Austrian Economics Research Conference — formerly the Austrian 
Scholars Conference — and the aforementioned Mises University summer program. At least 
four other libertarian institutions — the Cato Institute, the Independent Institute, the Institute 
for Humane Studies, and the Foundation for Economic Education — offer similarly popular, 
weeklong student seminars focused on disparate topics. The Institute for Humane Studies, 
associated with George Mason University, is particularly committed to social change through the 
power of ideas and today organizes about a dozen student seminars each summer to promote 
libertarian thought, awards over $750,000 per year in scholarships largely to graduate students, 
and actively assists with the academic job hunt through mentoring, career development 
webinars, and other resources — helping place over 1,200 professors in classrooms over the past 
fifty years, “where they teach over a quarter of a million students each year. And those students 
are exposed to libertarian ideas not just in a 30-second advertisement or debate answer, but for 
an entire semester, rigorously and in depth” (Zwolinski 2012). Aside from travel costs, most of 
these programs are free for accepted students, with housing and meals — as well as plenty of 
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social networking time — provided. It is not uncommon to leave laden with books and other 
literature, distributed free of cost. At several such seminars I attended, a handful of students 
participating for the second or third time brought along an empty suitcase for this purpose.  
 
“Death to Fusionism!”: Conservative Panic 
 In 2011, the conservative boycott of CPAC intensified, with the Heritage Foundation, 
one of Washington D.C.’s largest and most influential think tanks, and the Media Research 
Center joining the Family Research Council, Concerned Women for America, the American 
Principles Project, American Values, Capital Research Center, the Center for Military 
Readiness, the law firm Liberty Counsel, and the National Organization for Marriage in 
withdrawing from CPAC. Prominent conservatives including South Carolina Senator Jim 
DeMint, former Arkansas Governor and 2008 presidential contender Mike Huckabee, and Ohio 
Representative Jim Jordan also joined the boycott. While many cited the participation of 
GOProud, the organization representing gay conservatives, as a factor in their decision, some 
expressly noted CPAC’s growing libertarian presence. The American Family Association’s Bryan 
Fisher blogged, “It’s time for CPAC to change its name or change its tune. I’ve repeatedly made 
the point that it is no longer the ‘Conservative’ Political Action Conference; it’s instead become 
the LPAC, with the ‘L’ standing for ‘Libertarian.’ It’s a simple matter of truth in advertising.” 
 “CPAC has become increasingly libertarian and less Republican over the last years, one 
of the reasons I didn’t go this year,” Huckabee told Fox News in 2010 (Martin). Amidst that 
year’s CPAC boycott, various leaders urged conservatives to instead attend the annual Values 
Voter Summit organized by the Family Research Council, aiming to develop the event as a rival 
to CPAC. By contrast, the Summit, where panels focused largely on abortion, sexuality, and 
national security, was marked by a minimal youth presence and distinct lack of the energy and 
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enthusiasm brought by young libertarian activists to other events. In an interesting turn of events, 
Ron Paul also won the Values Voter Summit 2011 straw poll, illustrating his appeal to social 
conservatives—a subject taken up in the next chapter. The harmless, repellant “chirping 
sectaries,” as prominent conservative thinker Russell Kirk, quoting T.S. Eliot, characterized 
libertarians in a 1981 anti-libertarian tract, could no longer be ignored. 
 Referring to Nash’s leading “big tent” understanding of conservatism, historian Jennifer 
Burns aptly notes that “Nash’s definition — and historians’ acceptance of it — represented the 
final victory of conservative efforts at self-definition” (2004:453). With that definition in crisis, a 
tremendous lot is presently at stake for conservatism. Conservative positions on cultural and 
national defense issues are today simply unable to interest or mobilize youth en masse in any way 
even remotely comparable to the energy of the liberty movement.  
 Further, millennial libertarians are intensely critical both of national defense and cultural 
conservatism. Ardently resisting ever-expanding militarization, they are also increasingly both 
socially liberal and opposed to state enforcement of morality. While generally happy to build 
alliances with both conservative and other efforts around particular issues when expedient, many 
young liberty movement participants routinely stress the futility of a broader coalition with 
conservatism, whose key commitments they see as diametrically opposed to their own — a view 
that extends to economic questions, the ostensible common ground between the two movements.  
 “Conservatives don’t believe in real free market, voluntary exchange. They believe in the 
current system, which is best described as corporatism — giant corporations and business 
interests dominate the political and economic sphere, in coordination with politicians and state 
agencies, to the point where they are essentially one and the same,” explained a seasoned liberty 
movement activist in her late twenties, clarifying the term used by countless young libertarians to 
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describe existing political economic arrangements. A colleague helping her distribute literature to 
CPAC passers-by added,  
Wall Street, the bankers, giant conglomerates that quash competition through so-
called intellectual property and various licensing and permitting schemes . . . 
they’re all in bed with the politicians and the bureaucrats. It’s the elite screwing 
over everyone else. God bless them, but the liberals and most of the left think 
giving government more power is somehow going to fix this. It hasn’t, and it 
won’t. 
 
 At national conferences, regional rallies, and local meetings, bars, and living rooms 
around the country, the liberty movement is increasingly stripping away the carefully constructed 
layers that have papered over the differences between conservatives and libertarians for decades. 
“The older, libertarian establishment crowd tends to be way too tolerant of conservatives. A lot 
of them still think there’s something to be gained from this coalition, when conservatives never 
deliver on the free market talk. Conservatives are turncoats. They’re for business as usual. They 
talk up markets, but they’re all for state intervention when it’s their company that’s getting the 
subsidies. God forbid the bloated military-industrial complex that accounts for the largest part of 
the budget is even mentioned, that’s untouchable,” a libertarian community activist told me 
following a day of flyering for an upcoming Austin antiwar rally.  
 A libertarian graduate student articulated the current state of affairs during a lengthy 
conversation of this topic thus:  
Conservatives give lip service to the free market, but that just isn’t what they care 
about or what actually motivates them. The core motivations of the two different 
movements just don’t seem like they have anything in common. Conservatives 
support homeschooling so they can teach their kids that evolution didn’t happen 
or something, and homeschooling, alternative schooling, should be available and 
economically viable, but that’s no different than lots of other groups that are 
libertarian on specific issues that libertarians can help out with. There shouldn’t 
be this idea that there’s some permanent connection between conservatives and 
libertarians. 
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 Following an extensive exchange about the need for libertarians to break with the 
conservative coalition that has unduly led many to become apologists for the economic status quo 
and build alliances with the left around war, corporate welfare, and social issues, a young staffer 
at a libertarian organization expressed the sentiment bubbling up among young liberty 
movement participants nationwide — “Death to fusionism!” 
 By CPAC 2012, liberty movement energy was directed elsewhere, with Ron Paul 
declining the invitation in light of presidential primary campaign obligations and youth 
libertarian organizations, while maintaining a presence at the event, focusing on movement-
building efforts other than mobilizing CPAC attendance. With GOProud back to being 
prevented from participating, the conference had largely returned to business as usual, overrun 
with various Republican groups gearing up for the presidential election, poking fun at 
Democrats, and campaigning for their preferred primary candidate. The only break in the ho-
hum proceedings came in the form of a protest march by Occupy D.C., in preparation for which 
conference organizers clamped down on security, checking registration badges at each session 
door in fear of event disruption by protesters. While that danger never materialized, the specter 
of the liberty movement continued to haunt conference proceedings. 
 Although the liberty movement’s physical presence was much more subdued than in 
years past, its impact in abstentia was equally striking: A number of events concerned the state of 
conservative movement, while the theme of conservative crisis in light of libertarianism’s 
resurgence routinely reared its head in talks and Q&A sessions throughout the conference. “If 
you read the recent issue of Time magazine, you will learn that there is supposedly a conservative 
identity crisis,” announced a panelist from the Intercollegiate Studies Institute, a conservative 
organization focused on outreach to college students. “Well, I’m happy to tell you I don’t read 
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Time magazine,” to weak laughter from the audience. A palpable, thinly-veiled desperation 
seeped through repeat public reassurances that no crisis within the longstanding coalition exists, 
or if it does, it is either nearly over or presents little more than a bump in the road. It thus seemed 
entirely fitting that George Nash himself, the intellectual father of the “big tent” understanding of 
conservatism, partook in several CPAC 2012 panels.  
 Joining Nash in the session entitled “Is Fusionist Conservatism Still Possible?,” 
representatives of the Heritage Foundation and the Intercollegiate Studies Institute spoke 
insistently on the dire need to educate youth about the beauty of the all-but-forgotten fusionist 
philosophy, the solid foundation of the conservative movement which enables different people to 
take on different roles, whether their primary commitments lie in economic, social, or national 
defense issues. “Fusionist conservatives reject big government,” stressed the panelist from the 
Heritage Foundation, highlighting the ostensible appeal of the approach for libertarians and 
outlining how it underlies the work of figures from Jesse Helms to Michelle Bachmann, who, 
according to the speaker, may not think of themselves as fusionist conservatives but are guided by 
the philosophy.  
 I later recounted the talks to a fellow CPAC attendee, a college undergraduate active with 
several libertarian organizations. “Seriously? What a joke. Conservatives reject big government, 
right. Government small enough to fit in my uterus!” she smirked, pausing for a moment. “And 
big enough to bomb the hell out of brown people around the world, apparently.” Laughing, her 
friend, a fellow college libertarian activist, added, “Come on now. If you don’t vote Republican, 
then the terrorists win!” 
 Less public conservative exchanges revealed far greater anxiety about the prospects for 
reviving the “three-legged stool” of conservatism. “We need to rebuild the Reagan coalition,” a 
 56 
concerned CPAC speaker told his colleague as they walked together to take an event podium. 
“Social and economic conservatives have to unite,” another speaker frantically explained to a 
fellow presenter during a break between sessions. Despite frequent loud proclamations to the 
contrary, conservatives are well aware of the challenges their movement currently faces and have 
devoted attention to this issue for years.6 Interestingly, liberty movement participants themselves 
are usually absent from conservative efforts that present various claims regarding what is or 
ought to be appealing to libertarians about the conservative coalition. As was the case at the 
CPAC 2012 panels, these exchanges generally remain between conservatives, some of whom also 
identify as libertarian but who are relatively inactive in the liberty movement and whose primary 
commitments lie with defense or cultural politics — specifically, constraining reproductive 
freedom through state action and opposing same-sex marriage.  
 One of the more developed arguments for why libertarians ought to support state-
sanctioned marriage limited to male-female unions is made by former economics professor 
Jennifer Roback Morse (2012) of the Ruth Institute, a project of the National Organization for 
Marriage (NOM) that opposes same-sex marriage and promotes lifelong marriage between 
women and men. Grounded in the ostensible public function of marriage — the interest of 
children which, in this view, is best served by two opposite-sex parents — the argument was 
echoed in the CPAC 2012 panel “The Phony Divide Between Fiscal & Social Conservatives: 
Protecting Marriage as a Case Study,” in which both a co-founder and the chair of NOM 
participated alongside movement legend Phyllis Schlafly and other conservatives.  
 No one on the panel challenged this view. When I posted Morse’s article in a number of 
online libertarian forums for feedback, a throng of millennial libertarians quickly attacked the 
                                                
6 See, e.g., George (2010) and Devine (2003). 
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argument, pointing out how it conveniently lacks historical treatment — human societies 
managed to avoid collapsing into chaos for countless years without state involvement in marriage 
arrangements — and dismantling the underlying assumption of inherent “male” and “female” 
traits. Yet conservative arguments geared at libertarians and focused on revitalizing the 
conservative coalition rarely reach that audience. Rather, they often quickly devolve into an echo 
chamber of reassurances that may have the effect of appeasing conservatives, but does little to 
persuade millennial libertarians to partake in the conservative coalition.  
 In closing the session on fusionism, Nash diplomatically warned co-panelists against 
glossing over the conservative movement’s historical tensions, reiterating his oft-made insight that 
the movement has proved strongest when faced by a perceived external threat. Citing various 
predictions of a conservative civil war during the George W. Bush presidency, Nash pointed out 
how Barack Obama “forced conservatives back to their roots in a hurry,” with the tea party 
movement emerging very early on in his presidency. Yet this represents only a fraction of recent 
developments and sidesteps entirely the liberty movement youth, who see both Bush and 
Obama, as well as their respective political parties, as anathema. A reading of today’s political 
landscape through such a binary, whereby, in Nash’s words, “a sense of external challenge from 
the left has roused various branches of the right to hang together,” is fundamentally unable to 
explain contemporary developments. In fact, conservative attempts to replace the old glue of 
anti-communism with the enemy of “radical Islam” and build unity around the war on terror has 
instead fueled not only one of the largest schisms in the conservative coalition since the New 
Deal, but a mobilization against the entire political process.  
 Even so, Republican politicians and operatives, alongside key parts of the libertarian 
establishment, have worked to harness the energy of millennial libertarians in the service of 
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consolidating a populist, libertarian wing of the GOP. Many millennials actively embrace this 
project, while others remain fiercely antagonistic — bringing to the surface longstanding divides 
within the libertarian tradition and mirrored in many others. This is the subject of the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter Two: 
The Rise of the Libertarian Political Establishment and a Grassroots Divided 
 
 On December 16, 2007, well over a year before the first gatherings of what would 
become known as the tea party movement, between two and three thousand Ron Paul 
supporters gathered in downtown Austin for what organizers called the Austin Tea Party. A 
drum and fife corps led a march from the Texas State Capitol building down Congress Avenue, 
many demonstrators donning the colonial-era attire of wigs, frilly collars, breeches, stockings, and 
buckled shoes. Having arrived at Auditorium Shores on the edge of Town Lake, marchers 
reenacted the Boston Tea Party of 1773, loading large brown crates onto a boat that was soon 
“attacked” by a group disguised as Mohawk warriors. Thunderous applause and cheering 
resonated from the shoreline as the group tossed the crates overboard, each embossed with large 
stenciled label — “Gitmo,” “Iran War,” “IRS,” “National Debt,” “Federal Reserve,” and 
“Torture,” among others. The side of the last crate read “Don’t tase me, bro!” — the plea of 
Florida college student Andrew Meyer after security forcibly pulled him away from a 
microphone during a question and answer session following a campus speech by U.S. Senator 
John Kerry. As six campus police officers held down Meyer, struggling and calling for help, he 
shouted the catchphrase prior to being stunned with a Taser by one of the officers. The phrase 
went viral earlier that year, with a YouTube video of the incident accumulating over seven 
million views. Ron Paul supporters staged similar Boston Tea Party reenactments throughout the 
nation at the same time, with Paul himself partaking in his own district’s event in Freeport, TX. 
On that day, the 2008 Ron Paul presidential campaign raised over $6 million.   
 While organizers called these actions Tea Parties, U.S. protestors have long used similar 
tactics in highlighting government overreach, with numerous Tax Day demonstrations including 
references to the Boston Tea Party. What is today popularly understood as the tea party 
	   60	  
movement did not exist at the time of these events. As emerging scholarship has shown, the tea 
party itself is a multifaceted and complex formation (cf. Bauer 2013; Westermeyer 2013). Yet the 
dominant imagery that was to become widely associated with the tea party phenomenon — a sea 
of U.S. flags and constitutionalist, limited government slogans coupled with signs comparing 
Obama to Hitler and vocal concerns as to whether he is a “Muslim,” a “socialist,” or even a U.S. 
citizen — was well over a year in the making, erupting on a national scale in mid-2009. While 
increasingly distinguishing himself from a crowded field of Democratic presidential nomination 
hopefuls throughout 2007, few at the time saw a serious contender in Barack Obama, whose 
meteoric rise and ultimate presidential win almost certainly helped galvanize what is now known 
as the tea party movement. In the winter of 2007, Obama had yet to win the Iowa caucus, the 
first election of the primary season for both parties, and proceed to mount a series of challenges 
for expected frontrunner Hillary Rodham Clinton. He would not become the first black 
presidential nominee of either major U.S. party until the summer of 2008. Few of the thousands 
at Ron Paul’s Austin Tea Party were concerned with the dynamics of either major party at the 
time.  
 It is difficult to fully capture the exuberance of Ron Paul supporters, many of whom have 
dedicated months and sometimes entire years of their lives to volunteer for his presidential 
campaigns.1 The term “moneybomb,” referring to what is usually a one-day fundraising frenzy 
aiming to dramatically boost contributions and publicity, originates with Paul’s social media-
savvy supporters, who raised millions using the tactic. One striking element of Paul’s presidential 
runs is that most actions organized on his behalf were truly grassroots — the independent work 
of volunteers not coordinating with the official campaign. Through online message boards and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For an in-depth account of Ron Paul’s young base from the standpoint of a supporter, see Doherty (2012). 
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meetup groups across the country, Ron Paul enthusiasts have, on their own, organized hundreds 
of thousands of fundraising events in addition to promotional rallies, concerts, banner drops, as 
well as “blockwalking” and “sign-waving” actions — small groups signing up for time slots of 
walking door to door to promote the candidate, or standing near busy intersections with signs, 
sometimes for hours at a time. During both the 2008 and 2012 Ron Paul presidential runs, 
volunteers contacted the Ron Paul camp on a daily basis hoping to book an appearance by the 
candidate. If Paul was able to attend, they often handled all of the logistics and event publicity — 
occasionally leading to tensions between staffers and volunteer organizers who felt deprived of 
opportunities to meet the candidate, get front-row seats, or other perks they thought appropriate 
in light of their contributions. 
 Many of Paul’s most devoted supporters are indeed driven by the familiar populist 
narrative of a constitutional republic gone astray as “runaway spending on entitlements” presage 
a nation “going broke” and facing a moral crisis triggered by an erosion of personal 
responsibility. This approach envisions a U.S. future in decline pending serious “entitlement” 
and tax reform that would return the country’s government “to the people” — a vision 
illustrative of the “domestication” of U.S. politics (Stewart 2005) not oriented toward the global 
reconfigurations underlying contemporary political economic arrangements. A number of Paul 
advocates have long histories of immersion in this tradition, coming from families that ardently 
backed Barry Goldwater’s 1964 presidential run. Some grew up in homes heavily involved with 
the John Birch Society, the organization that, under the leadership of Robert Welch, Jr., became 
known particularly for its opposition to the civil rights movement as a communist front and 
sensationalist denunciation of President Dwight Eisenhower as a tool of communist operatives. In 
the1960s, conservative patron saint William Buckley Jr. became a leading opponent of the 
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Birchers, concerned that “the right-wing upsurge in the country would take an ugly, even Fascist 
turn” and deeming the claims against Eisenhower “paranoid and idiotic libels” (Judis 2001:193-
200). The John Birch Society, now dramatically declined, has only recently rejoined CPAC after 
years of exile from the mainstream conservative movement. 
 Yet the Austin Tea Party organizers and attendees came from radically disparate vantage 
points and analyses — some would become actively involved with the tea party activism that was 
to follow while others would fiercely reject it — but shared a common disgust with the political 
status quo. As the tea party as we now know it grew, so did the hostility of millennial libertarians 
toward the phenomenon, which most perceived as a cooptation of their mobilization by 
mainstream Republican operatives and attention-hungry politicians. As countless young 
movement participants described, what began as a grassroots revolt against government 
overreach and state-sponsored violence was captured by “neocons” like Sarah Palin and Michelle 
Bachmann. In turn, during the years of the tea party occupying center stage in media headlines 
and popular commentary, analysts at times distinguished between the “Ron Paul” and “Sarah 
Palin” wings of the tea party. Less noted, if at all, is that the divide was especially salient across 
generational lines. Millennial libertarians largely saw the former as a genuine challenge to the 
political establishment as a whole, and the latter as a crude jingoism masquerading in the tired 
Republican discourse of reform and limited government.   
 
The Tea Party vs. the Liberty Movement: Generational Lines  
 The 2007 Austin Tea Party was the first political event Christina attended that was 
organized in support of a political candidate. Nineteen years old at the time, she had moved to 
the U.S. from South America with her family as a child and lived predominantly in Dallas until 
relocating to Austin for college. It was obvious even then, she said, that Paul wouldn’t win. She in 
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fact knew little about Paul in attending the event. Her concern was with the havoc being wreaked 
by the war on terror and the drug wars. For the first time in her recollection, a nationwide 
movement was coalescing on these fronts, and promoting the message seemed important. 
Thousands of people were getting together for demonstrations all over the country; the internet 
was ablaze with Ron Paul and libertarian discussion forums. 
 She dated her interests in social change to middle school, when she helped found a 
student Amnesty International chapter. “Really as long as I can remember I’ve wanted to make 
my life and my career about understanding big political and economic questions, and using that 
to help people,” she recalled. “None of it came from a religious imperative, I’ve really always 
been an atheist but I can relate to people who say they’re basically spiritual. What I think is 
problematic is institutionalized religion, and the kind of suffering it has caused in the world 
historically. I was interested in that all through high school. But once I kind of tapped that out 
and solidified where I stand, I moved on to other issues.” 
 Her interests increasingly led her to seek out sources of information outside of her high 
school curriculum, and she developed a strong skepticism and critique of institutional authority, 
both within and outside of a state framework. “[Noam] Chomsky is probably one of the bigger 
influences, I read a lot of his stuff early on. I also listened to Pacifica, like Democracy Now with 
Amy Goodman.” What she struggled with constantly, she noted, was the tendency of the left to 
seek solutions through government and formal political processes. 
 “That might have something to do with how I grew up, I don’t know,” she laughed, a 
wide smile lighting up her big brown eyes. She lit a cigarette. “Nobody at home buys into the 
politicians, like any random person you asked on the street would tell you trusting them is stupid. 
At the same time, people have real problems, right. So if you can get the system to do something 
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about that, it’s better than nothing.” Most recently, she had been reading accounts of the civil 
rights and feminist movements, as well as anti-poverty initiatives in the U.S. She was particularly 
interested in debates among activists who have long grappled with whether, and to what extent, 
state mechanisms can be used toward liberatory ends.  
 “There are obviously important reasons people work through the state. There is serious 
poverty and inequality.” She recounted how her parents struggled after the move to the U.S., 
although ultimately both found good jobs in the medical field. “My sister and I grew up 
comfortable, we lived in a middle class type of suburb. I think for a lot of people like us, it’s hard 
to understand real economic hardship so it’s maybe easier to dismiss how important things like 
social safety nets are. And say screw the government, we should just rely on each other.” This, 
she said, was an issue she was constantly raising with her friends, a group of libertarian Ron Paul 
supporters who she met through an online meetup group and with whom she had attended the 
Austin Tea Party. “But getting the state involved does seem to cause its own share of problems 
most the time. Probably all of the time. But no one knows what the alternative is, that’s the whole 
problem.”  
 She paused for a drink of water, wiping beads of sweat from her face. It was close to a 
hundred degrees, just another Austin summer afternoon about two and a half years after that first 
Tea Party reenactment. A group of us had been talking outside for nearly an hour, sitting in a 
circle on a University of Texas campus lawn kept green by sprinklers working overtime each 
evening.   
 “She has a hard time with Ron Paul because he’s a Republican and she still believes in 
the Democrats too much,” spoke up a young man, leaning against his bicycle. It was covered 
with Ron Paul stickers and peace signs. Despite the weather, he was wearing a black hoodie, a 
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thick bicycle chain around his waist. His name was Josh, and he was also a member of Christina’s 
meetup group. He just began work as a tattoo artist and played in a rockabilly band. He left an 
abusive home at seventeen, and had been working odd jobs ever since, apprenticing at a friend’s 
tattoo shop in his spare time. 
 He turned to Christina. “We’ve talked about this, you still think the Democrats are better 
because their rhetoric makes them sound like they care about people more. And we know its all 
the same bullshit, like how it was Clinton that dismantled welfare programs, you showed me those 
articles. And now Obama is supposed to be some savior, just watch what . . .” 
 She cut him off abruptly. “Stop man-splaining everything. I didn’t say I believe the 
Democrats, I said that it’s not entirely correct to say that there is no real difference between the 
parties. Because the platforms are different, especially on reproductive rights. And even though 
the whole system isn’t set up to help people, that does end up having a real impact in a lot of 
cases. Like in local races or when there are judicial appointments.”  
 “OK, but what does that have to do with Ron Paul? If you believe in voting you can still 
do that strategically in those cases where you think something worse will happen if you don’t.” 
Christina nodded, taking another sip from her water bottle. 
 Josh went on, “He’s not perfect, but Ron Paul is the only politician calling out everybody 
on the wars, and now we’re a huge movement. I don’t even believe in the political system. And I 
don’t care, because he can’t win, it’s symbolic no matter what all those kids online say. This is a 
way to say ‘fuck you’ to all those assholes in politics.” He grew increasingly frustrated. “What I’m 
getting at is that there’s this idea out there that good people who care about people have to vote 
for Democrats. Even though everybody knows hardly anything good happens through politics. So 
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many people can’t ever see outside the box, I keep running up against this everywhere. Ron Paul 
is . . . what is that word? He’s disabusing people of this idea of this false choice.” 
 “Yeah, I know. I just…” Christina trailed off briefly. “There’s so much weird shit tied up 
with it all. Look at how the tea parties got hijacked by the neocons, now the tea party is Sarah 
Palin and a bunch of lying Republicans. And scary mobs who don’t have a bigger analysis and 
blame Obama for everything. Even in the Ron Paul circles . . . all that crap about founding 
fathers and the Constitution. That can get really scary really fast.” 
 Millennial libertarians consistently differentiate between the tea party and the liberty 
movement. Those who participated in the early Ron Paul Tea Party events routinely describe a 
process of cooptation of the concept by parts of the Republican establishment. “Then all the 
grassroots crazy came out too, with the racism and xenophobia,” Josh had said earlier. 
“Scapegoating immigrants for the economic issues. Plus the USA fanaticism, the nationalism. I 
didn’t want to have anything to do with it anymore. I still organize Ron Paul events, but I got 
way more into libertarian thought. I’m going to Mises Academy [the Mises Institute’s week-long 
program in Austrian economics] this summer.” 
 Other commentators have noted the process of disenchantment with the tea party in the 
years after its national emergence.2 Similarly, quantitative studies show a split tea party, with less 
than half of tea party supporters identifying as libertarian. In a 2012 study on the tea party by the 
libertarian Cato Institute, the authors compile local and national polling data to find that about 
half the tea party is socially conservative and half is libertarian, when “libertarian” identifies 
voters who are fiscally conservative but socially moderate to liberal, even if the term “libertarian” 
is not familiar to them (Kirby and Ekins). But not all libertarians are tea party supporters. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See, e.g., Blackmon and Levitz (2011) for accounts of former participants disenchanted with both a rise in tea party 
social conservatism and with compromises made by tea party politicians.  
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authors interpret Washington Post data to find that only 44 percent of libertarians consider 
themselves supporters of the tea party, and New York Times data to show that only 46 percent of 
libertarians consider themselves supporters. Further, the study found that libertarians broadly are 
even less loyal to the GOP than the subset of tea party libertarians, with 40 percent reporting 
voting equally for Democrats and Republicans. 
 Josh’s mention of the Mises Institute peaked Yuri’s interest, and he looked up from the 
large volume in his lap. He had been sitting with us quietly, reading Murray Rothbard’s classic 
Man, Economy, and State — for the third time. I first met Yuri some months back at an economics 
seminar organized by a libertarian institution. His passion was Austrian economics. Less excited 
by activist projects and the spectacle of demonstrations, he largely engaged with the liberty 
movement by writing numerous pieces in the Austrian tradition for various journals and websites. 
“I don’t mind Ron Paul, he’s a great way to get out the message. He’s bringing tons of people to 
libertarianism. But he’s still a politician. The real issue is whether the movement can keep 
growing on this momentum. And what’s going to happen when this thing gets to Mordor,” 
invoking a moniker for Washington, D.C. commonplace among more antistatist millennial 
libertarians. 
 
The Liberty Movement Enters Mordor 
 In addition to the significance of age in libertarian support of the tea party movement, 
little attention is paid to the mixed responses of millennial libertarians to another crucial 
development, one that did not coalesce until well after Ron Paul’s first presidential run. The 
liberty movement had begun to coin its own political establishment, with Ron Paul at the helm. 
Young Americans for Liberty (YAL), the movement’s largest youth-based organization, grew out 
of Students for Ron Paul during the Texas Congressman’s first bid for the Republican 
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presidential nomination in 2008. In less than eight months, Students for Ron Paul formed over 
500 college and high school chapters across all 50 states and signed up over 26,000 students for 
Paul’s campaign. Under the leadership of Jeff Frazee, then in his early 20s and the former head 
of Students for Ron Paul, YAL aimed continue the grassroots support galvanized by Paul’s first 
campaign.  
 Highly focused on electoral politics, YAL works to identify and train new leaders to 
“reclaim the policies, candidates, and direction of our government,” according to a YAL national 
officer in her early twenties. Chapters are officially recognized campus student organizations and 
follow YAL rules, including paying dues and completing a chapter plan. Due to its electoral 
politics orientation YAL is regarded by some millennial libertarians as “the practical version” of 
Students for Liberty, the movement’s other large youth organization, and by others as overly 
hierarchical and “much more culturally conservative and tied to Paul’s paleocon tradition.” YAL 
also publishes the magazine Young American Revolution and organizes several nationwide activism 
initiatives annually, encouraging chapters to participate by providing a comprehensive activism 
guide, $100 activism grants, and activity-themed kits that include event-specific flyers, fact sheets, 
and ideas for enhancing the event. Past activities have included the Obama = Bush initiative, in 
which chapters distributed a questionnaire highlighting the similarities between the policies of the 
Bush and Obama administrations, particularly regarding bailouts, foreign intervention, and the 
erosion of civil liberties. The effort targeted “disaffected Obama supporters and politically-lost 
college students to show them liberty is the answer,” aiming to “tear down the falsely alleged 
Republican vs. Democrat dichotomy, and educate students about liberty, which offers the only 
genuine alternative to the political status quo” (Liberty 2012a). In YAL’s Visualize the Debt 
initiative, 78 chapters across 32 states built visual displays, such as “debt clocks,” on campus to 
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illustrate the rapidly rising amount of each U.S. worker’s debt share. To encourage participation, 
YAL also sponsors activism contests in which chapters compete for prizes in categories ranging 
from Best Overall Event to Most Media Attention Earned.  
 In 2011, YAL debuted the Campaign Bootcamp program, hosting ten day-long events in 
key states across the country to train over 1,000 grassroots activists in preparation for the 2012 
election season and connect local leaders with volunteer and full-time campaign positions. The 
organization began to demonstrate its political muscle during the 2010 U.S. Senate GOP 
primary elections, helping to supplant Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell’s protégé, Trey 
Grayson, with Ron Paul’s son Rand in the minority leader’s own state of Kentucky. Rand Paul’s 
defeat of Grayson, endorsed by the likes of Dick Cheney, Rudy Giuliani, and Senator Rick 
Santorum, was part of the internal Republican Party turmoil that would only intensify over time. 
YAL’s 2013 National Convention brought together the group’s top 300 youth leaders, 
representing over 200 campuses across 46 states, for a four-day activist and campaign training. 
Keynote speaker Ron Paul was joined by his son Rand, alongside U.S. Senators Ted Cruz from 
Texas and Mike Lee from Utah as well as U.S. Representatives Justin Amash from Michigan and 
Thomas Massie from Kentucky. At least some of the successful candidates heavily backed by the 
tea party so reviled by many millennial libertarians were now the anointed heroes of the 
libertarian political establishment.  
 Because the liberty movement is a loose assemblage of networks across various scales and 
not united by a formal platform or single decision-making body, participants’ approaches to these 
developments vary widely. Tens of thousands of millennial libertarians are eager participants in 
YAL political efforts and similar initiatives, thrilled at the opportunity to reclaim the political 
process from the violent grip of the “the political class” in the service of a truly limited 
	   70	  
government that respects the rights of each individual. Simultaneously, the skepticism of others 
has extended from conservatism and the Republican Party to the libertarian establishment 
broadly on two fronts: “the smuggling in of cultural conservatism through the back door, and the 
idea that we’re now supposed to put our trust in a new order of limited government politicians,” 
a leader of the University of Texas libertarian student group aptly summarized the dilemma. 
 In the aforementioned Cato Institute study, the authors make the case that the tea party 
has strong libertarian roots and is a functionally libertarian influence on the Republican Party 
(Kirby and Ekins 2012). Thus, the study argues, the tea party phenomenon bucks the 
conventional wisdom that Republican candidates must persuade socially conservative voters to 
win elections; increasingly, Republican candidates must appeal to tea party voters on libertarian 
economic issues. But while it may be ever more the case that “religious bona fides are no longer 
sufficient to win” Republican primaries (38), many candidates simply deemphasize their socially 
conservative platforms in pursuing the tea party and liberty movement vote. Such politicians 
instead present themselves as “true constitutionalists” focused on reducing government size and 
spending.  
 
A Grassroots Divided 
The worst thing for the movement that could come out of this entire Ron Paul 
thing is a repeat of what happened with Reagan — that all of these Ron Paul 
supporters get brought into the Republican Party and end up just promoting more 
false free market rhetoric. It makes perfect sense from the Republicans’ 
perspective.  
 
 Thus lamented a concerned libertarian student activist from New York City during the 
peak of Ron Paul’s bid for the 2012 Republican presidential nomination. Much had changed 
since 2007, when the Congressman — long perceived by Capitol Hill colleagues as a bit of a 
kook full of fringe ideas — first galvanized the liberty movement nationwide and became a living 
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legend in the eyes of hundreds of thousands of young supporters. The 2010 midterm elections 
saw well over a hundred candidates with significant tea party support seek office in Congress, all 
under the Republican ticket (Zernike 2010). While the bulk of these races occurred in solidly 
Democratic districts, a sizeable amount — about thirty percent — ultimately won. Despite Paul’s 
prescient invocation of Boston Tea Party imagery well prior to the emergence of the tea party as 
such, various warring factions lay claim to the movement. The midterm elections only intensified 
accusations of cooptation by the Republican mainstream. Polls during the 2012 Republican 
primaries showed that voters who support the tea party are in fact less likely to support Paul, 
preferring instead conservative stalwarts Newt Gingrich and Rick Santorum. In South Carolina, 
Paul did best among voters opposed to the tea party, placing behind Gingrich, Santorum, and 
Mitt Romney with thirteen percent of the vote. And yet, a libertarian establishment was 
consolidating in Washington. Throughout the 2012 election season, Paul and his allies channeled 
even more of their energies into supporting “liberty Republicans” endorsed as “true 
constitutionalists.” 
 In the high-profile 2012 Republican U.S. Senate primaries in Texas, liberty movement 
participants, as well as myself, were inundated with e-mails and phone calls on behalf of Ted 
Cruz. The tea party and libertarian favorite had forced a run-off with David Dewhurst, the 
Texas Lieutenant Governor under Governor Rick Perry with deep establishment ties and 
millions in personal wealth. Publicity for Cruz poured in from both established libertarian 
organizations and the Cruz campaign. According to the campaign, contact information was 
obtained from those who had signed up to attend the Tea Party Express Tour, which visited 
Austin in May and featured appearances by both Ron Paul and his son Senator Rand Paul in 
addition to Cruz. Numerous libertarian groups, including YAL and Ron Paul’s Campaign for 
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Liberty, endorsed Cruz and filled supporters’ mailboxes with countless emails in support of the 
“pro-liberty” candidate.  
 But as a Washington Post commentary (Sullivan 2012) observed, part of the reason that 
fiscal issues so heavily drove the Republican primary race between Cruz and Dewhurst “is that 
both are so socially conservative on almost every issue that conservative voters would be hard 
pressed to find fault with either.” Following Cruz’ crushing defeat of Dewhurst, a spokesperson 
for Dick Armey’s FreedomWorks noted that wins by candidates such as Cruz would “force 
Romney to the right” (Montgomery 2012). FreedomWorks, a key tea party organizational 
mechanism, had played an important role in the 2010 midterm elections. Cruz ultimately won 
the seat, becoming the first latino senator from Texas. 
 “I’ve endorsed Ted Cruz because he has pledged to end warrantless searches, restore the 
Fourth Amendment, audit the out-of-control Federal Reserve, and fight to finally start cutting 
the size and scope of our federal government,” read an e-mail sent on behalf of Ron Paul by his 
Liberty PAC. YAL, which actively works to match young people with campaign jobs, internships, 
and volunteer positions “on the frontlines fighting for liberty,” helped place at least two members 
in high-level, full-time jobs with the Cruz campaign as state field coordinator and state youth 
director — the organization prominently advertises its “Work for the Revolution” job application 
to supporters. The Super PAC Concerned American Voters, which supported Cruz, similarly 
reached out to liberty movement participants in seeking applicants for twenty full-time jobs 
“working to elect pro-liberty candidates at all levels of government” via e-mail, sent on behalf of 
the former national youth director of Ron Paul’s 2012 campaign. Meanwhile, the Ron Paul 
camp and allies snubbed John Jay Myers, Libertarian Party nominee for the U.S. Senate Texas 
seat. “I didn’t join this party to be a Republican. If I wanted to be a Republican I would have 
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joined the Republican Party,” Myers said. “The real problem with Ted Cruz is he’s a social 
conservative, not a libertarian”(Quinn 2012). 
 Indeed, some liberty movement participants balked both at Cruz’ positions and at 
libertarian-oriented organizations’ endorsement of him, as well as of other Republican 
candidates. Cruz draw wrath for his views on immigration — including categorical opposition to 
amnesty for undocumented people living in the U.S. — and particularly his position that “We 
need to do everything humanly possible to secure the borders. Electronic surveillance, a wall, 
helicopters and, most importantly, boots on the ground. If elected, the first thing I will do is triple 
the Border Patrol” (Siggins 2012). 
 Cruz has also “fought to protect innocent human life” in several significant court cases, 
authoring a U.S. Supreme Court amicus brief for 13 states defending the federal ban on late-
term abortion procedures, upheld by the Court in a 5-4 decision. He further drafted a Court 
amicus brief for 18 states defending New Hampshire’s parental notification law, which required 
that a girl’s parent or guardian be notified in person or by certified mail at least 48 hours before 
an abortion is to be performed (Senate N.d.). 
 Cruz staunchly opposes same-sex marriage, stressing his credentials in this arena by 
routinely noting his role, as solicitor general, in vacating a divorce granted by a Beaumont, TX 
state court to two men who had obtained a civil union in Vermont. Cruz explained during the 
February 22 Republican primary debate that intervening in the case on behalf of the state was 
important in protecting “traditional marriage” because advocates of gay marriage in Texas — 
which does not recognize same-sex unions and defines marriage as the union of one man and 
one woman — are building a legal strategy “so you could say, well of course they can get married 
if they can get divorced.” He also worked with Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott, by whom 
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he was appointed, in writing a letter to the U.S. Senate in support of the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA), which defines marriage as the legal union of one man and one woman 
for federal and interstate recognition purposes. During the same primary debate, Cruz thus 
criticized one of his Senate race opponents, former Dallas mayor Tom Leppert, for marching in 
the city’s gay pride parade: “When the mayor of a city chooses twice to march in a parade 
celebrating gay pride that’s a statement, and it’s not a statement I agree with.”  
 One night shortly before the Cruz-Dewhurst runoff election, I joined several University of 
Texas libertarian leaders at a local café following a meeting. The conversation quickly turned to 
the relationship between Republicans and the liberty movement. People shared experiences with 
their early tea party involvement — before, as millennial libertarians often note, it was harnessed 
by Republican agendas and tainted with “blatant nativism.” Much like numerous younger 
movement participants’ early tea party immersion, the involvement of many with the Ron Paul 
campaign comprised but one part of a much broader quest for meaningful political philosophies 
— explored in greater detail in the following chapter. 
 The activists soon began discussing the ongoing election campaigns. “I’m really disgusted 
by all of these so-called liberty Republicans and how cool with that a lot of people in our 
movement are. Like I get all of these Ted Cruz messages and calls almost every day,” a recent 
college graduate shared with the group. “All of my friends in the movement, even the ones who 
have conservative views personally, don’t believe in using the state to force that on other people. 
Sometimes I forget how not all libertarians are like that.”  
 Reading through an email from YAL promoting Cruz on her phone, another activist 
added, “Man, YAL is really conservative. And it’s really scary that they’re focused so much on 
winning elections. This is not about carving out a space within the Republican Party!”  
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 As the conversation continued into the night, one of the activists recalled an event we had 
recently attended — the YAL Campaign Bootcamp. He turned to me, observing, “That was a 
perfect example of what we’re talking about.” 
 
Toward a Place in the GOP 
 “Constitutionalist conservative.” “Liberty Republican.” “Ron Paul Republican.” “Tea 
Party libertarian.” Thus identified the majority of the approximately sixty participants in the 
Campaign Bootcamp organized by YAL in Austin, one of ten such events launched by the 
national organization across key states in preparation for the election battles of 2012.  
 The introductions drew looks of discomfort from the handful of college-age attendees who 
described themselves as “just libertarian,” or “libertarian anarchist.” The majority of the 
Bootcamp attendees appeared in their forties and older. Many had driven to Austin from small 
towns and suburbs throughout Texas to learn effective campaign tactics for winning local 
elections. Several were currently or planned to become involved in campaigns in their 
hometowns. Yet the event ultimately represented a trend of far greater significance than any 
single set of campaign tactics: promoting social conservatism while speaking the language of 
liberty. Bootcamp presenter Mike Rothfeld, then a senior consultant at Ron Paul’s Republican 
presidential primary campaign, opened the training with a virulent indictment of “illegals,” 
“baby-killing,” and “radical homosexuals” — themes that permeated the rest of his presentation 
and served as examples in most hypothetical scenarios. While the Bootcamp’s stated and oft-
repeated objective was electing “pro-liberty,” “non-establishment” candidates, the implication of 
this mission was clear: it is not only compatible with, but in fact dictates, electing representatives 
committed to putting a stop to the travesty of “babies being ripped out of mothers’ wombs,” 
among other social conservative cornerstones. Toward the session’s end, a college-aged Ron Paul 
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advocate asked whether focusing on the abortion issue is strategically wise, given that so many 
younger Paul enthusiasts support reproductive freedom. Rothfeld replied that the polling data is 
clear: “You must be pro-life to win a Republican primary. That is a fact.” 
 In the course of his talk, Rothfeld identified a core Paul campaign goal. Describing the 
internal wings of U.S. political parties, he recalled a reporter’s question to Ralph Nader following 
the 2000 presidential election. The reporter, Rothfeld said, had asked Nader if he regrets 
running, having cost Al Gore the presidency. Not at all, Nader replied — now Democrats will 
pay more attention to the party’s progressive wing than its establishment wing. It is the 
progressive wing that Barack Obama represented in the 2008 Democratic primaries, Rothfeld 
continued. Similarly, he said, Mitt Romney represents the Republican Party’s establishment 
wing: “The whole fight is about who will become the conservative, pro-life candidate. Our hope 
at the Ron Paul campaign is to become that conservative candidate.” 
 Indeed, as the emergent libertarian political establishment directs efforts toward claiming 
a space within the Republican Party, it increasingly unveils ties to other expressly conservative 
projects. The YAL Bootcamp was no exception — the conservative infrastructure loomed large 
behind the event’s undertaking of promoting “liberty candidates.” To be sure, in his presentation 
Rothfeld made clear that abortion and the other issues used in the examples throughout his talk 
constitute only his own personal motivations for political involvement, taking the time to describe 
these in some detail: “I believe a baby in a mother’s womb is a life and the highest obligation of 
government to protect. I believe that the blood of Jesus Christ is available for salvation to anyone 
who wants it anywhere in the world.” Distinguishable from any personal motivations, Rothfeld 
stressed, the campaign technologies he teaches are “ideologically neutral” — quoting Morton 
Blackwell, renowned conservative activist and founder of the Leadership Institute. Alma mater of 
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Grover Norquist, Ralph Reed and Karl Rove, the Institute has taught “conservatives the nuts 
and bolts of how to succeed in the public policy process” since 1979, striving “to produce a new 
generation of public policy leaders unwavering in their commitment to free enterprise, limited 
government, strong national defense, and traditional values” (Horwitz 2005; Institute 2013). 
Prior to his work on Ron Paul’s 2008 presidential campaign, YAL Executive Director Jeff 
Frazee, also in attendance at the Bootcamp, served as the Institute’s Deputy Campus Services 
Coordinator. The Institute played a significant role in helping launch YAL, and continues its 
extensive sponsorship. 
 Rothfeld’s view of the path to power, shared by many on the electoral politics scene, is 
diametrically opposed to what he termed the “education theory” of social change. It is not 
through persuading the masses or changing hearts and minds that one attains power — it is 
through getting votes and striking fear into establishment politicians. What ultimately matters, 
stressed Rothfeld, is not people’s motivations, but their votes. It doesn’t matter whether they 
support your candidate for the same reasons you do —identify them, show them how your 
candidate speaks to the issues important to them, and get them to the polls. He could have added 
that Republican outreach to the liberty movement is a case in point.  
 While the Bootcamp’s socially conservative rhetoric did not appear to strike much of a 
cord with the vast majority of participants, a handful of younger people — leaders and members 
of libertarian student organizations throughout Texas — vented their frustrations following the 
talk. Gathered outside in a small circle, students in business attire described being “offended” and 
“disgusted,” particularly by Rothfeld’s anti-gay stance. “I was this close to just walking out and 
slamming my nametag down in front of Frazee — you know, do the sheriff thing, give up the 
badge,” said a campus organizer as the students traded similar stories.  
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 “Man you should have seen him [Rothfeld] speak at the [YAL] national convention, it 
was even worse,” another student chimed in.  
 “What?” responded the first organizer, nearly laughing. “How could it be worse?!”  
 The conversation continued as the students noted that YAL is a good organizing tool for 
campus libertarians, but that many chapters across the country are “YAL in name only” and do 
not reflect the election-focused, conservative-friendly approach of the Bootcamp and the national 
organization broadly. One leader, still shaken, discussed looking into changing his campus 
group’s name upon returning home. “I don’t want to be associated with this,” he said. 
 
Hearts & Minds: Millennial Libertarians Beyond the Voting Booth 
This activism infrastructure started with think-tanks and pressure groups 
spreading the ideas, and even crafting the policy proposals to implement them. 
But with the advent of dedicated support networks for student societies and young 
people to bring them together, this has allowed an initially small number of 
activists to inspire each other, create their own social groups, and consequently 
expand them even further. Perhaps most importantly, the success of these ideas-
based groups is likely to be more sustainable than any overtly political or partisan 
project. Unlike political party youth groups, they lack the wannabe politicians and 
careerists, have a much broader appeal across the political spectrum, and aren’t 
dependent on individual political figures or the popularity of parties. 
 
—Anton Howes (2012), UK Liberty League co-founder and former Students for 
Liberty Executive Board member  
 
 In the fall of 2011, zombies took the streets of Austin, TX. Just in time for Halloween, 
Texas students organized the Founding Fathers Zombie Crawl, marching on the State Capitol 
dressed as zombies in 18th-century garb to show politicians that constitutional violations have the 
founding fathers rolling in their graves. Led by “town crier” Andrew Kaluza wearing a tricorn 
hat, knickers, and bloody white shirt — then Students for Liberty’s Campus Coordinator from 
the University of Texas, San Antonio — students lurched and moaned through downtown 
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Austin in colonial-style wigs, lace-trimmed jabots, and green makeup. Shouting “End the Patriot 
Act!” and “The war on drugs is unconstitutional!” while waving signs like “Politicians Need 
Brainnnsss!,” some stumbled zombie-style and others literally crawled on the sidewalks, capturing 
the attention of both passers-by and the local media. 
 The spectacle drew on the familiar symbolism associated with tea party rallies, invoking 
imagery associated with the country’s founding and calls for the return to a lost constitutional 
republic ideal. Yet most of the event’s message focused on civil liberties and the wars on terror 
and drugs. While many of the zombies expressed their firm commitments to sound money 
through the iconic libertarian slogan “End the Fed!,” the same group could be heard shouting, 
“Death to the state!” and “Everyone secede!” 
 Several participants self-consciously reflected on the juxtaposition: “I think of all of these 
founding fathers things in the march as symbolic. It’s a funny way to get people’s attention . . . I 
don’t believe in the state or in electoral politics. Those are the very reasons we are in this 
situation right now,” told me a second-year University of Texas undergraduate student, who 
identified as an anarcho-capitalist. 
 An organizer of the event, face dripping with green make-up, added: “Let the statists 
come. Once they read Rothbard they’ll change their mind.” 
 At the time, the student group Libertarian Longhorns at the University of Texas, Austin 
was particularly well-known for “high success rates of converting minarchists” — a good-
naturedly pejorative movement term to describe libertarians who favor highly limited state 
institutions for the protection life, liberty, and property. A pleased group leader proudly 
described the organization’s success in educating students about anarchist ideas: “A whole lot of 
students walk in the first meeting as minarchists and graduate anarchists.” Indeed, few begin 
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their intellectual journeys in an anarchist tradition. Millennial libertarian discussions often 
revolve around how modes of social organization could function absent at least some minimal 
state structures, such as court systems, police, and the military. Today, an “anarchist vs. 
minarchist” debate is a nearly obligatory affair on any libertarian student group’s schedule of 
annual campus events. As a result of the massive amounts of energy invested in extrapolating the 
nuances of how a stateless society could not only avoid collapse but flourish and thrive, young 
converts to libertarian anarchism quickly become seasoned in explaining the basic principles to 
doubtful newcomers and rebutting the most common objections — occasionally exchanging 
knowing glances and asking sarcastically, “but who will build the roads?!” 
 Beyond its significance in the consolidation of its own GOP wing, the Ron Paul 
extravaganza is also an indicator, and in many ways a catalyst, of a broader phenomenon. An in-
depth look at the Paul-centered euphoria reveals an organized contingent of grassroots millennial 
libertarian activists committed to mobilizing ideas and building a movement, not simply 
promoting a candidate. At the core of millennial libertarian efforts outside of the formal political 
arena is Students for Liberty (SFL), the structure, vision, and approach to social change of which 
varies considerably from the more politics-oriented YAL. The Zombie Crawl was in fact 
organized as an informal action the night before the 2011 SFL Regional Conference in Austin. 
SFL has no chapter structure and significant overlap with YAL exists; many participants see the 
groups’ work as complementary, with numerous formal YAL chapters also receiving SFL 
assistance. The presence of both organizations was palpable each year that I attended CPAC, 
their tables in the main exhibit hall abuzz with chattering students throughout the three-day 
gathering. 
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 Although the day-long YAL Campaign Bootcamp was coordinated in partnership with 
the SFL Regional Conference and took place on the same October weekend in 2011, the two 
events stood in stark contrast. The SFL conference drew about 150 students from across the 
state, many of whom militantly decried conservatism, partisan politics, and the broken electoral 
system, and included numerous self-identified libertarian anarchists. In contrast to YAL speaker 
Rothfeld’s take on power that was to dominate the next day’s Bootcamp, the SFL conference 
highlighted the importance of ideas — an approach that also guides the work of several other 
libertarian efforts. Most of the YAL Bootcamp participants did not attend the conference, and 
vice versa. 
 In line with SFL’s overarching commitment to fostering change through developing and 
promoting the philosophy of liberty among youth, the group’s trademark theme of winning 
hearts and minds — rather than elections — pervaded the conference, entitled “Innovating 
Liberty with the Life of an Idea.” Giving the keynote address was director and producer John 
Papola, whose online hip-hop videos “Fear the Boom and Bust: A Hayek vs. Keynes Rap 
Anthem” and “Fight of the Century: Keynes vs. Hayek Round Two” helped breathe new life 
into “the dismal science.” The first video propelled Papola to instant millennial libertarian 
celebrity status, garnering over four million YouTube views with its depiction of the famed clash 
between the approaches of the two economists. 
 A vibrant assortment of young people comprised the SFL audience: Suits mingled with 
dreadlocks, ex-Republicans joked with ex-Democrats about their “statist” political pasts, 
anarchists argued with limited government advocates about the particularities of transitioning to 
a true libertarian society. A microcosm of millennial libertarianism, conference attendees came 
from different backgrounds and prioritized different issues, from war, militarization, and the war 
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on drugs, to the federal reserve and fiscal policy, to the police state, civil liberties, and ever-
increasing surveillance. But all shared a profound disenchantment with the political economic 
status quo and a deep suspicion of electoral politics and policy as the remedy.  
 SFL, a global network of student groups, provides training and resources to over 500 
campus organizations nationwide, recently launching European, Canadian, and African 
counterparts. Growing from around 100 participants at the inaugural 2008 gathering, the 2012 
International Students for Liberty Conference, held in Washington, D.C., drew over 1,000 
students. SFL focuses on developing and promoting libertarian ideas through offering a broad 
spectrum of libertarian groups free literature, the Journal of Liberty & Society, protest grants, and 
regular webinars on a wide range of issues. According to Executive Director Alexander 
McCobin, “We are rejecting the typical top-down model of student organizing where groups are 
expected to take directives from the national office. Instead we empower students to advance 
liberty through whatever strategies they think will be effective on their own campuses” (Liberty 
2011:3). Growing from a full-time staff of three to five, in 2010/11 SFL completed its first 
campus coordinator program with 24 student leaders serving as “libertarian community 
organizers” ( 19), extending SFL’s virtual campus presence by providing ground support to start 
143 student liberty organizations across the country and sustain numerous groups already within 
the SFL network. Another 58 coordinators have been selected for 2011/12, undergoing a 
rigorous training program culminating in a weekend retreat in Washington, D.C. SFL has 
developed Alumni for Liberty to keep graduating students involved in the network and held nine 
regional conferences in 2010, drawing well over a thousand unique participants. The number of 
regional conferences grew to twelve in 2011.  
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 Lively socials and other activities suffuse millennial libertarian communities as 
participants build the movement by creating their own spaces independently of national 
organizations. In Austin, the home base for much of my fieldwork, it is no exaggeration that 
“there’s a libertarian event for every night of the week,” as activists frequently tell new arrivals. In 
addition to weekly meetings of several University of Texas, Austin (UT) student organizations 
attended by dozens and not limited to students — including the Libertarian Longhorns, the 
economics-focused UT Mises Circle, and, during his last presidential run, UT Youth for Ron 
Paul — those interested can participate in regular events at the libertarian bookstore Brave New 
Books and join Texans for Accountable Government, a political action committee that meets 
monthly at a local restaurant. 2013 brought the monthly social Liberty on the Rocks to Austin, a 
networking staple in Washington, D.C. launched by a non-profit of the same name and adopted 
in numerous other cities including Dallas and Houston. Further, one can partake in the informal 
socials of the Alliance of the Libertarian Left, join the libertarian Toastmasters chapter Speaking 
for Liberty, or assist with libertarian-launched grassroots organizing efforts ranging from 
initiatives opposing war and police violence to building neighborhood organic gardens. Similarly 
vibrant hubs of various sizes permeate the country — the nearest to Austin being libertarian 
activity at Texas State University in San Marcos, a mere 30 miles away — as libertarian activists 
increasingly collaborate not only online or at events organized by the longstanding, established 
institutions, but create their own, nascent organizations and informal spaces.  
 Millennial libertarian leaders in fact consciously articulate the historical lessons of both 
libertarianism and conservatism: long-lasting, sustainable movements thrive on institutions and 
broad-based intellectual traditions that outlast and overshadow the impact of political candidates, 
single issue efforts, or isolated direct action tactics. Rife with vibrant debate carried out routinely 
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in journals, online forums, and at community events, parts of the movement grow ever more 
multifaceted — and further at odds with not only the GOP, but also with the libertarian political 
establishment — on a near daily basis.  
 
 “Fabians or Marxists?” The History of a Dilemma 
 Today as decades earlier, a critical fault line within the libertarian tradition remains the 
extent to which the electoral politics arena — and, more specifically, either the Republican or a 
third party — is considered an avenue for meaningful change.  
 The questions confronting millennial libertarians on these fronts are neither novel nor 
limited to this particular social and political movement — the history of libertarianism 
throughout the late 20th century is in fact partially a history of clashes over this issue. In 2012, 
many movement participants skeptical of electoral politics nevertheless cast a vote for libertarian 
icon Ron Paul in the Republican presidential primary contest, noting Paul is by no means a 
perfect candidate but citing particularly his ardent antiwar stance, longstanding criticism of the 
Federal Reserve and U.S. monetary policy, as well as the campaign’s critical function in 
disseminating the libertarian message and galvanizing the movement. Some maintained 
involvement with the Libertarian Party, turning their support to former New Mexico governor 
and 2012 Libertarian Party presidential nominee Gary Johnson after Paul lost the Republican 
nomination. Similarly, many who unenthusiastically viewed Paul’s son Rand as simply another 
mainstream conservative politician embraced the Senator following his March 2013 criticism of 
domestic drone use during his historic 13-hour filibuster delaying the confirmation of CIA 
director John Brennan. Yet numerous others, many in the recently resuscitated libertarian 
anarchist traditions, scoff both at the prospect that anything good could come of backing most 
politicians — let alone, in the words of one libertarian anarchist, a “closeted fascist” such as Ron 
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Paul. Such skeptics were hardly surprised at Rand Paul’s apparent about face a month following 
the filibuster when he clarified his stance on drone use in “imminent threat” cases, telling Fox 
Business Network that “If someone comes out of a liquor store with a weapon and fifty dollars in 
cash, I don’t care if a drone kills him or a policeman kills him” (Ungar 2013). 
 A brief look at libertarianism’s history in the U.S. reveals that the questions with which 
various strands of the movement grapple today are by no means unprecedented. Strikingly 
similar conflicts between libertarians committed to various degrees of radicalism and disparate 
ideas about how to best effect change have permeated the burgeoning movement throughout the 
20th century. A key figure in these dynamics was the aforementioned Murray Rothbard, the 
Bronx, NY-born founder of anarcho-capitalism who first inspired libertarian twenty-somethings 
in the 1950s.3 At that time, Dwight Eisenhower’s prominence in the Republican Party had 
thoroughly alienated Rothbard and his cadre. Simultaneously, this group was quickly becoming 
disenchanted by the lack of radicalism among early libertarian institutions such as the 
Foundation for Economic Education, whose founder Leonard Read scandalized libertarian 
anarchists in 1954 with his proposition that government can force citizens to pay taxes for their 
own protection. The ensuing skirmish was perhaps the first significant “anarchist-minarchist” 
clash, although the term “minarchist” to describe libertarians who favor limited state action to 
protect life, liberty and property was not coined until somewhat later — one of many witticisms 
devised by anarchist Samuel Konkin, who saw libertarianism as radically leftist and played a key 
role in forging the libertarian left, a subject taken up in the next chapter.  
 In Rothbard’s day, the night was young for institutions that would prove crucial in 
disseminating the libertarian message, their development pushed along significantly by “the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For historical treatments of postwar libertarianism through the 1990s, see also Kelley (1997) and Raimondo’s 
biography of Rothbard (2000).  
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Kochtopus,” another Samuel Konkin moniker for the vast network of established libertarian 
organizations and projects built with the support of billionaire brothers Charles and David Koch 
that today includes the Cato Institute, the Reason Foundation, which also publishes Reason 
magazine, and the George Mason University-based Institute for Humane Studies and Mercatus 
Center. The Koch family foundations — part of the liberty movement’s dominant current that 
overlaps with mainstream conservative formations — also fund the tea party-affiliated 
FreedomWorks and Americans for Prosperity, as well as conservative behemoths such as the 
Heritage Foundation and the Federalist Society, among others.  
 In the 1970s, Rothbard co-founded the Cato Institute, today an influential libertarian 
think tank, along with Charles Koch and Ed Crane, then Libertarian Party chair who backed Ed 
Clark’s high-profile 1978 California gubernatorial campaign and subsequent bid for the 
presidency. Commentators and libertarians alike frequently reference the schism between “the 
Kochtopus” and the Rothbardians, the particulars of which have been detailed elsewhere.4 In 
sum, the radical Rothbard saw the Cato Institute’s efforts to appeal to a broader constituency as 
the selling out of libertarian principles, especially miffed by what he described as opportunism 
and soft-pedaling by Crane and Koch; extensive infighting culminated in the firing of Rothbard 
from Cato. Rothbard, who claimed his shares in the Institute were taken from him illegally and 
who passed away in 1995, would no doubt draw some satisfaction from the fact that Crane has 
recently found himself at odds with the Koch brothers, settling a high-profile shareholder lawsuit 
over majority control of the think tank in 2012. 
 Following the schism, Rothbard went on to head academic programs at the Ludwig von 
Mises Institute (LvMI), today a leading center in the promotion of the laissez faire Austrian school 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Rothbard published his account of the split in a “Special Conflict Issue” of the Libertarian Forum (1981b). For an 
overview of the issue, see also Doherty (2007). 
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of economics. There, he profoundly influenced the organization as a radical alternative to the 
policy-oriented Cato and the “minarchist,” limited government approach of many Koch-
sponsored organizations. The longstanding rift between “the Kochtopus” and the Auburn-based 
LvMI, in the courtyard of which Rothbard’s bust stands today next to that of Mises himself, 
reflects enduring disparities that permeate the movement. Focusing on research and education, 
LvMI, with its anarchist, Rothbardian bent grounded in natural law, eschews attempts at 
influencing government, instead providing valuable resources to those interested in Austrian 
economics and libertarian thought. Hundreds of students descend upon Auburn each summer 
for Mises University, the intensive, week-long seminar in Austrian economics. The organization 
further offers nationwide seminars, online courses with Institute-affiliated faculty, and a robust, 
free online database of literally thousands of contemporary and historical books and articles on 
these topics. 
 It is thus that at the dawn of the 1980s, libertarians faced a critical impasse: were they “to 
play the role of the Marxists — the hard-core fire-breathing theoreticians — or the Fabians — 
the gradualists who try to effect some version of the radical goals within the system?” (Doherty 
2007:433). While this analogy does an injustice to the referenced historical debates where “the 
Marxists” in fact held a wide range of disparate positions, it illustrates how libertarianism in the 
late 20th century was no stranger to the internal disputes that typically permeate growing 
movements. Younger, more radical liberty movement participants familiar with this history, 
much like some active at the time, frequently attribute the decline of libertarian activity during 
this period to the rise in prominence of the Libertarian Party. In the eyes of many, the Party has 
tainted libertarianism with infighting and bureaucracy while diluting the overall message. Despite 
achieving high visibility during the 1980 Ed Clark presidential run — which secured a vote total 
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double what the Libertarian Party would win again until Gary Johnson’s 2012 run — the Party, 
in severe debt following the campaign, was further crippled by internal feuds and factionalizing. 
To this day, the Party constitutes a relatively minor part of the movement, although in certain 
local contexts Party staffers play important roles in facilitating movement activism. Some young 
movement participants also serve as convention delegates and partake in election campaigns, 
particularly during big election years such as 2012, when many rallied behind Johnson. For these 
reasons, when today’s movement participants introduce their views, many are careful to identify 
as “small-l” libertarians — indicating their distance from the Libertarian Party. 
 It was in this context that a critical figure emerged on the national political scene and — 
at least for a time — placed a final nail in the coffin of the libertarian moment. Ronald Reagan 
forced the libertarians’ “revolution or reform” hand faster than most had imagined possible. 
Many found homes in Reagan’s Washington, where the Cato Institute relocated in 1981 from 
San Francisco, either working for the administration or various libertarian-oriented policy 
organizations. These had grown in number and legitimacy with funds provided by conservative 
behemoths such as the Olin Foundation and the Scaife and Koch family foundations. Despite the 
proliferation of libertarian thought in the arenas of economics and political theory throughout 
the 1980s, many libertarians were ultimately appalled not only by Reagan’s record on civil 
liberties and foreign policy, but also by his economic legacy — specifically his wielding of 
antigovernment rhetoric while increasing tax revenue in various forms, heightening tariffs, 
increasing import quotas, taking credit for deregulation measures implemented by the Carter 
administration, and adoption of inflationary monetary policies. Rothbard characteristically 
summed up Reagan’s impact both on the U.S. and libertarianism in his scathing “Ronald 
Reagan: An Autopsy”: 
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As the Gipper, at bloody long last, goes riding off into the sunset, he leaves us with 
a hideous legacy. He has succeeded in destroying the libertarian public mood of 
the late 1970’s, and replaced it with fatuous and menacing patriotic symbols of the 
Nation-State, especially The Flag, which he first whooped up in his vacuous 
reelection campaign in 1984, aided by the unfortunate coincidence of the 
Olympics being held at Los Angeles. (Who will soon forget the raucous baying of 
the chauvinist mobs: “USA! USA!” every time some American came in third in 
some petty event?) He has succeeded in corrupting libertarian and free-market 
intellectuals and institutions, although in Ronnie’s defense it must be noted that 
the fault lies with the corrupted and not with the corrupter . . . It is a decidedly 
unlovely and unlibertarian wasteland, this picture of America 1989, and who do 
we have to thank for it? Several groups: the neocons who organized it; the vested 
interests and the Power Elite who run it; the libertarians and free marketeers who 
sold out for it; and above all, the universally beloved Ronald Wilson Reagan, Who 
Made It Possible. 
(1989) 
 Millennial libertarians find themselves facing a strikingly similar fork in the road 
regarding approaches to social change. Discussion on these fronts flourishes across disparate 
movement spaces, expressed by participants in more radical and grassroots initiatives as well as 
those involved with established institutions — such as the Institute for Human Studies, focused 
on facilitating the development of libertarian-minded intellectuals, and SFL, similarly oriented 
around promoting libertarian ideas. Yet the intricacies of the libertarian labyrinth extend far 
beyond contrasting views of electoral politics and policy as mechanisms of social change. 
 
Fiscally Conservative, Socially Liberal?: The Dizzying Intricacies of the Libertarian Establishment  
 As opposed to the “Kochtopus” Beltway institutions which are generally perceived as 
more cosmopolitan and socially progressive, the radical Rothbardian wing associated with LvMI 
is known to attract socially conservative supporters — many of whom embrace the common 
position that libertarianism is perfectly compatible with social conservatism when the latter 
remains one’s personal commitment and is not directed toward using state power to enforce 
particular moral norms. Yet the “Kochtopus’” Reason magazine was quick to document the 
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prominence in some libertarian circles of figures such as Gary North, a writer affiliated with 
LvMI and the “paleolibertarian” circle of the Institute’s founder Lew Rockwell, Ron Paul’s 
longtime friend and colleague. Parts of North’s work aim to consolidate Austrian economic 
approaches with the theological conservatism of his mentor and father-in-law R.J. Rushdoony, 
the leader of the Christian Reconstructionism movement. Christian Reconstructionism, the 
Reason article notes, advocates positions that even committed fundamentalists find “scary,” 
including the execution (possibly by public stoning, depending on the offense) of gay people, 
women guilty of “unchastity before marriage,” and those who curse or strike their parents, 
among others (Olson 1998). Particularly irksome to the vast numbers of libertarians opposed to 
state enforcement of morality is North’s call to “use the doctrine of religious liberty to gain 
independence for Christian schools until we train up a generation of people who know that there 
is no religious neutrality, no neutral law, no neutral education, and no neutral civil government. 
Then they will get busy in constructing a Bible-based social, political, and religious order which 
finally denies the religious liberty of the enemies of God. Murder, abortion, and pornography will 
be illegal. God’s law will be enforced. It will take time” (North 1982:25). 
 Such severe views are extremely rare even in the movement’s more socially conservative 
spaces, and North doesn’t draw on these elements of his work at LvMI events. Most young 
liberty movement participants have never heard of Christian Reconstructionism, and those who 
have generally laugh it off as “insane.” Despite the socially conservative commitments of many 
affiliated with LvMI, such topics are rarely the subject of public talks, although the organization 
has come under fire for promoting views that see the right of secession, not slavery, as the cause 
of the “War of Northern Aggression,” as argued by LvMI-affiliated economics professor Thomas 
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DiLorenzo (2002).5 LvMI scholar and New York Times bestselling author Thomas Woods, who 
cites historians Eugene Genovese and Donald Fleming as influences, penned a letter of non-
apology in response to criticism of his association with the League of the South, a “Southern 
Nationalist” organization whose ultimate goal is a free and independent Southern republic — 
recalling a time when organizations on the left, many in a decentralist tradition themselves, “gave 
you the courtesy of not automatically assuming that the reason you favored decentralism was so 
you could oppress people” (2005). 
 Nevertheless, the cultural politics divide among the movement’s established institutions 
persists and is not lost on millennial libertarians. Some affectionately refer to the Cato Institute as 
“Gayto” due the organization’s perceived openness toward gay staffers. Fellow Cato interns 
jokingly warned a student of Southeast Asian descent to “be careful” in attending LvMI’s 
summer Mises University program, teasing that they weren’t aware that “non-white people were 
allowed to attend” — the student ultimately reported the program enjoyable and beneficial.  
 LvMI is especially friendly with Ron Paul, longtime friend and associate of Institute 
founder Lew Rockwell who Reason identified as chief ghostwriter of the now infamous Ron Paul 
newsletters rife with racist and antigay content, a role Rockwell has denied (Sanchez and Weigel 
2008). Brink Lindsey, former vice president of research at the Cato Institute and vocal proponent 
of breaking with conservative ranks, wrote of Paul: 
I hadn’t known about his old newsletters and their cesspool of racism and 
homophobia.  But I didn’t need to know about them to know that I wanted 
nothing to do with Ron Paul’s brand of libertarianism. 
 
Here’s why. I’m a libertarian because I’m a liberal.  In other words, I support 
small-government, free-market policies because I believe they provide the 
institutional framework best suited to advancing the liberal values of individual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See also, DiLorenzo (2006). 
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autonomy, tolerance, and open-mindedness. Liberalism is my bottom line; 
libertarianism is a means to promoting that end. 
 
Ron Paul, by contrast, is no liberal. Just look at his xenophobia, his sovereignty-
obsessed nationalism, his fondness for conspiracy theories, his religious 
fundamentalism — here is someone with a crudely authoritarian worldview. The 
snarling bigotry of his newsletters is just the underside of this rotten log. 
(Lindsey 2008) 
 
The shortcomings of the “fiscally conservative, socially liberal” understanding of the liberty 
movement are further illustrated by a perhaps counterintuitive twist commonplace in the 
libertarian world: The anti-conservative Lindsey was one of the foremost libertarian supporters of 
the Iraq War, prompting Justin Raimondo of Antiwar.com, an openly gay libertarian in Ron 
Paul’s paleolibertarian tradition, to condemn the “hostility of the Beltway faux-libertarians 
toward the Paul campaign” as rooted in Paul’s fierce antiwar stance (2007). Further illustrating 
the movement’s divisions on these fronts, Raimondo continued, “Lindsey and his fellow creative 
geniuses are too good for the poor untutored hoi polloi who don’t go to the gym four days a week 
and are neither feminists nor gay. In Lindsey’s lexicon, ‘Forward-looking’ means ‘people like me,’ 
and ‘backward-looking’ stands for non-feminist non-gay non-gym-going proles, who don’t count 
anyway.”  
 To complicate matters further, the Cato Institute is itself not, as some would have it, a 
beacon of social progressivism. As is the case with many established libertarian institutions, Cato 
associates contribute to a range of antifeminist polemics, a partial result of libertarianism’s 
longstanding coalition with conservatism from which few libertarians emerged unscathed. 
Conservative talk show host Rush Limbaugh, who popularized the term “feminazi” to disparage 
feminists, credited his friend Thomas Hazlett, former Cato Institute adjunct scholar, with coining 
the term (1992:193). In the vein of ally organization Independent Women’s Forum, Cato 
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Institute publications generalize about the positions of “radical feminists,” dismiss sophisticated 
feminist analyses of patriarchy, and refuse to acknowledge non-state forms of coercion broadly. 
Indeed, it was philosophy professor Roderick Long, senior scholar at the ostensibly culturally 
retrograde LvMI, who co-authored the piece “Libertarian Feminism: Can This Marriage Be 
Saved?” (2005), striving to reconcile libertarian and feminist commitments and recognize insights 
each approach has for the other. LvMI, largely through Long and collaborators such as Charles 
W. Johnson, has in fact hosted a range of libertarian efforts that aim to merge critiques of state 
power with subverting other forms of domination — explored in greater detail in the next 
chapter. Rothbard, LvMI’s patron saint, was himself prone to antifeminist tirades, declaring, 
“And so, at the hard inner core of the Women’s Liberation Movement lies a bitter, extremely 
neurotic if not psychotic, man-hating lesbianism” (1970).  
 In the face of the liberty movement’s complexity, millennial libertarians describe an 
intellectual and political journey across the movement’s wide-ranging political and social spaces 
that grow and expand on a daily basis. Having spent some time with Paul’s brand of 
libertarianism and various policy and electoral politics initiatives, numerous millennials explore 
libertarian spaces not tied to the political arena. Developing and nuancing their own views and 
affiliations, sharing their experiences with others, and engaging with disparate movement trends, 
they interrogate various parts of the tradition they have inherited. In the process, they engage 
and remake ideologies at the heart of western political thought and U.S. liberalism. The 
libertarian resurgence facilitated, in part, by established conservative and libertarian institutions 
and foundations has thus not only troubled a powerful political coalition and shaken up the 
GOP, reviving for millennials the longstanding questions about the limits of working within 
formal political processes. It has ushered forth a vibrant, dynamic complex of counterpublics that 
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challenge existing political economic arrangements from various — and conflicting — 
perspectives. 
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Chapter Three: 
Millennial Libertarian Journeys, From Paul to Proudhon 
 
 Of Ron Paul’s countless taped interviews, certainly the most unique is the then-
Congressman’s cameo in 2009’s Brüno. The mockumentary is headlined by comedian 
Sacha Baron Cohen, whose projects often entail interviews with the unsuspecting who are 
unaware they are being set up for self-revealing ridicule. The movie follows a gay 
Austrian fashion commentator, played by Cohen, as he attempts to find fame in the U.S. 
by making a sex tape with a celebrity. A segment features an interview with Ron Paul, 
who Brüno has “mistaken” for RuPaul, a popular performer who often makes 
appearances in drag. While waiting in a hotel room under the pretense of a lighting 
problem in the adjoining room where the interview is being filmed, a painfully 
uncomfortable Paul endures extensive flirting by Brüno. He ultimately angrily storms out 
of the room, shouting that the interview is over: “That guy is queerer than the blazes!” 
yells Paul. “He’s queer, he’s crazy! He put a hit on me! He took his clothes off!” Indeed, 
Cohen had dropped his pants, revealing a bright purple thong. 
 Christina played the film clip her phone’s YouTube app several times in a row, 
her friends convulsing with laughter. 
  “Queerer than the blazes!” 
 “I really shouldn’t even be laughing, he’s so awful. But it’s hilarious!” 
It was months after the end of Paul’s 2012 campaign, but Christina had broken with the 
Ron Paul camp much earlier — a very difficult time for her. She had come to the 
University of Texas from a small Dallas high school, not knowing anyone in Austin. 
Feeling lost and overwhelmed at one of the country’s largest universities, she found a 
tight-knit community in the liberty movement. Several people she met through Ron 
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Paul’s campaigns, including Josh and Yuri, became her closest friends, having connected 
over their shared quest for meaningful alternatives to the political status quo and 
suspicion of state power. Their friendships grew increasingly strained as Christina not 
only became a vocal critic of Ron Paul, but came to question many of the liberty 
movement’s core tenets.  
 Concerned in particular with the struggles of historically marginalized groups, 
Christina had always felt wary of Paul’s strong socially conservative views as well as his 
individualist philosophy that does not account for the structural roots of inequality. Yet 
she was energized and stimulated by the various antistatist perspectives she encountered 
in circles of Ron Paul supporters, which traversed political commitments and ideologies. 
During his speeches, Paul himself regularly highlights this spectrum, reading aloud signs 
held up by attendees — from “End police violence!” and “Close Gitmo now!” to “Raw 
milk!” Thus at a rally at the Texas state capitol building, Paul drew massive cheers and 
applause from a section holding a large “Smash the state!” banner when he 
enthusiastically noted, “We even have anarchists here!”  
 Like Christina, many millennial libertarians who over time part ways with the 
Ron Paul scene describe their involvement with both Paul supporters and the broader 
liberty movement as pivotal in their development as thinkers and activists. While 
established institutions play a central role in libertarianism’s renewed popularity and thus 
in the trajectories of millennial libertarians, equally significant are the ensuing 
communities forged by movement participants themselves. Christina noted the uplifting, 
energetic mood of millennial libertarian spaces of various stripes: “Everywhere I went, 
people were so forward-looking and upbeat, even though the issues were extremely 
serious. War, torture, suffering, poverty. But there wasn’t this doom and gloom that I’ve 
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come across in other places, with people wringing their hands about how horrible 
everything is and how everyone’s oppressed and dwelling on that. I think that gets 
internalized . . .  In the movement there is a real awe of market forces and their potential 
to help people. There is a very genuine commitment to the idea that a truly free market 
economic system is the best way to promote human flourishing across the board.” 
 For Christina, what initially began as criticism of Ron Paul’s views would over 
time extend to central libertarian concepts, propelling her across various parts of the 
movement in a political and personal journey similar to that of increasing numbers of 
millennial libertarians. Throughout this process, some are increasingly challenging and 
reconfiguring key libertarian concepts and their implications. Drawing on intellectual and 
political lineages both within and outside of the liberal tradition in rethinking the central 
categories of “freedom” and “individual,” they unsettle existing understandings of 
libertarianism itself. In turn, the resurgence toward which key libertarian figures and 
institutions have worked for decades — while shaking up the Republican Party and 
consolidating a libertarian establishment — has also enabled some movement 
participants to engage libertarian thought on their own terms and reorient it in new 
directions.  
 
It Usually Begins with Ron Paul 
 Amid Ron Paul’s two consecutive CPAC presidential straw poll wins and sweep of 
the youth vote during the 2012 Republican primaries, Christina noted another significant 
Paul triumph: the 2011 straw poll at the Values Voter Summit, the leading annual 
conference for socially conservative activists, where Paul took a relatively-whopping 37 
percent of the vote.  
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 To be sure, Paul advocates are known for packing such events to support their 
candidate. Of the 3,400 who attended the Summit, 1,983 voted in the poll. About 600 
registered Saturday morning — the event’s final day — rather than for the full Summit, 
voted for Paul, and left after he spoke, according to Tony Perkins, head of the Family 
Research Council that organizes the Summit. “You do the math,” Perkins added 
(Knickerbocker 2011). Nevertheless, the strong biblical themes woven throughout Paul’s 
address along with his vehement anti-abortion stance — combined with his career as an 
obstetrician who routinely notes that he has delivered over 4,000 babies — appeal to 
many social conservatives.  
 That Paul is generally uncomfortable around gay people routinely surfaces in the 
libertarian grapevine, articulated perhaps most prominently by Eric Dondero, Paul’s 
former senior Congressional aide and longtime campaign coordinator. “Is Ron Paul a 
homo-phobe? Well, yes and no. He is not at all bigoted towards homosexuals. He 
supports their rights to do whatever they please in their private lives. He is however, 
personally uncomfortable around homosexuals, no different from a lot of older folks of his 
era,” Dondero wrote in a lengthy statement (2011). He went on to cite several examples, 
including a 1988 trip to the Bay Area organized by longtime openly gay libertarian Jim 
Peron. “But Ron thought the world of him. For 3 days we had a great time trouncing 
from one campaign event to another…We used Jim’s home/office as a ‘base.’ Ron pulled 
me aside the first time we went there, and specifically instructed me to find an excuse to 
excuse him to a local fast food restaurant so that he could use the bathroom. He told me 
very clearly, that although he liked Jim, he did not wish to use his bathroom facilities. I 
chided him a bit, but he sternly reacted, as he often did to me, Eric, just do what I say. 
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Perhaps “sternly” is an understatement. Ron looked at me directly, and with a very angry 
look in his eye, and shouted under his breath: ‘Just do what I say NOW.’” 
 In discussing these sides of Ron Paul with Paul enthusiasts who shared her 
commitment to reproductive freedom and support of LGBT communities, Christina was 
largely persuaded that the disagreeable personal views of candidates are not legitimate 
reasons for withdrawing support, insofar as such commitments do not affect their work 
and policies. She noted that most people likely have at least one friend who holds some 
position they find abhorrent, but the friendship is maintained anyhow. The beginning of 
the end for Christina was seeing how Paul’s personal views extended into policy and 
public forums: “Actually, I’m not sure if it was that, or more how other libertarians 
excused and rationalized it.” 
 Most observers of the 2012 Republican presidential primaries recall the media 
firestorm over the racist and antigay Ron Paul newsletters. Printed since at least 1978 on 
a largely monthly basis under different titles and by different entities, the newsletters 
featured articles that mostly lacked individual bylines — but all under a banner featuring 
Paul’s name, and many written in the first person. While much attention focused on the 
newsletters’ rampant racist content, the newsletters also had quite a bit to say about gay 
people, and particularly about AIDS.1 In 1994, one article callously proposed that one of 
three factors in the rise of AIDS infection “from the gay point of view” is that “they enjoy 
the attention and pity that comes with being sick.” A 1990 piece written in the first person 
read, “I miss the closet. Homosexuals, not to speak of the rest of society, were far better 
off when social pressure forced them to hide their activities.” 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The original newsletters were republished in a New Republic (2011) exclusive. 
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Yet another article written in the first person praised “My old colleague, Congressman 
Bill Dannemeyer” who “speaks out fearlessly despite the organized power of the gay 
lobby.” The article went on to approvingly cite some of these courageous statements, such 
as: “AIDS was originally known as GRIDS — gay related immune deficiency syndrome. 
For political reasons it was changed to AIDS. A whole political movement has been 
created and sustained on a single notion: homosexual sodomy.” Dannemeyer, a longtime 
antigay activist, was one of two prominent politicians who championed the infamous 
1986 California ballot initiative that would authorize quarantines of people living with 
AIDS and give officials the authority to order blood tests and report results to the state, a 
measure opposed by the vast majority of officials and health experts at the time.2 Over 
the years, he went on to propose several related policies. 
 The notorious newsletters were insufficient to deter most hardcore Paulites, 
however. Supporters stressed that he has repeatedly disavowed their content, asking the 
public to stop playing “gotcha” with past controversies and focus on Paul’s substantive 
views at issue in the 2012 campaign. Online, Christina found liberty movement figures 
who were less forgiving. Some described in detail the “paleolibertarian” strategy of 
courting the hard right cooked up by Paul’s circle during the 1980s. The chickens are 
now coming home to roost, they said, a blowback that will haunt the movement until it 
expressly rejects that unsavory history and reclaims libertarianism from the right.3  
 “I was done with the whole Paul thing when I read those newsletters, but I 
couldn’t believe how many people didn’t think it was a big deal. It was really shocking, 
actually, to see how hard people worked to look the other way and make up excuses for it. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See, e.g, Paddock (1988) and Hardisty (1993). 
3 For a succinct version of this argument, see Horwitz (2011). 
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There were all out Facebook wars over it. People are so invested in this one man,” 
Christina recalled.  
 She began noting contradictions between Paul’s stated philosophy and his record 
on reproductive freedom and LGBT issues. “Everyone touts him as the ultimate 
principled, consistent politician, but surprise! He doesn’t take the states’ rights position 
when it doesn’t come out how he wants. And his supporters just don’t seem to care. 
People will point it out, and it makes no difference to them. The issues are different, but it 
reminds me of Democrats always excusing Obama on the wars, on civil liberties. On 
spying.” 
 Grounded in his understanding of freedom as the absence of government 
coercion, the central tenet of Paul’s political philosophy is that “the proper role for 
government in America is to provide national defense, a court system for civil disputes, a 
criminal justice system for acts of force and fraud, and little else” (2007). In turn, his strict 
constitutionalist jurisprudence adamantly rejects grounding any extension of rights to 
same-sex couples in the U.S. Constitution, as evidenced in his criticism of the Supreme 
Court’s 2003 Lawrence v. Texas decision. Lawrence held Texas sodomy laws 
unconstitutional, decriminalizing same-sex sexual activity. Paul wrote on the matter: 
“Ridiculous as sodomy laws may be, there clearly is no right to privacy nor sodomy found 
anywhere in the Constitution. There are, however, states’ rights — rights plainly affirmed 
in the Ninth and Tenth amendments. Under those amendments, the State of Texas has 
the right to decide for itself how to regulate social matters like sex, using its own local 
standards” (2003). For many who disagree with this view, it nevertheless serves as another 
admirable example of Paul’s trademark consistency in rejecting any legislation not 
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expressly authorized by the U.S. Constitution — a stance that earned him his nickname, 
Dr. No.  
 Thus, Paul’s support of the now-overturned Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) 
caused some turmoil in movement circles. The law, in part, defines marriage as a legal 
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, codifying the non-
recognition of same-sex marriages for all federal purposes. DOMA’s impact is substantial. 
The General Accounting Office found that 1,138 federal provisions implicated benefits, 
rights, and privileges contingent on marital status, including insurance benefits; Social 
Security survivors’ benefits; veterans’ benefits, including pensions and survivor benefits; 
taxes on income, estates, gifts, and property sales; and immigration matters (2004).  
 Criticisms of Paul on this issue — and of libertarians with similar views — are 
many and disparate. Several movement figures noted that Paul’s DOMA position is 
incompatible with federalism, as the law in fact marks the first time in U.S. history  
that marriage has been defined on the federal level — “the nationalization of marriage.”  
While taking the common libertarian position that keeping the state out of marriage 
entirely would be ideal, other movement participants posited that until this is feasible, the 
appropriate libertarian stance is support of marriage equality and individual liberties for 
all — some say, even through federal action, as federalism does not always advance 
liberty. Yet others responded to Paul’s statement by challenging the constitutionality of 
DOMA on grounds other than federalism, arguing that there exists no legitimate 
justification for restricting the individual rights of gays and lesbians. Some saw Paul’s 
DOMA statement, issued during a stop in Iowa during the 2012 primary contest, as 
pandering to Iowa conservatives. So much for the principled Congressman from Texas, 
they noted. Many simply expressed profound disappointment that Paul publicly and 
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vocally defended the “traditional definition of marriage” as that between a man and 
woman.  
 Countless supporters, however, glossed over the DOMA episode in a vein similar 
to the newsletters debacle. No candidate is perfect, they stressed repeatedly, highlighting 
his admirable other views. Especially on foreign policy, they noted, few speak truth to 
power as vocally, passionately, and consistently as Paul. But Christina was unwilling to 
subordinate the significance of some issues to others in this way. Particularly important to 
her was reproductive freedom, and she again highlighted how Paul bends his political 
philosophy to fit his socially conservative beliefs. 
 Paul’s take on reproductive freedom is rarely a topic of discussion among 
supporters; due to its divisiveness, the issue itself is relatively marginalized in the 
movement broadly. As Christina noted, Paul supporters’ analysis on this issue essentially 
falls into one of three categories. Anti-abortion, limited government advocates argue that 
“protecting the unborn” is a key government duty. Paul supporters who view 
reproductive freedom decisions as best left to individual women again look the other way, 
pointing out that no candidate is perfect and that Paul prioritizes many other important 
issues that warrant support. Paul supporters of this persuasion frequently posit that a U.S. 
president has little impact on reproductive freedom, glossing over judicial and non-
judicial appointments, veto power, and using the administration to further a range of 
policies. Commonly coupled with this perspective is that reproductive freedom is 
essentially a non-issue because “abortion will never be illegal in the U.S.” Thirdly, many 
argue that Paul’s anti-abortion position is consistent with his limited government views in 
that this is an issue that ought to be decided on a state rather than federal level — a 
longstanding Paul stance for which he faces criticism from many abortion foes. However, 
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Paul’s Sanctity of Life Act — which he introduced in Congress in 2005, followed by 
different versions twice in 2007, 2009, and 2011— would have defined human life and 
legal personhood as beginning at conception at the federal level. The Act would then have 
provided that each state has the authority to “protect the lives of unborn children residing 
in the jurisdiction of that State” and removed jurisdiction from the U.S. Supreme Court 
and federal courts on this issue. Paul has also voted several times for the federal ban on 
late-term abortion procedures; the bill was initially vetoed by President Bill Clinton but 
ultimately enacted in 2003 under George W. Bush and upheld by the Supreme Court in 
a 2007 5-4 decision. “To summarize my views — I believe the federal government has a 
role to play. I believe Roe v. Wade should be repealed. I believe federal law should declare 
that life begins at conception. And I believe states should regulate the enforcement of this 
law, as they do other laws against violence,” Paul wrote in his signing statement of the 
Personhood Pledge, which the anti-abortion Christian ministry Personhood USA asked 
all Republican candidates to sign in 2011.  
 The notion that federal courts lack the right to review the constitutionality of state 
laws lies at the core of Paul’s legal and political philosophy, a view pervasive throughout 
the emerging libertarian political establishment. Even the movement’s rapidly growing 
anarchist elements often see any form of decentralization as a positive development that 
brings us one step closer to a “truly free” libertarian society. “But people with anarchist 
leanings who just support all devolutionist policies because they supposedly increase 
freedom really aren’t considering how this can hurt real people,” Christina observed. She 
was referring to the fact that in the U.S., reproductive freedom restrictions are 
particularly severe at the state level. These include onerous facility regulations not related 
to patient safety that dramatically decrease abortion access; parental notification laws for 
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minors; unnecessary procedures such as required, non-medically indicated ultrasounds; 
and mandated and often misleading counseling and waiting periods that impose obstacles 
particularly for low-income women and those in rural areas. A record number of state 
abortion restrictions were enacted in 2011, with 55 percent of all reproductive-age 
women living in states hostile to abortion rights in 2011, up significantly from 31 percent 
in 2000. “The people who say that Roe v. Wade will never be overturned so this is not an 
issue also aren’t considering this kind of chipping away of access to abortion,” Christina 
added. “They’re making it clear that this issue hardly worth talking about and is way less 
important than the ‘real problems’ like foreign and monetary policy.” 
 Not all liberty movement participants who oppose state power broadly find the 
states’ rights argument compelling, pointing out that historically, U.S. states have been as 
complicit as the federal government in civil liberties violations, among other forms of 
oppression. “Yes, let’s replace a tyrannical federal government with tyrannical state 
governments. Fantastic,” sarcastically opined one of Christina’s friends who had been 
watching the Brüno clips with us. Nevertheless, some movement participants, albeit 
skeptical of formal political processes, maintain that policy change is easier at the state 
level, which they see as more accessible and responsive to constituents than Washington, 
D.C. “I’m not convinced by that at all, especially in the bigger states,” noted the friend. 
“But in any case, all of this romanticizing of local politics is really misguided.” At least 
some movement participants share this perspective. During a similar conversation, 
another angered libertarian had commented, “This political theory that people who live 
really close to you should have the power to regulate the intimate details of your life is a 
terrible one. My neighbors should shut the fuck up and mind their business.”  
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Christina’s growing clash with the liberty movement’s dominant strains, however, was not 
limited to her disagreement with many of Ron Paul’s positions and what she saw as 
hypocritical application of federalist ideas. Increasingly, she was questioning the broader 
underpinnings of libertarian thought, at least as most commonly articulated. In particular, 
her impending struggle with the central concepts of “freedom” and “the individual” 
reflects growing trends within the liberty movement’s more radical spaces. Increasingly, 
some within the movement draw on a range of intellectual lineages to rearticulate these 
core tenets of the liberal tradition, highlighting how dominant movement analysis erases 
existing political economic constraints ad legitimizes status hierarchies — challenging the 
meaning of “libertarianism” itself. 
            “It usually begins with Ron Paul!” she laughed, referencing a prevalent pun on It 
Usually Begins with Ayn Rand, Tuccille’s (1971) classic account of the early liberty movement 
in the U.S. For much of the latter half of the twentieth century, Rand and her philosophy 
of objectivism provided a seminal point of entry into libertarianism, despite her loathing 
for the movement she saw as a “monstrous, disgusting bunch” of “intellectual cranks” 
who “substitute anarchism for capitalism.”4 Nearly all millennial libertarians are familiar 
with Rand’s legacy and many remain sympathetic to at least parts of her approach; 
objectivist organizations continue to have a small presence on college campuses and 
Rand’s novels have enjoyed a resurgence in popularity of late given the movement’s 
growth. But in stark contrast to its heyday and influence on an earlier generation of 
libertarians, objectivism is today a distinct minority within libertarian spaces — 
movement participants regularly mock its cult-like aspects, terming adherents “Randbots” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For historical accounts focused on Ayn Rand and objectivism, see Burns (2009) and Heller 
(2009). 
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and “Randoids.” The newly appropriated catchphrase “It usually begins with Ron Paul” 
gestures toward Ron Paul supplanting Rand as the primary entry point into the liberty 
movement. Incidentally, Paul is adamant that his son’s name is not a reference to the 
novelist. 
            But rather than referencing Ron Paul’s role in this regard, Christina was 
highlighting how her criticisms of Paul led to a broader questioning of dominant liberty 
movement ideas. As philosophy professor and LvMI affiliate Roderick Long (2012) noted 
in his review of It Usually Begins with Ayn Rand, “Perhaps nowadays it usually begins with 
Ron Paul — though it often ends someplace very different.” 
 
The Austrian Appeal in the 21st Century 
  
 Josh, the tattoo artist and onetime Ron Paul enthusiast, had returned from the 
summer Mises University program at LvMI captivated by Austrian economics and 
libertarian anarchism. During the Paul campaign’s second go-around, he was much more 
concerned with popularizing these ideas than the candidate, spending his free time 
composing posts for Yuri’s Austrian economics blog and collaborating on libertarian 
journal articles.  
 Josh was strikingly less troubled than Christina by the prospect of replacing 
government social safety nets with civil society, volunteerism, and charity initiatives. 
Herself wary of the drawbacks of using state mechanisms in assisting the poor and 
marginalized, Christina nevertheless struggled with abandoning the notion entirely. Yet 
Josh’s ambivalence toward social welfare programs was not a result of the “dependency 
theory” view, widespread in the liberty movement as well as elsewhere, that sees welfare 
as breeding a culture of dependency intertwined with behaviors such as out-of-wedlock 
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child-bearing, female-headed households, and participation in the informal economy 
(Murray 1984). He had himself relied on food stamps and other state assistance during 
several stretches of time over the past few years.  
 Josh has been living on his own with sparse family contact since leaving his 
father’s Oklahoma mobile home the day after high school graduation. His recollections of 
growing up were dominated by memories of avoiding the explosive, alcohol and drug-
fueled rage of his abusive father, and moments of comfort with his mother, a heroin 
addict who drifted in and out of his life between stints in prison, rehab, and periods of 
living on the streets while estranged from her husband. While not judgmental of people in 
need of services and support, he saw little hope in government poverty relief programs, 
which he described as a cumbersome, bureaucratic labyrinth “that’s better than nothing, 
but I always thought there’s got to be better ways to help people. All of their requirements 
and policies and meetings kept getting in the way when I was trying to get anything 
done.” Frustrated with the system, he “stopped wasting time and energy dealing with it,” 
instead supporting himself by selling marijuana in between low-wage jobs and help from 
friends. “The welfare system has so many problems, it’s hardly even worth it for what you 
end up getting. A lot of people just try to do different things to get by on their own 
anyway.” 
 Josh’s experiences reflect welfare state scholarship that shows poor people rarely 
rely on either welfare or low-income work alone. Rather, these are often combined with 
one another as well as with other strategies of making ends meet, including different 
forms of private assistance, support from communities of friends and family, and work in 
informal economies (Edin and Lein 1997; Newman 2001; Scharff 1998; Scott 2003). 
Further, studies illustrating the limitations of the U.S. welfare state both prior to and 
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following its recent retrenchment have extensively documented its historically racialized 
and gendered aspects, which demean and demoralize while excluding particular groups 
and reinforcing various social hierarchies (Abramovitz 1996; Kingfisher 2002; Neubeck 
and Cazenave 2001; Mullings 1997). Libertarian policy approaches too have noted the 
time-consuming, demeaning, and inefficient aspects of the bureaucratic maze that 
presently comprises federal anti-poverty programs, proposing — in the vein of Hayek’s 
minimum income floor and Friedman’s negative income tax — a guaranteed income as 
preferable to the existing labyrinth (de Reugy 2014). 
 Many of those concerned with the shortcomings of social welfare and related 
institutions in terms of uplifting the vulnerable have identified solutions in reconfiguring 
and expanding welfare state regimes. In her study of working class adulthood amidst the 
economic insecurity and instability of twenty-first century life, Silva (2013) interviews 100 
white and black young people born in the U.S., with U.S.-born parents, who work low-
wage jobs and do not hold a college degree. She found the emerging working-class adult 
self to be characterized by widespread distrust of social institutions and isolation from 
others, among other tendencies. Feeling bewildered and betrayed, these young adults 
have learned to trust no one but themselves. Silva’s analysis in large part sees hope in 
revamped government programs and economic intervention. That sentiment, however, is 
significantly less, if at all, visible in the words of the young people she interviews, a point 
not taken up in the book itself.  
 Young people like Josh and Scott from CPAC do not believe in government 
solutions. From a different class background and significantly more stable home life, Scott 
was disenchanted with the situation in which he found himself — ridden by debt with 
meager job prospects amidst a crumbling economy — despite working his way through 
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college and doing “everything right.” But, like Josh, he saw little promise in seeking 
change through state channels and established political processes. Their life experiences 
have led increasing numbers of young people toward the critique of corporatism or crony 
capitalism, an understanding of the existing political economic system as marked by a 
partnership between big business and big government and prominent especially in more 
militantly antistatist parts of the liberty movement. Both Josh and Scott, alongside 
numerous millennial libertarians, dismiss the political process as a tool of what Josh 
termed “the corporatist political class,” with its “tribal feuds” between liberals and 
conservatives: “Each side is trying to convince us to side with them, which just distracts 
people into fighting over crumbs while the entire system survives by screwing over people 
like us, you and me, everyday people.” This concern is further developed by philosophy 
professor Roderick Long of LvMI (2010): 
I’m very concerned about the tendency for libertarian free-market rhetoric 
to be co-opted by the establishment right, as well as for radical leftist 
rhetoric to be co-opted by the establishment left. Conservative policies are 
marketed as protecting ordinary people against big government, while 
liberal and progressive policies are marketed as protecting ordinary people 
against big business. But in actual practice, though some policies may 
favour the government side a bit more while others favour the business 
side more, both sets of policies tend to reinforce a ruling partnership 
between big government and big business at the expense of ordinary 
people, with the bulk of economic distribution going upward rather than 
downward (for familiar public-choice reasons); and the political battles that 
dominate mainstream headlines are thus mainly squabbles between two 
wings of the ruling class.  
Increasingly, young people are finding an alternative in libertarian philosophy combined 
with the Austrian economic framework. “It was just this magical place,” Josh said of 
LvMI. “It was incredible to be surrounded by so many people who have no problem 
saying the state should be abolished, its obvious to them. And at the same time, to have 
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access to all these ideas about why. The main libertarian principles are so basic and 
simple, which is one of the reasons I like libertarianism so much. How it’s grounded in 
logic. So many people have thought and written about this for so long! And there are so 
many Austrians out there right now!” 
              In 1974, Friedrich Hayek received the “first free-market Nobel” Prize in 
economics, along with “leftist maverick” Gunnar Mydal (Rothbard 1992:3). This 
recognition, occurring in the historical context of the 1970s recession and a broader 
revitalization of free market economics, is generally credited with sparking renewed 
interest in Austrian thought.5 Eclipsed for decades by the ideas of John Maynard Keynes 
that became firmly established in the 1930s, the Austrian revival, as is to be expected in 
any vibrant intellectual tradition, brought with it extensive internal debates and the 
development of several competing paradigms of Austrian thought. The points of 
contention are varied, and have been detailed at length elsewhere. Today, while the 
Austrian school remains a heterodox approach marginalized within the economics 
profession, strongholds exist at institutions throughout the U.S. and internationally. The 
economics department at George Mason University (GMU), the school that also houses 
the libertarian Mercatus Center and Institute for Humane Studies, is one of the few 
programs where one can obtain a Ph.D. guided by faculty in the Austrian tradition. New 
York University, the Austrians’ first home in the U.S. where Mises taught upon 
emigrating in 1940 in light of the German threat, for some time served as an Austrian 
beachhead. Israel Kirzner, who received his doctorate under Mises, and Ludwig 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 For an introduction to Austrian economics, see, e.g., Butler (2010), Callahan (2002), and Taylor (1980). 
For contemporary issues and research, see, e.g., Boettke (1994a), (1994b), and (2010). For an historical 
perspective on the Austrian school, see Schulak and Unterköfler (2011) and Vaughn (1994). For a critique 
of Austrian economics by a former Austrian and its distinctions from neoclassical economics, see Caplan 
(1997).  
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Lachmann, a former colleague of Hayek whose radical subjectivism forms its own 
Austrian paradigm, carved out a niche for Austrians at the university by the early 1980s. 
Today, with Kirzner serving as professor emeritus, only Mario Rizzo — also affiliated 
with the Institute for Humane Studies and the Foundation for Economic Education — 
remains actively teaching in the Austrian tradition at NYU. Austrianism today has a 
growing presence at San Jose State University and West Virginia University, while 
individual Austrian economists remain scattered throughout U.S., including Walter Block 
at Loyola University and Ben Powell at Suffolk University. 
 It is the framework popularized by Murray Rothbard and associated with LvMI 
that is most expressly wrapped up with libertarian political philosophy, a fundamental 
point of contention among Austrians beyond substantive theoretical and methodological 
arguments. Many LvMI affiliates remain frustrated at the GMU crowd’s reluctance to 
actively use economics as a weapon against state intervention. For their part, the GMU 
Austrians and their colleagues, themselves libertarians, often stress the importance of 
preserving economics as a value-free science, despite the numerous compatibilities of 
Austrian economics and libertarian political philosophy. Due to longstanding divisions on 
this front, for instance, those affiliated with LvMI and those in the GMU circle, along 
with their colleagues at other institutions, rarely interact or attend the same events. The 
latter generally present at libertarian seminars held by the Institute for Humane Studies 
and Foundation for Economic Education rather than at LvMI. The politics of citation 
and choice of publication venues further reflect these divisions.6 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For more on this issue, see Doherty (2007:427-438), especially his interview with GMU 
economist Peter Boettke.  
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 In enthusiastically describing the appeal of the “basic and simple” libertarian 
approach “grounded in logic,” Josh was in part referring to the non-aggression principle 
(NAP), central to the liberty movement’s political philosophy. Also termed the non-
aggression axiom, zero aggression principle, or anti-coercion principle, it axiomatically 
declares illegitimate the use or threat of coercion against persons or property where 
coercion is understood as physical force. Movement participants generally define being a 
libertarian as adhering to the NAP, however formulated or derived, although Murray 
Rothbard’s approach is particularly influential among millennials. 
 While the NAP concept in various forms far precedes J.S. Mill’s harm principle, 
Rothbard’s is a deontological method grounded in natural law, opposing the initiation of 
force and fraud irrespective of consequences — in contrast to, for instance, the 
consequentialist anarcho-capitalism of David Friedman (1978) who refuses to link the 
validity of his claims to morality. Thus, while consequentialist libertarians — those in the 
tradition of Milton Friedman and the Chicago school of economics who stress the 
desirable consequences of free market policies using cost/benefit approaches, as well as 
those influenced by the public choice theory of James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock —
have profoundly influenced the discipline of economics and political science, large parts 
of the liberty movement today consist of natural law libertarians influenced by Rothbard. 
Some version of the NAP, however, plays a central role in libertarian philosophy broadly, 
and various consequentalist approaches embrace it as a key principle because it tends to 
lead to favorable outcomes.	  
 The NAP is closely tied to the question of property rights, since what constitutes 
aggression against one’s property depends on the property system in question. In his 
extensive contributions that span economics, history, and philosophy and include over 
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twenty books, Rothbard drew heavily upon the work of Mises, with whom he had few 
scruples and whose New York University seminar he regularly attended throughout the 
1950s while working on his doctoral degree in economics at Columbia. Here Rothbard 
departs from his mentor, who, using the Austrian framework, posited that a value-free 
defense of the free market grounded in private property rights exists without resorting to 
questions of ethics. Rothbard disagreed, noting instances where government intervention 
in the economy serves the interests of one group, albeit at the expense of another. In cases 
where interventionist measures do help some people, the results are not always 
unsatisfactory to all — a value-free defense of the market economy does not stand by 
itself. 
 In The Ethics of Liberty (1982), Rothbard develops the philosophical foundation of 
the NAP, grounded in self-ownership and heavily indebted to Locke’s conception of 
property. In short, all persons rightfully own their own bodies. It is from this principle of 
self-ownership that private property rights follow. Property is legitimately acquired, as 
famously argued by Locke, through homesteading — “mixing one’s labor” with unowned 
property, as well as through gift or voluntary exchange. Rothbard summarizes this 
lynchpin of libertarian philosophy thus: 
The basic axiom of libertarian political theory holds that every man is a 
self owner, having absolute jurisdiction over his own body. In effect, this 
means that no one else may justly invade, or aggress against, another’s 
person. It follows then that each person justly owns whatever previously 
unowned resources he appropriates or “mixes his labor with.” From these 
twin axioms — self-ownership and “homesteading” — stem the 
justification for the entire system of property rights titles in a free-market 
society. This system establishes the right of every man to his own person, 
the right of donation, of bequest (and, concomitantly, the right to receive 
the bequest or inheritance), and the right of contractual exchange of 
property titles. 
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The full implication of Rothbard’s philosophy is severe, and shared by anarchist 
libertarians partial to other justifications for the NAP: The state is unique in its 
fundamental monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and must thus be abolished 
entirely. Writes Rothbard: 
But, above all, the crucial monopoly is the State’s control of the use of 
violence: of the police and armed services, and of the courts — the locus of 
ultimate decision-making power in disputes over crimes and contracts. 
Control of the police and the army is particularly important in enforcing 
and assuring all of the State’s other powers, including the all-important 
power to extract its revenue by coercion . . . Only the State obtains its 
revenue by coercion, by threatening dire penalties should the income not 
be forthcoming. That coercion is known as “taxation,” although in less 
regularized epochs it was often known as “tribute.” Taxation is theft, 
purely and simply even though it is theft on a grand and colossal scale 
which no acknowledged criminals could hope to match. It is a compulsory 
seizure of the property of the State’s inhabitants, or subjects. 
 
It is Rothbard’s uncompromising anarchist stance, which insists that the state — the 
principal violator of rights the abolition of which would benefit all — is not required to 
produce public goods nor to maintain law and order, that increasingly informs the 
perspectives of many millennial libertarians. Libertarian anarchists dominate the 
contemporary liberty movement’s radical spaces, generally grounding their economic 
analysis in the Austrian school. Libertarianism thus remains a political philosophy, albeit 
one where proponents generally draw on either the Austrian or neoclassical traditions for 
economic explanations. Simultaneously, however, some trends within the movement 
relegate economics to an ancillary position within the overall ideology. While many such 
libertarians espouse Austrianism as a default economic position, they remain open, or 
agnostic, about the possibility of other economic theories, the principles of which align 
with libertarianism. 
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 The well-known Lockean concept of property in oneself is thus central to the 
Rothbardian anarchist framework. If everyone owns themselves, and no one may coerce 
or aggress against anyone else or their property, there exist no legitimate grounds for non-
consensual government. In Rothbard’s hands, libertarian anarchism is derived from a 
central tenet of classical liberalism — its “logical conclusion” that so animated Scott.  
Josh too was enamored of the libertarian anarchist framework that proceeds from a single 
axiom, the NAP, which renders illicit only the initiation of physical force against others 
and their property. On this point, Gordon (2007:35) observes that Rothbard’s Ethics is in 
one sense mistitled, given that Rothbard sharply distinguishes between ethics and political 
philosophy. For instance, in deducing that people are free to engage in voluntary 
exchange, a key part of his political philosophy, he makes no case that all such exchanges 
are morally desirable, that is, ethically defensible. It follows that activity seen by some as 
immoral but which does not contradict the NAP, for instance sex work or drug use, 
should not be legally prohibited — a key libertarian notion. 
 While libertarian spaces are rife with debate, such discussion overwhelmingly 
takes place within the auspices of the NAP. Describing his life-altering experience at the 
summer Mises University program at LvMI, Josh recounted endless conversations in 
lounges and dorm rooms about what types of scenarios do and do not violate the NAP. 
He had befriended economics professor and LvMI fellow Walter Block, the irreverently 
charismatic author of over two dozen books. Embraced by millennial libertarians as a 
leading anarcho-capitalist figure, the former Rothbard pupil credits his mentor with 
providing the final push toward his full acceptance of the anarcho-capitalist philosophy.  
 During his time in the Mises University program, Josh became a strong advocate 
of Block’s popular “plumb-line” libertarian approach. In Block’s view, libertarianism is 
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entirely compatible with any cultural formation that is consistent with the NAP: “For 
example, there is nothing in libertarian law which forbids promiscuity, or drug taking, 
rock music, raves, nudism, macrobiotic diets, Ben and Jerry ice cream, the wearing of 
earth shoes, beads, etc. . . . All that is needed for compatibility with libertarianism and 
any other doctrine is respect for the nonaggression axiom of the former” (2007:156). In 
fact, says Block, there is actually a case to be made for greater negative attention to be 
focused on libertarians who veer too far to the right, rather than “the liberal or pinko” 
(163) variants, insofar as many of the former support an aggressive foreign policy. 
 In Block’s view (2003), hypotheticals aiming to highlight the ostensibly 
problematic aspects of the NAP misunderstand the nature of libertarianism. Such 
examples include the permissibility, under the NAP, of a 10th-floor apartment owner 
refusing admittance to a person hanging on the owner’s balcony flagpole, having fallen 
from above; or the permissibility of a cabin owner setting up a booby trap to kill a lost, 
starving hiker who breaks into his stocked building, guarded by a “no trespassing” sign: 
These arguments implicitly assume that libertarianism is a moral 
philosophy, a guide to proper behavior, as it were. Should the flagpole 
hanger let go? Should the hiker go off and die? But libertarianism is a 
theory concerned with the justified use of aggression, or violence, based on 
property rights, not morality. Therefore, the only proper questions which 
can be addressed in this philosophy are of the sort, if the flagpole hanger 
attempts to come in to the apartment, and the occupant shoots him for 
trespassing, Would the forces of law and order punish the home owner? 
Or, if the owner of the cabin in the woods sets up a booby trap, such that 
when someone forces his way into his property he gets a face full of 
buckshot, Would he be guilty of a law violation? When put in this way, the 
answer is clear. The owner in each case is in the right, and the trespasser 
in the wrong. If force is used to protect property rights, even deadly force, 
the owner is not guilty of the violation of any licit law. 
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FIGURE 5: A libertarian cartoon featuring Walter Block. February 11, 2013. 
http://www.facebook.com/LibertarianHumor. 
  
 The question of when deadly force is justifiable to protect property, here 
uncontroversially swept aside by Block, is somewhat more contested both in the 
movement broadly and among anarchist libertarians themselves. But his basic premise 
that libertarianism does not speak to questions of morality, and is thus compatible with all 
NAP-abiding cultural formations, is widely accepted. In turn, “plumb-line” libertarianism 
says nothing about the kinds of values or morals a society should espouse, or how these 
are to be inculcated, short of compliance with the NAP; that is the business of members of 
society to settle among themselves. 
 Josh, like many of his peers especially during their early introduction to Austro-
libertarian anarchism, loved the stark simplicity of the NAP: “I think it’s brilliant to just 
make physical force the only thing that’s off limits legally. You can’t control people’s 
behavior anyway, whether it’s good for them or not. Let people be free to make their own 
decisions about their lives.” 
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Freedom 
 Following his stint at Mises University, Josh grew more and more at odds with 
Christina. Increasingly, he spent his free time in groups devoted to the study of Austrian 
economics and Rothbard’s political philosophy. When they did get together, casual 
lunches and coffee runs ended in lengthy arguments. At the heart of their divergent views, 
however, was no longer the candidacy of Ron Paul. As each became more familiar with 
various lineages of libertarian thought, their clashing perspectives implicated some of the 
tradition’s central concepts. 
 Unlike Josh, Christina was not impressed with the NAP. In particular, she saw the 
focus on physical force as erasing other important factors that constrain individual 
choices. An prominent example is what she and others term economic coercion — for 
instance, the situation of impoverished people, with few alternatives due to any number of 
hardships beyond their control, working under horrific conditions for very low wages. 
Such a work environment does not violate the NAP, unless physical force is used or 
threatened. Out of the available options, workers choose the best according to their 
preferences. That is sufficient, in most analyses, to satisfy the NAP. 
 “This to me is a perverse idea of freedom. It’s choice-fetishism. As long as there is 
a choice, any choice, it doesn’t matter between what alternatives, then we no longer need 
to be concerned about it.” She elaborated, “Of course, they’ll always say you can be 
concerned and do any number of things not involving government, but none of these 
kinds of ancaps ever do. They don’t even think about doing anything unless there’s ‘a gun 
in the room,’” she rolled her eyes, referring to the popular metaphor invoked in assessing 
whether a given scenario represents a NAP violation. “They like to just sit around coming 
up with extreme hypos that rationalize horrible outcomes to scandalize people. And then 
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they pat themselves on the back for defending freedom. What the hell kind of freedom is 
that?!” 
 While Josh found simplicity and logic in the “plumb-line” libertarian approach, 
Christina was frustrated by the reluctance of many libertarians to look beyond the 
provisions of the NAP — which does not specify, beyond the issue of the threat or use of 
force, what kinds of values or preferences should guide people’s behavior. Here, Johnson’s 
(2008) distinction between “thick” and “thin” libertarianism is useful. Walter Block’s type 
of “plumb-line,” NAP-only libertarianism is as compatible with atheism as evangelical 
Christianity, as compatible with feminism as misogyny, as long as adherents to any of 
these do not aggress against others or attempt to impose their beliefs using or threatening 
force — including, crucially, through the coercive power of the state, which always 
operates “at the barrel of a gun.” In contrast to this “thin” libertarian view, “thick 
libertarians” posit that the NAP ought to be in some way integrated with commitments to 
other social and cultural projects. The types of values that inform such projects are of 
course a contested matter. Yet a growing chorus of voices within the movement 
increasingly argues that libertarianism ought to incorporate a broader socioeconomic 
critique, integrating, for instance, antiracism, feminism, mutual aid, and labor solidarity 
— a development bemoaned by other movement participants, who see it as the influence 
of a “politically correct” leftism. 
 In turn, Christina soon found that she was not the only one in libertarian circles 
underwhelmed by the Rothbardian natural law approach and frustrated by the apparent 
lack of concern with the wellbeing of others. One of her earlier discoveries was the 
popular blog Bleeding Heart Libertarians (BHL), launched in 2011. Libertarians, as blog 
co-founder Matt Zwolinski (2011) notes in one of his earliest posts, are not known for 
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their sympathy to the ideas of social justice. The project thus seeks to emphasize that the 
most effective path toward the meaningful flourishing of humanity as a whole is grounded 
in the institutions of free markets and private property, without regard to — and indeed, 
in spite of — elite interests:  
The libertarian tradition is home to multiple figures and texts modeling 
commitment both to individual liberty and to consistent concern for the 
marginalized, both here and abroad. We seek here to revive, energize, and 
extend that tradition — to demonstrate that contemporary libertarians 
can, in addition their traditional vindication of individual liberty, 
offer effective, powerful, and innovative responses to the problems of 
economic vulnerability and injustice and to their social, political, and 
cultural consequences. 
 
While most libertarians do believe that free markets in fact best serve the interests of the 
marginalized, “this fact does not seem to play an essential role in the moral justification of 
those markets. It is, it seems, merely a happy coincidence,” writes Zwolinski. In contrast, 
he identifies a type of “bleeding heart libertarian” whose appreciation for libertarian 
institutions and practices — market mechanisms, voluntary social cooperation, private 
property rights, individual liberty — is grounded in how these contribute to important 
human goods, “and especially the way in which they allow some of society’s most 
vulnerable members to realize those goods.” The view of Zwolinski and fellow “strong 
bleeding heart libertarians” holds that libertarian institutions “depend in part for their 
moral justification on the extent to which they serve the interests of the poor and 
vulnerable.” 
         Libertarians have expressed formulations of this sentiment in the policy and 
electoral politics arena as well. For instance, in 2006 the Cato Institute’s Brink Lindsey 
made a case for “liberaltarianism,” a progressive fusionism in the form of a political 
alliance between libertarians and liberals, in the U.S. sense of the term: 
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[An] honest survey of the past half-century shows a much better match 
between libertarian means and progressive ends. Most obviously, many of 
the great libertarian breakthroughs of the era — the fall of Jim Crow, the 
end of censorship, the legalization of abortion, the liberalization of divorce 
laws, the increased protection of the rights of the accused, the reopening of 
immigration — were championed by the political left . . . Both [liberals 
and libertarians] generally support a more open immigration policy. Both 
reject the religious right’s homophobia and blastocystophilia. Both are 
open to rethinking the country’s draconian drug policies. Both seek to 
protect the United States from terrorism without gratuitous 
encroachments on civil liberties or extensions of executive power. And 
underlying all these policy positions is a shared philosophical commitment 
to individual autonomy as a core political value.  
 
Lindsey’s approach focuses on the political challenge of developing an economic policy, 
and corresponding vision of reform, behind both which liberals and libertarians could 
rally.7 It does not problematize actually-existing capitalism, urging progressives to instead 
overcome “knee-jerk antipathy to markets” and “bitter denunciations of the unfairness of 
the system” in favor of building a pragmatic political bloc:  
The basic outlines of a viable compromise are clear enough. On the one 
hand, restrictions on competition and burdens on private initiative would 
be lifted to encourage vigorous economic growth and development. At the 
same time, some of the resulting wealth-creation would be used to improve 
safety-net policies that help those at the bottom and ameliorate the 
hardships inflicted by economic change. Translating such abstractions into 
workable policy doubtlessly would be contentious. But the most difficult 
thing here is not working out details — it is agreeing to try. And, as part of 
that, agreeing on how to make the attempt: namely, by treating economic 
policy issues as technical, empirical questions about what does and doesn’t 
work, rather than as tests of ideological commitment. 
 
As noted, however, many millennial libertarians are more compelled by broader 
approaches to current political economic arrangements than by the particulars of policy 
reform. The last time I saw both Christina and Josh together, we met Yuri on the 
University of Texas campus. On our way to a cafe, we passed an anti-sweatshop student 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Lindsey (2006) outlines a range of policies around which such a coalition could mobilize and notes already 
existing alliances.  
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group promoting an event to expose the conditions endured by workers in Mexican 
maquiladoras. Commenting on the display, Josh recounted the common libertarian 
argument that this type employment in fact constitutes the best option for poor workers in 
the global south. While certainly not ideal, it provides a meaningful alternative to the 
existing options of, say, begging or scavenging. As these countries develop under 
capitalism, the argument goes, working conditions and wages will improve. 
 It didn’t take long for Yuri to provide the oft-cited corollary: the factories of 
Industrial Revolution-era Europe, however nasty, ushered forth standards of living far 
superior to those that came before. With increased productivity and competition come 
improved conditions and higher wages — had these enterprises been stymied by 
government regulations at the start, the entire process would have likely occurred on a far 
smaller scale, or not at all. 
 Christina was unsympathetic. “Why are you apologizing for these shit conditions? 
You’re saying that this is just how it is, everyone has to deal, and then you’re surprised 
when people think you don’t care about other people, or say that libertarians are just 
arrogant assholes.”  
 She went on, comparing the analysis to what she described as the crudest type of 
Marxist determinism, where the stages of history ultimately lead to capitalism’s demise. 
With a mischievous grin, she later confided, “I love making that analogy to Josh, it really 
pisses him off!” 
 Her ultimate concern, she said, was not with the objection to state intervention. 
She too remained heavily skeptical of the state as a tool for progress. Rather, she was 
disturbed at the lack of interest in identifying and supporting alternative means of 
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improving global working conditions: “I’d like to see more libertarians show things people 
are doing to help with this situation without using the government apparatus.” 
 Amidst the explosion of dynamic spaces emerging through libertarianism’s 
resurgence, Christina quickly found approaches that systematically fuse market analysis 
with ardent critique of structural poverty and other forms of subordination. While 
certainly not in the majority, a quickly proliferating, multifaceted part of the movement 
collaborating under the broad rubric of the libertarian left is rearticulating parts of the 
libertarian tradition while drawing on other lineages. The rise in popularity of left 
libertarianism warranted a 2011 piece in the American Conservative, penned by left 
libertarian advocate Sheldon Richman: 
They are standard libertarians in that they believe in the moral legitimacy 
of private ownership and free exchange and oppose all government 
interference in personal and economic affairs . . . they are leftists in that 
they share traditional left-wing concerns, about exploitation and inequality 
for example, that are largely ignored, if not dismissed, by other 
libertarians. Left-libertarians favor worker solidarity vis-à-vis bosses, 
support poor people’s squatting on government or abandoned property, 
and prefer that corporate privileges be repealed before the regulatory 
restrictions on how those privileges may be exercised. They see Walmart 
as a symbol of corporate favoritism — supported by highway subsidies and 
eminent domain — view the fictive personhood of the limited-liability 
corporation with suspicion, and doubt that Third World sweatshops would 
be the “best alternative” in the absence of government manipulation. 
 
Nathan Goodman (2013), who blogs for the Center for a Stateless Society — one among 
a growing number of anarchist spaces synthesizing market approaches with a critique of 
oppression and subordination — encapsulates this orientation in the context of the 
sweatshop labor issues that so troubled Christina:  
There is a lesson to be drawn from “best of alternatives” arguments 
regarding sweatshops, but it’s not a lesson of “sweatshops are fine.” 
Instead, it’s a lesson that rather than boycotting sweatshops or calling for 
them to be banned, we should try to determine what is constraining 
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workers’ options and help them resist that. 
 
This resistance can take a lot of different forms. It can mean organizing 
against US imperialism. It can mean doing solidarity work with labor 
organizers who are facing Pinkerton style suppression from sweatshop 
bosses. It can mean providing microloans to people in the global south 
who want to start their own businesses. It can mean doing solidarity work 
with those who are resisting the land monopoly. It can mean standing 
against intellectual property that is used to suppress local economies in the 
global south. It can mean standing against so-called “free trade” 
agreements that globalize intellectual property and other pro-corporate 
and anti-worker policies. It can mean organizing against agribusiness 
subsidies that have destroyed local agriculture throughout the rest of the 
world. It can mean working to abolish borders and immigration 
restrictions, so people are free to travel to countries with better economic 
opportunities. 
 
But people like [professor of economics and Austrian scholar] Ben Powell 
don’t end their talks on sweatshops by discussing strategies like this. 
Instead, they argue that capitalist development will move countries with 
sweatshops past that phase, and in doing so they promote inaction and 
gratitude towards captains of industry. Where corporate capitalism has 
created a real problem, they simply praise corporate capitalism and state 
that it will “develop” its way past the problem. And that’s not the right 
way to address this at all. 
 
As discussed briefly earlier, Josh and countless millennial libertarians are highly drawn to 
the notion of “corporate capitalism,” which they find speaks to their lived experiences and 
disenchantment with formal political processes and state-based solutions. Yet the critical 
distinction between the market form and the economic features of actually-existing 
capitalism that so often captures the imaginations of millennial libertarians equally often 
underpins a slippage that legitimizes existing political economic arrangements. Many 
libertarians thus treat existing business practices as though they are taking place in the 
context of a genuinely free market, while selectively highlighting how the current system 
is far from a free market in other contexts. This tendency is what Kevin Carson (2007) 
terms “vulgar libertarianism”: 
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Vulgar libertarian apologists for capitalism use the term “free market” in 
an equivocal sense: they seem to have trouble remembering, from one 
moment to the next, whether they’re defending actually existing capitalism 
or free market principles. So we get the standard boilerplate article in The 
Freeman arguing that the rich can’t get rich at the expense of the poor, 
because “that’s not how the free market works”--implicitly assuming that 
this is a free market. When prodded, they’ll grudgingly admit that the 
present system is not a free market, and that it includes a lot of state 
intervention on behalf of the rich. But as soon as they think they can get 
away with it, they go right back to defending the wealth of existing 
corporations on the basis of “free market principles.” 
 
Roderick Long (2010), who is affiliated with LvMI as well as the Center for a Stateless 
Society and the Alliance of the Libertarian Left, calls this tendency right conflationism: 
“The error of treating the virtues of a freed market as though they constituted a 
justification of the evils of existing corporatist capitalism.” But, he notes, much of the left 
is guilty of the converse: “Treating the evils of existing corporatist capitalism as though 
they constituted an objection to a freed market.” In Long’s view, as well as in the view of 
many likeminded libertarians, the myth that the prevailing economic system is an 
approximation of a free market (“rather than, as I see it, a long-established and ongoing 
system of massive government intervention on behalf of the corporate elite”) thus 
simultaneously masks and entrenches the corporatist reality:  
[O]n the right (including, alas, large sections of libertarianism), the case for 
free markets is distorted into a defense of existing corporate privilege, 
while on the left, the case against existing corporate privilege is distorted 
into a case against free markets — so that each wing of the ruling class 
offers itself as an antidote to the other, and alternatives to both are 
rendered invisible. 
For many, the understanding of freedom dominant in the liberty movement collapses this 
distinction between a free market and the present corporatist reality. Increasingly, they 
are adopting the self-identification of “market anarchist” rather than “anarcho-capitalist,” 
signaling the complicity of the term “capitalism” with the existing system: 
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To a very significant degree, the economic system we have now is one 
from which peaceful, voluntary exchange is absent. An interlocking web of 
legal and regulatory privileges benefit the wealthy and well connected at 
the expense of everyone else (think patents and copyrights, tariffs, 
restrictions on banking, occupational licensing rules, land-use restrictions, 
etc.). The military-industrial complex funnels unbelievable amounts of 
money — at gunpoint — from ordinary people’s pockets and into the 
bank accounts of government contractors and their cronies. Subsidies of all 
kinds feed a network of privileges businesses and non-profits. And the state 
protects titles to land taken at gunpoint or engrossed by arbitrary fiat 
before distribution to favored individuals and groups. No, the economies 
of the US, Canada, Western Europe, Japan, and Australia, at least, aren’t 
centrally planned. The state doesn’t assert formal ownership of (most of) 
the means of production. But the state’s involvement at multiple levels in 
guaranteeing and bolstering economic privilege makes it hard to describe 
the economic system we have now as free. So if “capitalism” names the 
system we have now, anyone who favors freedom has good reason to be 
skeptical about capitalism. 
(Chartier 2011) 
 
Themselves rife with debate, market anarchist approaches fundamentally reject the 
notion that the market form “must entail a social order of bosses, landlords, centralized 
corporations, class exploitation, cut-throat business dealings, immiserated workers, 
structural poverty, or large-scale economic inequality” (Chartier & Johnson 2011:3). 
 The emerging prominence of such approaches has very likely helped propel the 
widespread use of the “crony capitalism” slogan by the liberty movement’s mainstream. 
Youth libertarian organizations today commonly distribute “Crony Capitalism = Phony 
Capitalism” merchandise such as shirts and stickers. On Valentine’s Day 2012, Young 
Americans for Liberty and Students for Liberty promoted National Crony Capitalism 
Day, providing student campus groups with tabling kits to “expose the love between big 
business and big government to college students.” 
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FIGURE 6: The popular left libertarian edited volume Markets not Capitalism. November 
2011. http://distro.libertarianleft.org. 
  
 Christina first came across the concept at one such event. From there, it took only 
a handful of conversations and a few internet searches for her to find the work of Kevin 
Carson and his analysis of “vulgar libertarianism.” An independent scholar and prolific 
writer, Carson has emerged as a central figure associated with the recent revival of 
mutualism — a long-dormant tradition that increasingly plays a central role in the 
transition of many young libertarian anarchists away from the heavily propertarian 
Rothbardian framework. While crudely dismissed as socialist especially by the more 
purist adherents of Rothbardian anarchism, Carson’s work can be seen as a “gateway 
drug” of sorts for millennial libertarians exploring the limits of the Austro-libertarian 
lineage. A former anarcho-capitalist in his late twenties thus described his journey: 
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Austrian economics and the libertarian critique of the state made a lot of 
sense to me when I was looking for ways to understand what’s happening 
in the world. Libertarians do great outreach, and they speak to a lot of big 
issues. Opposing the state is really important. I spent years thinking of 
myself as an ancap . . . Basically I got really fed up with the cesspit of 
apologizing for poverty and big business in the name of freedom. For a lot 
of ancaps, what we have is “free market” enough when it’s convenient, like 
defending sweatshops and Wal-Mart and McDonald’s. The history of the 
state in creating the current system and the private property regime is just 
not dealt with. Then I read Carson . . . It changed my entire analysis. I 
never looked back. 
 
In a matter of weeks, Christina read all of Carson’s writing, available online free of cost, 
and became heavily involved in discussing his and related ideas in several online forums. 
She even playfully adopted his self-identification, announcing “I’m a free market anti-
capitalist!”  
 Christina was particularly interested in analyses of how current economic 
vulnerability is, as a historical matter, largely a product of the power of the state and the 
elite privilege it secures. Carson (2012) explores the state mechanisms responsible for 
depriving working people of the resources and leisure to develop self-organized safety 
nets: 
Writers like Kropotkin and E.P. Thompson describe elaborate self-
organized safety nets — cooperatives, mutuals, friendly societies, etc. — 
created by workers for themselves. These met a huge volume of needs. But 
their effectiveness was limited by the fact that they existed in a society — 
like ours — of privilege and artificial property rights. 
 
The effectiveness of the self-organized welfare state was limited by the 
resources of an exploited class. In a freed market, where labor is not 
burdened by such parasitic rent extraction by the privileged, the working 
class would have a lot more resources to devote to a mutual/cooperative 
welfare state. 
 
In general, artificial scarcities and artificial property rights are the main 
source of the overclass’s ill-gotten wealth, and the main reason for the 
underclass’s poverty. Government systematically redistributes income 
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upward to the classes that control it. The welfare state is a way of giving 
just enough of it back to the hardest-hit to prevent destabilizing levels of 
homelessness and starvation from imperiling the system. 
 
Christina became immersed in the implications of such an approach. As the passage 
suggests, Carson favors a system of property rights that departs from the standard 
libertarian and Austrian economic frameworks. His contributions are part of a growing 
series of exchanges between activists and thinkers outside of formal academic and 
research institutions aiming to resuscitate and build upon a range of 19th century 
individualist anarchist thought. While in close conversation with, and sometimes coming 
from, Rothbardian anarchism, these thinkers draw in particular on the work of Pierre-
Joseph Proudhon and Benjamin Tucker, among others. Chapter five returns to these 
developments in their historical context. 
 
The Individual 
 Inseparable from the central notion of freedom in classical liberal and 
libertarian thought is, of course, the concept of the individual. It should come as no 
surprise that at present, many libertarian approaches see a profound tension between a 
commitment to the centrality of this concept and the recognition of persisting structural 
barriers that result in social hierarchies and group stratification, for instance, across race 
and gender lines. To be sure, millennial libertarians overwhelmingly condemn individual 
prejudice and reject the kind of crude bigotry exemplified by Ron Paul’s infamous 
newsletters. Amidst the controversy, Paul took this position as well, asserting in a 
statement that the inflammatory quotations “are not mine and do not represent what I 
believe or have ever believed. I have never uttered such words and denounce such small-
minded thoughts.” In the same statement and on other occasions, Paul stressed that, “In 
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fact, I have always agreed with Martin Luther King, Jr. that we should only be concerned 
with the content of a person’s character, not the color of their skin.” This adamant 
commitment to the irrelevance of factors such as race and gender — not only in terms of 
individual relationships, but in current social structures broadly — is pervasive among 
millennial libertarians and the spaces of established libertarian institutions alike, 
informing much of the liberty movement across generational lines.  
 Yet, as the robust scholarship on race and inequality has routinely demonstrated, 
while express racism has decreased in many parts of the world, racial inequality persists 
and is even exacerbated in some cases. The practices and ideologies of racism have in 
large part transformed into complex formations that thrive without formal institutional 
support — buttressed by individual and cultural explanations for inequality. In the U.S. 
context, “colorblindness” has emerged as both a legal standard and “a particular kind of 
social order” (Brown et al. 2003:7). A broad range of scholars has investigated the 
colorblindness ideology, which explains “racial inequality as the outcome of nonracial 
dynamics” (Bonilla-Silva 2003:2).  
Claiming that the legislative victories of the 1960s civil rights movement 
have ended racism and that we live in a color-blind society where each 
individual is free to determine his or her destiny, proponents of color 
blindness have sought to undermine many of the measures won during the 
civil rights period designed to prohibit and correct the consequences of the 
300-year history of discrimination, such as affirmative action in education 
and employment, minority voting districts, and federal enforcement of 
antidiscrimination laws . . . Ironically, these frameworks incorporate the 
oppositional language of the civil rights struggle, calling for individuals to 
be judged “not on the color of their skin but on the content of their 
character,” a phrase made famous by Martin Luther King’s August 28, 
1963, “I have a Dream” speech at the historic March on Washington, DC. 
. . . Similar to earlier forms of racism, these new formulations seek to make 
the social appear natural and ruthless inequality appear as common sense. 
            (Mullings 2005:476) 
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 Key to the colorblindness ideology is the concept of the individual embraced by 
much of the liberty movement: inequality is rationalized as the outcome of individual 
failure, cultural traits — “and, in a pinch, biological limitations” (Mullings 2005:678) — 
unrelated to the history of conquest, enslavement and centuries of express state-enforced 
discrimination, nor to contemporary reproduction of racial inequities. Several libertarian 
professors have found themselves in hot water after stumbling into this arena in the 
classroom and at public talks. Libertarian spaces are rife with victimhood narratives 
detailing experiences of persecution for championing unpopular or unfashionable ideas, 
peppered with self-representations as freedom fighters struggling against an Orwellian 
thought police. Beyond sloganeering, however, libertarian colorblindness advocates 
systematically fail to engage the extraordinarily broad contemporary scholarship on the 
structural elements of poverty, its racial and gendered aspects, and the various national 
and transnational processes that entrench and continually reproduce it across various 
axes — both through and outside of state processes. When the issue of the roots of 
existing inequality arises, many millennial libertarians — as well as key movement figures, 
especially in anarcho-capitalist spaces — on occasion refer to The Bell Curve’s (Herrnstein 
and Murray 1994) assertion of racial differences in intelligence, presenting the all but 
discredited theory as an equally valid alternative to approaches that stress historical 
circumstances and structural conditions. Much more frequently, the go to authority, if 
one is cited, is The Bell Curve co-author Charles Murray’s Losing Ground, published in 1984. 
Not addressed are the particulars of the swath of subsequent research that has challenged 
the dependency theory approach, relegating it into relative obscurity in the field of 
poverty studies.  
 Many otherwise very astute and well-informed young people in the liberty 
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movement are nearly entirely unfamiliar with this research. As part of this project, I 
interviewed 100 libertarian-identified college students from various backgrounds, in part 
about their views on the roots of poverty and inequality. Nearly half have intentionally 
avoided courses that would provide an introduction to these topics, citing critiques of the 
“politically correct” university that permeate the institutional spaces they occupy — 
seeing, for instance, the integration of ethnic and gender studies into the academic 
curriculum as a leftist political project not worthy of serious intellectual inquiry. Further, 
most did not take courses in subjects such as anthropology and sociology that would 
address these topics, majoring instead in economics, philosophy, and political science as 
well as the natural sciences and professional preparation programs. Of the fifteen who 
recalled taking a course that addressed status disparities across race and gender lines, five 
indicated the course/s did not equip them to understand current debates about the root 
causes of inequality. The five students, who all identify as white, instead described these 
courses as:  
 “Preachy stuff about tolerance. I wanted to learn about the real research behind 
why some groups do better than others, not do role-plays about how we shouldn’t judge 
people,” 20 year-old male, economics major, New York, NY. 
 “Cheesy exercises that were supposed to show how most of the world’s resources 
is in the hands of a few rich people, but didn’t really explain why it’s like that. It was like 
we were supposed to just think it’s bad,” 21 year-old female, economics major, Atlanta, 
GA. 
 “Confusing. I get there are a lot of bigoted people and they can create messed up 
policies. I think there is privilege there for certain people. But I don’t know what they 
[professors] mean when they say ‘structural’ or ‘institutional’ racism. There are just 
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individuals making decisions . . . Like racist cops that do profiling and bust more people 
of a certain race, or bank employees who don’t give loans to somebody because of how 
they look. So how does it not come down to just racist people?” 19 year-old male, 
computer engineering major, Austin, TX. 
 “The class made it sound like you’re basically screwed if you’re not born white 
and at least a little well-off financially. That sounds so hopeless, why would people want 
to think like that? There’s a lot of prejudiced people out there, I know. But none of us 
were there for slavery and segregation. That had nothing to do with us. How can we ever 
get beyond that if we keep talking so much about all of the differences between people, 
like between black and white people and latino people. I think it divides us instead of 
making us stronger,” 20 year-old female, philosophy major, Los Angeles, CA. 
 While illustrative of millennial libertarian approaches to these topics broadly, the 
students’ statements also highlight the challenges inherent in understanding and 
communicating the nature of increasingly complex transfigurations of racism that flourish 
without formal institutional support. Many young libertarians unequivocally dismiss and 
are often quite hostile to such approaches, despite lacking familiarity with the social 
scientific evidence in which they are grounded. Yet some express genuine interest in this 
research, as well as reveal how foreign it remains to the movement broadly.  
 One such example is a conversation among young libertarians during a planning 
meeting for a day-long conference. Of about ten young people, some in their late twenties 
and others in college, a handful — both men and women — wished to include a panel of 
speakers addressing the question of why relatively few women participate in the 
movement. While millennial libertarian groups targeting college students have been more 
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successful at involving women than their forebears, prominent movement figures, writers, 
and presenters remain overwhelmingly male.  
 The topic of why women are significantly underrepresented in libertarian spaces 
arises relatively frequently, and solicits a common range of responses. Almost shockingly 
often, participants in such discussions state that the philosophy stresses logic and reason, 
traits they associate with men. Replied one witty critic of this view, 
As a woman, and especially a pregnant woman, analytical consistency and 
rigor are definitely not for me, so I guess I won’t be a libertarian. I prefer 
feeling my way to views about the means of production, using my vagina 
for guidance. 
 
Some millennial libertarians note that the “sausage-fest” dominating many movement 
spaces contributes to the disregard of gender hierarchies perpetuated outside of a state 
framework. A 21 year-old female student group leader shared,  
Look, I’m a libertarian, I believe in markets and civil liberties and I oppose 
the wars . . . But when it comes to gender . . . and racism . . . there are real 
problems in the movement. Free markets won’t fix those inequities. Not 
everyone, but especially a lot of the men, do not take that seriously at all. 
People are so focused on state coercion . . . there are lots of things that 
should be taken seriously that can happen even in a stateless utopia, like 
patriarchy and racism. When I raise it, they’re dismissive and laugh it off. 
It’s a real problem. 
 
I noted the example to share with Christina, who had been compiling a list of parallels 
between “vulgar libertarians and vulgar Marxists” with which to further taunt Josh. The 
top item was “Just focus on building the revolution/libertopia and don’t worry about 
racism and patriarchy. If they even exist, they will disappear when the economic issues 
are resolved.” 
 As is common both in libertarian online spaces and meetings, this particular panel 
proposition was met by angry bristling toward what the other event organizers perceived 
as a concession to “politically correct conformism” and “identity politics groupthink.” 
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The meeting soon disintegrated, with opponents of the panel leaving the room. Jesse, a 
soft-spoken young man who was quiet for most of the exchange stayed behind. He was a 
recent engineering graduate and longtime advocate of Austrian economics, working as a 
computer programmer at a software company. As he talked with the group that had 
proposed the controversial panel, his genuine demeanor provided some insight into the 
dynamics at play. He thought the panel was a good idea, and was interested in the 
reasons behind the movement’s gender distribution:  
But before you can get libertarians to take the gender disparity seriously, 
though, you have to show why that particular category is relevant at all. 
 
One of the others in the room asked him to clarify what he meant. 
Well if you studied the prevalence of red-headed people in the movement, 
or people who are tall. And you found that there is some huge 
underrepresentation of them. Well I don’t think people think those 
categories are tied to anything important. So probably no one would care, 
right? . . . So you’d have to show that the gender category is different 
somehow. 
 
His interlocutor noted that the overall levels of female political participation broadly and 
the clear irrelevance of sex to ability, coupled with extensive documentation of historical 
and current gender-based disparities, indicate there is very good reason to assume that 
something about the movement is a deterrent and driving the underrepresentation. 
Well I think you’d have to prove the case about these disparities. I don’t 
see this kind of inequality in and of itself as bad when there is free 
association. People are not all going to like to do the same kinds of things . 
. . Why would you think that any kind of disparities or discrimination 
against women in society, even if it still exists, has anything to do with it? 
 
Replied another participant, 
Right well the issue is why they’re not joining. It seems likely that a big 
problem is what you said — maybe a lot don’t want to join because 
libertarians don’t think gender matters, or race, or whatever because the 
official discrimination laws are off the books. And there is plenty of 
evidence that it still does. 
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“Yeah. Well you would really have to show why it would still matter. I mean in some 
significant way. Obviously there’s always going to be sexists and people with dumb 
stereotypes . . . I don’t think most libertarians would just accept that it matters in that 
way. I want to know more about it too.” 
 Jesse’s response highlights much of the movement’s fundamental lack of 
familiarity with notions of systemic inequality as both historically entrenched and 
continually reproduced — barriers along axes of gender and race that often take form in 
much more complex ways than coercion “at gunpoint.” But most participants see such 
notions as something to be “accepted,” a fashion of the day rather than grounded in 
evidence-based research — the extent of which is thoroughly foreign to many. While this 
may be difficult to understand for readers immersed in critical approaches to the social 
sciences, the worlds of these young people overwhelmingly do not engage such 
perspectives. Despite the fluency of many in other arenas, they have, for much of their 
lives, thought about freedom, coercion, the individual, and the social in particular ways 
that render such approaches significantly less intuitive. 
 Many young libertarians also follow in the footsteps of the movement figures they 
admire, focusing on state oppression and violence as a uniform condition. Behind the 
concern with, for instance, police violence and the war on drugs, is the coercive power of 
the state — most often understood in an “individual vs. the state framework” that erases 
the particular and disproportionate impact on certain groups and communities. The 
ensuing reproduction of racial hierarchies in most libertarian analyses appears as little 
more than an afterthought — although is noted far more often than non-state forms of 
subordination.  
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 A monthly online feature of the longstanding Foundation for Economic Education 
illustrates these dynamics. Aiming to help libertarian readers explore timely issues, the 
organization regularly solicits two short editorials taking opposing views on a key topic, 
and asks readers to vote for the more persuasive. In 2014, two young women addressed 
“A Question of Privilege.” The editor of the “sex positive, state negative” blog Sex and 
the State Cathy Reisenwitz, who is also an associate at Young Voices, an organization 
that connects voices of the millennial generation with media outlets, argued that 
libertarians “should be more concerned about issues of class and privilege”: 
While the State is the primary mechanism by which this preservation [of 
unearned power held by those in traditionally privileged classes] is done, a 
libertarianism that seeks to remove the power to abuse without examining 
the cultural attitudes, ignorance, and prejudices that form the basis of that 
desire is a libertarianism not worth having . . . What privilege means is 
that people of differing identities experience markedly different forms of 
oppression . . . Acknowledging privilege isn’t putting people in categories 
or discriminating against them. It’s recognizing that one’s identity shields 
oneself from firsthand knowledge of others’ oppression. This isn’t a 
description of how things should be. It’s an admission of how things 
currently are. 
 
Julie Borowski, who runs the popular YouTube channel Token Libertarian Girl and is 
currently a FreedomWorks policy analyst, argued that “libertarians should stay focused 
on individual rights”:  
Libertarians should remain committed to maximizing freedom and 
opportunity for all individuals rather than playing identity politics and 
collectivizing people . . . We all have a common enemy in an oppressive 
state that restricts our ability to live our lives as we see fit.  
Libertarianism is about increasing freedom for every single individual.  
Libertarians want everyone to have the opportunity to achieve prosperity 
and happiness. We advocate for an environment that allows people to 
flourish and achieve their dreams. We want every child to be able to get a 
great education that prepares them to succeed in life. We want every 
person to have access to affordable and high quality health care . . . These 
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are not white people issues. These are not black people issues. These are 
not rich people issues. These are not poor people issues. These are human 
issues. 
While both analyses saw the state as the primary obstacle, the former argued that 
libertarians ought to take seriously the ensuing stratification that presents different 
barriers for differently situated people. Twenty percent of readers agreed, with 
eighty voting for the other position. 
 While this is simply an informal poll, it serves as another example of how 
an emerging set of debates on these fronts is gradually being introduced into 
movement spaces by small groups of millennial libertarians. The topics of 
privilege and subordination across gender and race lines are also regularly 
engaged by Thoughts on Liberty, launched in 2013 by several young women with 
the aim of serving as the premier blog for women libertarian voices. Blogger Gina 
Lutrell (2014) offered another understanding of individualism, noting that the 
Foundation for Economic Education poll framework, in pitting privilege against 
individual rights, perpetuates a false binary: “those who want to achieve a society 
where everyone is considered by their individual personalities and merits cannot 
achieve their goals without first battling systemic privilege.” 
  Similarly, the recently launched the Libertarian Anti-Racist Alliance 
provides an online discussion forum for anti-racist activism and actively opposes 
“colorblindness” in favor of “race consciousness,” aiming to popularize the notion 
within the liberty movement: 
You may have heard some libertarians advocate for some form of extreme 
atomistic individualism (e.g. “we’re all individuals, society doesn’t exist, 
and groups don’t exist”). This is harmful because it abstracts away real-life 
differences between individuals which arise based on their voluntary (or 
involuntary in the case of race) membership in various social groups, and 
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ignores the role that social understandings of race and racial prejudice play 
in perpetuating contemporary social and economic problems (e.g. the 
Drug War and the over-representation of African-Americans in the U.S. 
prison system). This is an unrealistic, unscientific and counter-productive 
position to take. The idea of Race Consciousness . . . is an alternative 
position which encourages people to acknowledge the cultural differences 
that have emerged based on our socially constructed notions of race, 
appreciate them and to take them seriously when engaged in analysis of 
social and economic issues. 
 
 The initiative is the work of JP Gonzales and James Padilioni, Jr. JP, finishing 
undergraduate studies in cognitive science at the University of California Merced, 
presently serves on the Students for Liberty (SFL) executive board. Primarily concerned 
with social justice issues, JP identified with the left throughout high school but became 
heavily involved with the liberty movement in college. He found the libertarian 
philosophy powerful both as a “critique of statist solutions to complex social problems” 
and in advancing the goals of “equality of opportunity and social justice traditionally 
associated with the left.” James is also active in the youth movement, having founded a 
student SFL group as an undergraduate at West Chester University in Pennsylvania and 
currently serves on the SFL international executive board. He regularly writes articles on 
the topics of race and racism for SFL, and is presently a doctoral student focused on slave 
culture and resistance as well as the musicology and political economy of jazz. As with 
other approaches to privilege and status gradually gaining steam among some millennial 
libertarians, the ideas being introduced by JP and James remain highly contested. 
 Much more widespread understandings of the individual consider the concept 
nearly exclusively in relationship to private property ownership. Particularly in anarcho-
capitalist spaces, the dominant focus is the individual’s right to exclusion inherent in the 
very notion of private property. Thus, the anarcho-capitalist society puts an end to the 
	   141	  
“forced integration” imposed upon private property owners by states “through various 
non-discrimination, affirmative action, and multiculturalist policies” (Hoppe 2001b). 
Private property owners’ right to exclusion — or, more diplomatically, voluntary 
association — is central to most versions of libertarianism, to different effects. It is thus 
that during his 2010 U.S. Senate campaign, Rand Paul — son of liberty movement icon 
Ron Paul — unproblematically declared his opposition to parts of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 barring discrimination on the basis of race by private businesses — a position that 
stirred intense public outcry but one that is relatively uncontroversial in many libertarian 
circles, and one to which his father also subscribes. 
 To be sure, some libertarians — particularly those in the world of public policy — 
take somewhat different approaches to the voluntary association argument. While 
generally critical of race-conscious government programs, those working in the many 
libertarian-oriented think tanks in and beyond the Beltway stress some version of limited 
government and equality under the law over anarcho-capitalist stateless societies. For this, 
they are condemned as faux libertarians by purists in the endless debate of what it means 
to be “a real libertarian.” For many radicals the answer is simple: libertarianism as such is 
a philosophy grounded in private property rights and a radical critique of the state. The 
right to discriminate — to exclude — is thus inextricably bound up with this vision of the 
free society. It is strict adherence to private property rights, best enforced by private 
parties, that is the lynchpin in this approach — not the various individual liberties 
compatible with this system, nor any benefits it may also hold for the vulnerable and 
marginalized. Pragmatic concessions too are largely impermissible.  
 In this vein, LvMI’s Jeffrey Tucker (1997) critiques the Cato Institute’s David 
Boaz, who, in writing about individualism as a key tenet of libertarianism, asserts that the 
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libertarian extension of dignity to more people, including women and historically 
marginalized racial groups and religions, marks one of the greater triumphs of the 
western world. Replies Tucker, “Far from being a victory for liberty, the extension of civil 
rights (that is, the right to trespass) has been a complete disaster and a major source of 
tyranny of our times.” Moreover, he asks, “since when has the purpose of libertarianism 
— a political theory delineating the boundaries of property rights — been to progressively 
extend ‘dignity’ to whole groups?”  
The reader is left with no doubt about where Boaz stands on lifestyle issues 
(drugs, sex, speech, etc.) and the policy concerns of the punditry class (how 
this or that program can be improved), but is left to speculate on precisely 
how strict Boaz’s utopia would be with regard to the protection of 
property rights, or how or on what level of society those rights would be 
enforced. 
(109) 
 
Libertarianism’s “PR Problem” 
 In 2012, the satirical newspaper the Onion covered the so-called “fiscal cliff,” the 
sharp decline in the federal budget deficit that could have occurred beginning in early 
January 2013 due to a range of tax cut expirations and spending reductions required by 
previously enacted laws. “Going over the cliff,” many experts believed, could plunge the 
nation into recession unless Democrats and Republicans reached a compromise 
agreement. Second on the Onion’s list of what will happen if legislators fail to act? “Total 
breakdown of effective government will turn large parts of the country into an 
unimaginably hellish libertarian paradise.” 
 As libertarianism’s popularity among millennials grows, so does the tradition’s 
visibility in contemporary popular culture. Yet another example is the comedy series Park 
& Recreation’s Ron Swanson, the staunch libertarian director of the parks and recreation 
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department who believes the park system should be privatized and thwarts its 
effectiveness at every turn. But the Onion’s satirical commentary also represents a common 
perception of libertarianism’s implications: without government, life will become 
“unimaginably hellish,” except for an elite few. Such views of libertarianism by 
commentators and the public alike are not surprising in light of the intentionally 
provocative views put forth by some of the movement’s leading figures. Many of the 
movement’s younger ambassadors in college classrooms and debates across the country 
notoriously follow suit, reveling in being perceived as purposefully incendiary and 
confrontational, even arrogant — to the great chagrin of other millennial libertarians 
frustrated with libertarianism’s “PR problem,” who tend to also be significantly more 
sympathetic to social justice questions. But the issue extends well beyond self-
representation and the themes considered throughout this chapter so far, into the realm 
of the movement’s central economic analyses. 
 “A lot of people really just aren’t informed about economics. They blame 
economic downturns on markets when they are actually caused by state intervention,” 
said Yuri, the young Austrian school devotee who by now had read Rothbard’s Man, 
Economy, & State for the fourth time — this time alongside Keynes’ General Theory (1936), 
“the antithesis of sane economic prescriptions.”  
 Yuri was referring to the subject of the “Fear the Boom and Bust” music video, 
the aforementioned libertarian sensation that revolves around Mises and Hayek’s 
economic explanation of the “boom and bust” of business cycles. That a hip hop video 
about such a seemingly dry topic would garner over four million YouTube views is less 
curious from the perspective of millennial libertarians, for many of whom this is a central 
concept in any introduction to Austrian thought. Austrian business cycle theory lies at the 
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core of libertarian commitment to sound money and opposition to the Federal Reserve 
and central banking broadly. In 1974, some four decades after the publication of his 
ideas, Hayek would receive the Nobel Prize in economics for his contributions on this 
front. 
 Austrian economics grounds the cause of cyclical business swings in state 
intervention: credit expansion, including the printing of additional notes by central banks 
and the creation of new demand deposits tied to federal debt monetization as well as 
fractional reserve banking. It is this unremitting injection of additional money into the 
system that leads to the continuous rise of prices, or inflation. As a result, market interest 
rates initially drop below the level they would attain absent such expansion of credit. In 
the Austrian view, the interest rate reflects the ratio of present goods valuation to future 
goods valuation. A shift in favor of more future goods would lead to a lowering of the 
interest rate due to a greater preference of future goods over present goods, and the 
converse. The interest rate thus tends toward a point where the amount of funds that 
savers are willing to invest in production equals the amount that entrepreneur-producers 
are willing to obtain and use for productive purposes. 
 Through saving and investment, a certain amount of resources is directed toward 
the production of capital goods rather than consumer goods. The interest rate thus signals 
the extent to which capital goods production may be undertaken: 
The role which the rate of interest plays in these deliberations of the 
planning businessman is obvious. It shows him how far he can go in 
withholding factors of production from employment for want-satisfaction 
in nearer periods of the future and in dedicating them to want-satisfaction 
in remoter periods. It shows him what period of production conforms in 
every concrete case to the difference which the public makes in the ratio of 
valuation between present goods and future goods. It prevents him from 
embarking upon projects the execution of which would not agree with the 
limited amount of capital goods provided by the saving public. 
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 (Mises 1949:547) 
 
 Credit expansion, in the early stages of which the interest rate drops, leaves 
entrepreneur-producers unable to differentiate between funds stemming from real savings 
and those created artificially. Here, the economic boom occurs: As a result of the faulty 
interest rate signal, business decisions are made as though the valuation ratio of present to 
future goods has dropped, when this in fact did not take place. Mortgages and loans 
become more affordable. Investments in capital goods and the corresponding extension of 
the production process are undertaken. Entrepreneur-producers operate as though 
heightened demand for capital goods exists, buying more land, sophisticated machinery, 
and hiring new workers. But savings available for capital goods production have not 
increased. In the case of a short-term credit expansion, the economic bust inevitably 
follows. The demand for consumer goods has in reality not dropped and the longer-term 
investments in production expansion are misplaced. When the newly created money 
begins to run out, projects that had appeared profitable are revealed as overoptimistic. 
Construction halts and factories close, unemployment and bankruptcies skyrocket. 
Businesses fail, workers are laid off, spending and investment plummet. Commerce at 
large, including firms that did not make bad investments, is affected, culminating in an 
adjustment process referred to a recession or depression. In the case of longer-term credit 
expansions malinvestment is compounded, intensifying the inevitable adjustment process. 
According to Mises, indefinite credit expansion ultimately leads to the collapse of the 
monetary system and the money economy, as in the great European inflations of the 
1920s — the phenomenon known as Katastrophenhausse, or the “crack-up boom” 
(1949:428). Due to political realities, however, this outcome appears less likely than the 
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disruptive pattern of credit expansion and contraction leading “to successive cyclical 
downturns. The cyclical process becomes self-perpetuating and proceeds to the ‘stop-go 
cycle,’ a familiar phenomenon in Great Britain and one becoming familiar in the United 
States” (O’Driscoll 1977). 
 In terms of concrete examples, Austrians perhaps most famously take up the 
depression of 1920-21 in arguing against political solutions to economic busts. Historian 
and Ludwig von Mises Institute fellow Tom Woods (2009:51) contends that it is precisely 
due to the lack of fiscal and monetary stimulus at that time that the economy quickly 
recovered, a point articulated earlier by economist Joseph Schumpeter. 
The economic situation in 1920 was grim. By that year unemployment 
had jumped from 4 percent to nearly 12 percent, and GNP declined 17 
percent. No wonder, then, that Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover 
— falsely characterized as a supporter of laissez-faire economics — urged 
President Harding to consider an array of interventions to turn the 
economy around. Hoover was ignored. Instead of ‘fiscal stimulus,’ 
Harding cut the government’s budget nearly in half between 1920 and 
1922. The rest of Harding’s approach was equally laissez-faire. Tax rates 
were slashed for all income groups. The national debt was reduced by one-
third. The Federal Reserve’s activity, moreover, was hardly noticeable . . . 
By the late summer of 1921, signs of recovery were already visible. The 
following year, unemployment was back down to 6.7 percent and it was 
only 2.4 percent by 1923 . . . The federal government did not do what 
Keynesian economists ever since have urged it to do: run unbalanced 
budgets and prime the pump through increased expenditures. 
 
Along with most Austro-libertarians, Yuri acknowledges that, in the current context, 
breaking the “boom and bust” cycle via the complete absence of state intervention in the 
economy would cause profound hardship for some time: “It’s true that things would be 
pretty bad for a while, until the economy readjusted. People with skills in sectors that are 
unproductive would have to transition to other sectors. All of that would take time.”  
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 But in this view, “the alternative is a lot worse. The current system is not viable. 
There’s only so long that state credit expansions can keep extending these cycles. And the 
kind of financial collapse that happens after that will be a lot, a lot worse.” 
 
 I was less interested in arguing the particulars of century-old debates around 
government’s role in the economy than in how proponents integrate this economic 
analysis with popularizing the libertarian movement. Yuri agreed that, from the 
perspective an actual person’s lived experience rather than as an economic abstraction, 
this “adjustment period” is extremely significant: “Yes, there is no getting around that the 
fix hurts, that’s the problem with the mess we’re in. It’s like tearing off the band-aid.” 
 So, in a context of widespread immiseration, unemployment, and suffering, why 
would any substantial number of ordinary people support a cause that offers no actual 
reprieve for some time, only the promise of reward at a future point — even if the 
underlying economic analysis is correct? Austrian time preference theory itself suggests 
that the likely scenario in such a hypothetical is mass support of alternatives presenting 
themselves as providing immediate help, however false they may be.  
 Yuri stared at me blankly. “But . . . that’s economics. It’s just how it is.”  
 In light of the central role that business cycle theory — alongside the threats of 
hyperinflation and ultimate collapse of the monetary system — occupy in the analysis of 
so many millennial libertarians, and especially those in the libertarian anarchist tradition, 
I was routinely struck by how rarely movement participants engaged the implications of 
this theory. For all the lectures, articles, and seminars on the particularities and danger of 
state credit expansion mechanisms, those most invested in eradicating the boom and bust 
cycles they see as borne of such intervention appeared to give the least thought to what is 
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to be done, should this occur, about the adversity wrought by the ensuing “period of 
adjustment.” It seemed enough that their economic analysis would be proven correct. In 
many presentations and discussions about this topic, there was almost an underlying 
assumption that some form of libertarian society would logically follow. Some ancap 
circles entertain the idea with a blasé smugness that would be difficult to associate with 
anyone who had witnessed first-hand anything resembling life under conditions of severe 
hardship. It was thus particularly striking to stumble upon a place where millennial 
libertarians saw in this very issue a predicament of epic proportions. Perhaps tellingly, this 
entailed leaving the United States. 
 In September 2011, I had the opportunity to visit Vienna, which was at the turn 
of the 19th century the home of Austrian economics and the school’s central figures, 
including Carl Menger, Ludwig von Mises, and F.A. Hayek. The occasion was LvMI’s 
Supporters Summit, five days of lectures, tours, and social events celebrating the Austrian 
school and, as noted in promotional materials, “the entire intellectual movement that 
came to the defense of liberty in an age of the total state.” 
 At the event, I met up with Yuri who, like myself, had been visiting family in that 
part of the world and extended his trip to attend the Summit. I had never seen him nearly 
remotely as excited about anything other than an economics text as when we walked 
through the classrooms of the grade school attended by Mises, part of a guided walking 
tour of significant Austrian economics sites. The day ended with a gathering at Café 
Künstler, where Mises and his circle would regularly venture following fortnightly, 
invitation-only seminars in his office. From 1920 to 1934, the late night gatherings were 
comprised of discussion, poetry, and music. Philosopher Felix Kaufman penned a series 
of songs for the group — based on Austrian folk melodies and popular songs, they 
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incorporated witty commentary about both the key debates of the time and members of 
the circle themselves. A total of 28 of these songs had been published in German, and was 
translated into English, with full musical scores, for the first time by the LvMI in 2010.  
At Café Künstler, attendees received copies and sang a number of the songs, led by the 
Institute’s Jeffrey Tucker, donning his signature bowtie look and accompanied by a piano 
player. “O quae mutation rerum,” Yuri hummed all throughout the walk to our hostel — 
“Oh, how things change,” the chorus of a farewell song to Mises, preparing to leave 
Vienna in light of the Nazi threat, as Hayek had earlier. The lyrics bemoan the breaking 
of the Mises Kreis, and offer hope that it will someday reunite. 
 While the Summit was primarily a gathering of the LvMI’s longstanding sponsors, 
the organization provided student fellowships for several young people, including a group 
from several universities in Austria and Germany. I had had similar conversations with 
several as I had with Yuri, and they shared their thoughts about the severe conditions that 
eliminating various forms of credit expansion could entail. Even though many did not 
know each other and I spoke with each alone, it was striking that, as soon as the topic 
arose, all four immediately highlighted the very same concern. 
 Toward the end of the event, Yuri and I joined a 20 year-old economics student 
from Germany for coffee. I had not spoken to him at length before, and I was curious 
whether his response would resemble the others. 
 I had barely finished my first sentence, asking what such a transition period might 
look like, when he cut me off. 
 “Yes, yes. This is a big thing, a serious problem. Weimar Germany.” 
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 Yuri turned to me. “Ooooh, that’s what you meant when we were talking about 
that earlier? Yeah I mean hyperinflation like that is possible. Weimar Germany went off 
the gold standard, if the state credit infusions keep coming it’s not out of the question  
that . . .” 
 “No, this is not what I am trying to say,” replied the German student. 
 “Oh.” Yuri looked a bit puzzled by the grave expression on his face. “Well what 
did you mean then?” 
 “What happened after.” 
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Chapter Four: Millennial Libertarian Spaces in the Antistate Moment 
 In a 2014 promotional video, the electoral politics-focused Young Americans for Liberty 
dramatically features the powerful statement of 1964 Republican presidential candidate Barry 
Goldwater: “Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice; moderation in the pursuit of justice is 
no virtue.”  
The popular quote was the work of Karl Hess, Goldwater’s speechwriter and the primary 
author of the Republican Party’s 1960 and 1964 platforms.1 But soon thereafter, Hess revolted 
against both government and corporate power. After working extensively as a welder, he joined 
Students for a Democratic Society and worked with the Black Panther Party during the Vietnam 
era. By the 1970s Hess was in Washington, D.C., placing self-built and self-managed technology 
for raising food and capturing solar power in the service of the then-predominantly black, 
working class neighborhood of Adams-Morgan, where he grew up (Hess 1979).  
 In the context of the disparate journeys of millennial libertarians who venture outside of 
the political arena, the trajectory of Karl Hess becomes less anomalous. The preceding chapters 
have explored various aspects of the contemporary liberty movement, from electoral politics and 
policy efforts to the wide range of initiatives aiming to popularize libertarianism while 
disseminating, building upon, and refashioning libertarian ideas from different perspectives. But 
given the widespread antipathy toward formal political processes of these liberty movement 
participants, what do they actually do? Political and educational interventions aside, what kinds of 
communities and projects do they create? The answer may surprise some outside observers, as 
millennial libertarians overwhelmingly focus on building spaces and movements they see as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In his autobiography, Hess notes that he came across the phrase in a letter from Abraham Lincoln 
 biographer Harry Jaffa (1999:168-70). 
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consistent with libertarian principles, but that resonate across ideological commitments and 
political philosophies. 
 Particularly among the movement’s millennials, an approach dormant for several decades 
is powerfully gaining ground: the philosophy of agorism — from the Greek agora, in the sense of 
an open marketplace — whereby voluntary market processes would provide services competing 
with and superior to those of the state. Over time, the moral authority and outright power of the 
state would become so thoroughly undermined that market anarchist legal and security 
enterprises developed underground could emerge and ultimately suppress formal government. 
The philosophy is the work of libertarian anarchist Samuel Edward Konkin III, affectionately 
known as SEK3, and longtime collaborator of former Goldwaterite Karl Hess. Expressly 
rejecting the political system and policy interventions, Konkin, alongside science fiction author J. 
Neil Schulman, developed what he saw as a revolutionary strategy to ultimately bring about a 
society in which all social relations are voluntary exchanges. His New Libertarian Manifesto (1980) 
lays out the central means of agorism: counter-establishment economics — the exclusion of all 
state-approved action (“the white market”) as well as violence and theft (“the red market”) in 
favor of “the free market, the Black Market, the ‘underground economy,’ all acts of civil and 
social disobedience, all acts of forbidden association (sexual, racial, cross-religious), and anything 
else the State, at any place or time, chooses to prohibit, control, regulate, tax, or tariff” (n.d.-a).  
 While Konkin and his allies envisioned the philosophy as a revolutionary strategy, they 
noted its appeal for many “who wish only to live their lives as free as possible and associate with 
others like-minded.” The approach of agorism sidesteps economic policy reform and the 
problems posed by overt, large-scale economic transitions that troubled the libertarian students 
in Vienna. Rather, the focus becomes strategies such as direct action, entrepreneurship, and self-
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sufficiency. Konkin — widely known for his witticisms and the source of libertarian monikers 
that persevere today, including “minarchist,” “the Kochtopus,” and “Nozis” to describe followers  
of philosopher Robert Nozick — declared his Manifesto a black market best-seller.  
 
FIGURE 7: Konkin’s classic essay on counter-economics, reprinted by the Distro of the 
Libertarian Left. http://distro.libertarianleft.org/category/zines. 
 
Weaving together the contributions of Hess and Konkin, among others, libertarian 
anarchist Per Bylund (2006) proposes a two-pronged libertarian strategy. The first is a “vertical” 
approach of building decentralized infrastructure and technologies in creating self-reliant 
neighborhood and regional networks: “Hess’s experience is that one can provide for a whole 
neighborhood’s demand for vegetables through setting up greenhouses on a fraction of the 
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available rooftops. Also, through using the pumps from old washing machines and left-over 
construction materials, the people in this neighborhood community were able to set up a fish-
breeding facility producing hundreds of pounds of fish annually.” Bylund unites the local 
production of essential goods and services with the corresponding “horizontal” approach 
developed by Konkin: Making use of one’s own personal contacts in engaging in black market 
activity and developing ever-expanding private trade networks. Because participating in activity 
not sanctioned by the state is not always the ideal approach for everyone, focusing on community 
technologies presents a viable alternative:  
The point I’m trying to make here is not that we should all go rural, live like 
cavemen, and grow our own vegetables. I’m saying we should stop thinking in 
terms of centralization and large-scale production. Hess stresses the fact that most, 
if not all important technology is equally or better suited for small-scale use on a 
family or community level. We do not need to rely on global corporations or the 
nation-state to get our hands on what we treasure in life. 
 
Like agorism’s earlier proponents, countless young libertarians have abandoned formal political 
processes to launch efforts expressly and consciously situated outside of political frameworks and 
the purview of the state. This chapter provides an overview of some of these projects, from 
grassroots police accountability activism fostering communities that “protect and serve each 
other” and regional webs promoting self-sufficient living to libertarian engagement with 
emerging technologies grounded in distributed, peer-to-peer networks.  
 That alternative institutions and communities promoted by millennial libertarians would 
also appeal particularly to those who identify with the political left is not unprecedented. 
Historically, a number of anarchist libertarian figures have argued that the movement is in fact 
best allied with the left. Murray Rothbard, the father of anarcho-capitalism, had his own “time 
on the left” throughout the 1960s (Payne 2005), collaborating on the Radical Libertarian 
Alliance, a coalition between libertarians and the New Left around anti-imperialism that 
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ultimately collapsed under ever-increasing factionalization (Konkin N.d.-b). Rothbard and 
anarcho-communist Murray Bookchin partook in the shortlived 1968 Left-Right Anarchist 
supper club, along with Karl Hess, who also played a key role in the Radical Libertarian 
Alliance. Building on these earlier collaborations, Konkin spearheaded the Movement of the 
Libertarian Left in the late 1970s. 
 None of the projects constituting this trend are the exclusive domain of libertarianism as 
such — police accountability activism in particular has a rich U.S. history that dates back many 
decades and spans a wide range of tactics and strategies. While some projects arise from expressly 
libertarian spaces and then expand, such as the Austin-launched Peaceful Streets Project, others 
represent arenas where libertarians have simply played a role. Consciously aiming to promote 
cohesion and avoid internal strife, participants often set rules against using these spaces to 
advance any single set of political ideologies — for instance, Peaceful Streets activists agreeing 
that the group will not endorse any expressly political efforts and that the many participating 
supporters of Ron Paul are not wearing Ron Paul gear during actions such as leafleting and 
community trainings. The agorism-inspired projects of liberty movement participants represent 
one aspect of emergent grassroots efforts that eschew centralized authority in favor of distributed 
networks with equipotential rights of participation. Michael Bauwens (2005) of the P2P 
Foundation describes the peer-to-peer relational dynamic broadly as:  
A form of human network-based organisation which rests upon the free 
participation of equipotent partners, engaged in the production of common 
resources, without recourse to monetary compensation as key motivating factor, 
and not organized according to hierarchical methods of command and control. It 
creates a Commons, rather than a market or a state, and relies on social relations 
to allocate resources rather than on pricing mechanisms or managerial 
commands. 
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Anarchist blogger Melanie Pinkert (2010) indirectly addresses the rise of new, counter-hegemonic 
collaborations across ideological boundaries in the context of the ever-present question of why 
there are so few women anarchists and libertarians. Her analysis not only astutely highlights the 
gendered aspects of caregiving, but also gestures toward the appeal of counter-hegemonic 
projects that meet real human needs irrespective of political orientation: 
The fact is that every one of us had our baby diapers changed by a woman.  And 
there is a damn good chance that your adult diapers will be changed by one too. 
Complete independence and freedom are an illusion. It is an illusion that women 
are not in a position to hold. We are interdependent. And we are only free in so 
far as everyone is willing to share in taking responsibility for the caregiving that is 
a fundamental need for all humans. 
 
Whoever is addressing the real life situations that women face is going to get their 
attention — whether that is liberals offering government social programs, 
conservatives offering church social programs, or anarchists offering something 
new. Talk to me about how to have the freedom to pursue my dreams without 
leaving a mountain of young, old, sick, and dying to fend for themselves and I’ll 
listen. 
 
Protect and Serve Each Other 
            In the early morning hours of New Year’s Day 2012, Antonio Buehler pulled into an 
Austin 7-Eleven for gas. The 35 year-old West Point graduate, a former Army Ranger who 
served tours in Kosovo and Iraq, was the designated driver for the night and taking his friend 
home in the friend’s truck. After refueling, Antonio and his friend began getting back into the 
truck when they heard a woman scream violently. Turning around, they witnessed Austin police 
officer Robert Snider forcefully jerk the woman out of the passenger seat of a nearby car and 
throw her on the ground. Officer Patrick Oborski joined Snider as he applied continued upward 
pressure on the woman’s arms in a maneuver considered to be a torture move by the U.S. 
military. Antonio tried to take pictures of what he believed was a violent assault; when the 
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woman noticed him, she begged him to record the incident, and he then began loudly 
demanding that the officers stop abusing her.  
             The officers ultimately arrested the woman and escorted her to a police cruiser. They 
had pulled over the car in which she was a passenger after observing the vehicle driving without 
headlights. As Officer Oborski conducted a field sobriety test on the driver, the woman had 
yelled from the passenger seat to her friend that she did not have to submit to a sobriety test. 
Speech is not sufficient to “interfere” with a police investigation, and the passenger was never 
charged on this count. Instead, despite being seated in the car until forcibly dragged out by an 
officer, she was arrested for public intoxication, a Class C misdemeanor. Nearly two weeks 
following the arrest, and after the woman shared her story with the media, the Austin Police 
Department filed two new charges against her for resisting arrest and failure to obey a lawful 
order—noted her attorney, “[I]n all of my years of doing criminal law, I would be hard-pressed 
to find not only a Class C where additional charges were filed weeks after, but the very fact that a 
lieutenant from APD called my client to tell her about these additional charges two weeks later.” 
          Immediately following the woman’s arrest, Officer Oborski turned and walked aggressively 
toward Antonio, demanding “Who do you think you are?!” A video recording later aired 
repeatedly on local news stations shows Buehler putting his arms down by his side, with his palms 
forward and taking several steps back, while Oborski continued moving toward him. The video 
then shows Oborski violently thrusting his hands into Antonio’s chest several times, pushing him 
back until he was trapped between the bed of the truck he had been driving and the officer. After 
repeatedly pushing Antonio in the chest while Antonio kept his arms raised with palms facing 
forward, yelling, “what are you doing, why are you touching me?,” Oborski forcefully tackled 
him to the ground and handcuffed him. Antonio says he was then taken to the “BAT Mobile”—
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a converted bus used by the Austin Police Department for breath alcohol testing—where he blew 
into a breathalyzer machine, and was told by the technician that he “broke” the machine by 
“blowing too hard” when no alcohol was detected. 
             He was then escorted to another police vehicle where Oborski confronted him: “You 
don’t fuck with police, you fucked with the wrong cop this time and now you’re going to fucking 
pay.” Antonio didn’t learn what the officer meant until being taken downtown to the Travis 
County Jail. In addition charging him with resisting arrest, a Class A misdemeanor, Oborski had 
claimed Antonio has spit in his face, and further charged him with felony harassment of a public 
official—a third degree felony offense carrying a prison sentence of two to ten years. 
 
 
FIGURE 8: Photographs of the New Year’s Day 2012 incident, taken by an anonymous 
bystander, that helped launch the Peaceful Streets Project. http://peacefulstreets.com. 
 
              Upon being released from jail the following day, Antonio learned from the friend he was 
driving home that witnesses were present on the scene, but the officers had prevented them from 
sharing their contact information with him. Antonio immediately began using social media to 
seek out the witnesses and posted fliers around the 7-Eleven location. Several stepped forward, 
including someone who had recorded video footage with a cell phone from a distance and left the 
scene unbeknownst to anyone present. The police department refused to release the police 
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vehicle camera recordings as well as the 7-Eleven security camera footage, pending criminal 
proceedings. During the entire 15 months it would take until a grand jury heard Antonio 
Buehler’s case, that cell phone recording was the sole public evidence of what happened that 
night, and of the officers’ misrepresentation of the facts. Not only did the officers violently aggress 
against the woman and Antonio; Antonio never spit on Oborski, nor did Oborski wipe his face, 
as claimed in his police affidavit (2012)—“No spit, no wipe!” read the flyers soon plastered all 
over the city.  
             Following the incident, Antonio met with several friends and supporters at Brave New 
Books, Austin’s libertarian bookstore that also provides free space for a wide range of libertarian-
oriented meetings and events. Following his experience in the military, Antonio had become both 
an ardent anti-war activist and supporter of Ron Paul’s presidential bid. Having relocated to 
Austin from New York about a year prior to the New Year’s incident, he quickly became a part 
of the city’s libertarian community and regularly shared his own personal experiences in a variety 
of public forums, from trans-partisan anti-war events to Ron Paul rallies. The small group, 
largely acquainted through libertarian circles, planned a strategy to build on the momentum 
provided by Antonio’s case: his media outreach, along with the credibility provided by his 
educational and military background, had already made his story a local news phenomenon. The 
mission of the group was to bring about a cultural shift where individuals understand their rights 
and hold law enforcement officials accountable, and communities protect and serve each other. 
Rather than aiming to petition officials or otherwise engage the political process, the group 
expressly opted for the tactics of community organizing, non-political and non-violent direct 
action, and use of new media technologies. By stressing the non-political, transpartisan nature of 
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the project, the activists aimed to unite Austinites across ideological divides to shed light upon 
police abuse rampant throughout Austin — the Peaceful Streets Project was born. 
 
FIGURE 9: Peaceful Streets Project Facebook banner. http://peacefulstreets.com. 
 
           I learned about Antonio’s case through the libertarian grapevine, and joined the effort to 
build the organization.  The group soon recruited activists from a variety of backgrounds to help 
with the project, including several extensively involved with Occupy Austin. One of the group’s 
earlier actions was an “Occupy APD” rally in support of Antonio. Held in front of Austin Police 
Headquarters, the action brought together representatives of Veterans for Ron Paul, Occupy 
activists, libertarian student group members and longtime liberty movement participants, as well 
as members of the general public.  
             In the months that followed, the Peaceful Streets Project became a central hub of Austin 
community organizing. Through “Police Complaint Departments,” volunteers recorded 
testimony of Austinites wishing to share their own experiences of police misconduct. Volunteers 
gathered stories by tabling in public spaces, particularly outside of the county jail where those 
being released were provided free snacks, water and cell phone access. The collected testimony is 
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made available on the organization’s website, underneath a quote from James Baldwin’s No Name 
in the Street: 
 [I]f one really wishes to know how justice is administered in a country, one does 
not question the policemen, the lawyers, the judges, or the protected members of 
the middle class. One goes to the unprotected— those, precisely, who need the 
law’s protection most!—and listens to their testimony. 
 
Volunteer teams hit the streets to reach out particularly to Austin’s marginalized communities 
disproportionately affected by police abuse, especially the predominantly black and latino 
neighborhoods on the city’s east side — spending countless over-100 degree days flyering the 
streets and going door to door to speak with community members about free upcoming events. 
Having had some organizing and legal experience on police misconduct issues, I developed a 
training curriculum on knowing your rights in police encounters. In my months of volunteering 
with the project we hosted numerous such trainings, which provided donated food and were held 
at locations ranging from bookstores to east side public libraries and churches to the local 
community college.  
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FIGURE 10: Peaceful Streets Project founder Antonio Buehler making new friends while getting 
out the word about an upcoming Know Your Rights training in east Austin. June 2012. 
http://peacefulstreets.com. 
 
              In the year and some months since its inception, the Peaceful Streets Project has held 
over a dozen such trainings and spearheaded scores of copwatch actions, where volunteers 
record police interactions for the public’s protection. A substantial base of volunteers is associated 
with the liberty movement; much of the donations making the organization’s work possible come 
from libertarian donors who regularly fund cooperative grassroots efforts launched by activists in 
libertarian circles. 
             During this time, Antonio remained a constant target, receiving intimidating phone calls 
and being stared down and followed by several officers while facing the very real possibility of 
years in prison. But this only fueled his commitment to police accountability activism. Prior to 
the grand jury hearing on the New Year’s Day incident, he was arrested two additional times 
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during copwatch actions and charged with misdemeanor offenses for allegedly “interfering” with 
an investigation—a widespread tactic in suppressing otherwise legal video monitoring of police 
encounters.  
FIGURE 11:	  Peaceful Streets Project founder	  Antonio Buehler greets supporters after being 
released from jail following his second arrest during a copwatch action. 
http://peacefulstreets.com. 
 
             In the summer of 2012, he led the Peaceful Streets Project in organizing the first annual 
Police Accountability Summit, which gathered over 200 people at an east Austin community 
space. At the event, the Project placed 100 free digital videocameras in the hands of trained 
Austinites without phones with recording capability, committed to monitoring police activity in 
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their neighborhoods. The Summit brought together young and old Austinites of disparate 
backgrounds, from different parts of town, and across political divides for a free day of police 
accountability education and activism, with breakfast and lunch provided: families with 
children—as well as a youth group of young folks who enthusiastically partook in the event’s 
discussions—joined longtime organizers from Austin’s black and latino communities, activists 
from Occupy Austin and various other organizations, students, and many others including 
several of Austin’s homeless. Victims of police abuse moved participants with tragic stories of 
lives scarred forever by police violence. A local artist presented the family of Byron Carter, Jr. 
with two paintings of Carter, a 20-year old black man shot and killed in 2011 by Austin Police 
Department officers who fired into the vehicle in which he was a passenger.  
             In addition to training sessions on knowing your rights in police encounters and on 
recording police activity safely, participants heard from a wide range of speakers, including Rene 
Valdez of Austin’s Resistencia Books, community organizers Debbie Russell and Scott Crow, 
personal safety instructor Micheal Cargill, Texas Civil Rights Project founder and director Jim 
Harrington, and Pete Eyre of copblock.org, a longtime liberty movement activist. The Summit 
also featured prerecorded interviews which Project volunteers conducted with Austin’s Paul 
Hernandez, founding member of the local Brown Berets, and Robert King, former Black 
Panther, political prisoner and the only freed member of the Angola 3, who spent 29 years in 
solitary confinement in Lousiana’s Angola prison. That year, the Peaceful Streets Project was 
voted Best Grassroots Movement of 2012 — and Antonio was voted Best Activist of 2012 — in 
the Austin Chronicle’s Best of Austin, a popular annual readers’ poll conducted by the independent 
weekly publication. 
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             Fifteen months after the New Year’s Day 2012 incident, the Travis County grand jury 
finally convened to hear the cases of both Antonio and the female passenger. Four weeks later, 
the jury chose not to issue any felony indictments against Antonio. He was instead indicted for 
failure to obey a lawful order, a Class C misdemeanor punishable by up to a $500 fine. The 
grand jury further did not indict the passenger on the charges of public intoxication and failure to 
obey a lawful order. They did, however, indict her for resisting arrest, a Class A misdemeanor 
punishable by up to a year in jail. 
             During the summer of 2013, the Peaceful Streets Project organized the second annual 
Police Accountability Summit in Austin. Chapters of Peaceful Streets have formed in 
Houston, Dallas and New York City, all launched by individuals active in the liberty movement. 
Additional chapters are currently forming in San Antonio and El Paso, Texas as well as in 
Sacramento, California; Pueblo, Boulder, Colorado Springs, and Denver, Colorado; Vero 
Beach, Florida; Chicago, Illinois; New Orleans, Louisiana; Boston, Massachusetts; Bismark, 
North Dakota; Greenville, South Carolina; Provo, Utah; Lewis County, Washington; and Eau 
Claire, Wisconsin. 
 
The Free State Project: A Microcosm of the Liberty Movement 
 One of the most well-known libertarian initiatives remains the Free State Project, a 
political migration effort aiming to recruit at least 20,000 libertarians to relocate to New 
Hampshire and build a beachhead of the like-minded. Participants sign a statement of intent to 
relocate to New Hampshire and work toward a society in which the sole role of civil government 
is the protection of individuals’ rights to life, liberty and property. As provided by the Free State 
Project’s participation guidelines, the first 5,000 people to sign the statement chose the 
destination state through a vote, using a simple Condorcet method. Participants pledge to move 
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as soon as possible within five years of 20,000 people signing the statement. To date, over 14,000 
have signed and over 1,100 have become “early movers” — relocating to New Hampshire prior 
to the 20,000 signature benchmark. 
             Established in 2001 and guided by the slogan “Liberty in our lifetime,” the Free State 
Project began with observations regarding the inability of libertarians to elect federal candidates 
to office. While the Project itself is a non-profit organization the sole purpose of which is to work 
toward the relocation of 20,000 liberty-supporting individuals into a single state, New Hampshire 
was chosen in part because its low population ensures greater impact upon the political system. 
In turn, the Project has been portrayed as everything from a radical right secessionist scheme to a 
sinister political takeover devised by the Koch brothers. In this sense, both the Project and its 
popular representation are microcosms of the broader liberty movement. Some Project 
participants are indeed Republicans with tea party sympathies, and several have run for office 
themselves. Once elected, they sponsor legislation such as repealing the state’s Property Assessed 
Clean Energy program that allows municipalities to finance new renewable and energy efficient 
projects through offering loans to participating property holders. That bill was introduced by 
Carol McGuire, a libertarian activist who moved to New Hampshire as part of the Project and 
was elected to the state’s House of Representatives in 2008. Her bill ultimately passed with 
amendments, permitting financing through the issuance of municipal revenue bonds but not 
from general municipal revenues. Carol’s husband Dan won a House seat several years after his 
wife’s first election, proposing legislation such as a bill to repeal the federally-funded New 
Hampshire Rail Transit Authority providing commuter rail and related public transportation 
services. The bill passed, but was ultimately vetoed by the governor.  
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             But Free State Project participants and supporters in the House, including the McGuires, 
also routinely join many Democrats on issues such as marijuana law reform. The House has 
passed measures to decriminalize the possession of small amounts of marijuana four times over 
the past five years. These Representatives also support a range of related marijuana bills, from 
legalizing the substance altogether to sanctioning it for medicinal use. Similarly, when the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) faced public outrage for civil liberties violations 
stemming from the implementation of airport pat downs and body scanners in 2010, the House 
passed a bill requiring law enforcement officers to document complaints relating to 
administrative searches by TSA agents.  
             Further, as is the case in the liberty movement broadly, a substantial number of “Free 
Staters” reject the political process altogether, focusing instead on civil disobedience actions and 
community projects. Thus, activists arriving through the Free State Project, alongside locals and 
longtime residents, have launched Free Keene — an effort based in the New Hampshire city and 
aimed toward replacing government with voluntary alternatives using peaceful, market-based 
actions. The community’s activities are disseminated via several vibrant online forums, 
promoting a wealth of activism and related efforts.  
             Alongside fellow police accountability activists, Pete Eyre, the copblock.org organizer 
who presented at the Peaceful Streets Project’s Summit, is heavily involved with Free Keene. 
Pete and allies identify as voluntaryists — in its contemporary manifestation, a libertarian 
philosophy that stresses individual sovereignty and nearly synonymous with anarcho-capitalism 
grounded in the non-aggression principle. Free Keene provides Free Staters with the option of 
signing The Shire Society Declaration, which stipulates that that no form of political governance 
may be relied upon to secure the individual rights of life, liberty, or property, and that binding 
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obligations may only be created consensually, through explicit voluntary association. The 
Declaration was inspired by “A New Covenant,” an essay penned by libertarian science fiction 
writer L. Neil Smith — not to be confused with the aforementioned science fiction author J. Neil 
Schulman, Konkin’s collaborator. Aware that the mix-up is commonplace especially in 
libertarian circles, Smith once signed a letter to Konkin, “Neil (L., not J.)” 
 
Natural Living, Food Freedom, and Small-Scale Production 
 Efforts inspired by the Free State Project are mushrooming throughout the country on 
various scales. In this vein, Austin libertarian icons John Bush and Catherine Bleish have 
launched Lone Star Libertopia, a grassroots effort to encourage both liberty movement activists 
and others “working to create a free, prosperous, and sustainable world to move to Central 
Texas and participate in the liberty evolution already taking place.” Through regular social 
events, the initiative creates networking opportunities and aims to promote the area as an activist 
destination. Some who have already relocated, those traveling to central Texas, and numerous 
local activists have fostered a community at the couple’s Blush Family Farm, a resource for 
anyone interested in learning about growing food, raising chickens, and sustainable living 
broadly. Life on the 2.4 acre farmstead is the subject of Sovereign Living, a television show 
concept developed by the couple that documents their challenges as parents transitioning toward 
a more self-sufficient lifestyle devoid of dependence on centralized institutions. Portraying the 
family’s attempt to reduce their energy consumption through a combination of preservation and 
solar power and goal of growing, trading and farming half of their food needs, the show also 
offers a look at the natural home birth of the couple’s second child. With the first three episodes 
currently in post-production, the duo is traveling to similar activist and community spaces across 
the country to show sneak-peeks and raise money to finish the full season. 
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             A co-founder and former executive director of Texans for Accountable Government, a 
non-partisan, Austin-based political action committee dedicated to limiting the reach of 
government, John gradually moved away from the political arena toward addressing social and 
economic problems through grassroots, community efforts. As the longtime host of the daily 
morning radio talk show Rise Up Radio on the Liberty Radio Network, he highlights radical 
solutions that everyday people can adopt in addressing injustice and building resilient 
communities, from gardening and sustainability, to sound money and alternative currencies, to 
local mobilization such as the Peaceful Streets Project, of which he is a founding member.   
             In late 2012, John spearheaded Austin’s non-profit Center for Natural Living and 
currently heads the Center, of which the television show is a project. Other Center initiatives 
include organizing health education meetings in marginalized communities; providing fluoride 
water filters to new or expecting mothers; assisting low-income families with alternative 
education needs and accessing nutritional supplements and natural health remedies; and building 
a community garden alongside biodiesel processing and aquaponics systems. At the launch party 
for the Center, children frolicked in the backyard of a local café amidst community members 
enjoying local food, raffles, and a silent auction. The event brought together a range of speakers, 
from Arturo Arredondo of the Texas Aquaponic Group, an expert in aquaponics who helps 
Texans convert backyards into farmyards using aquaponics in conjunction with other personal 
food production methods, to MariMikel Penn of New Life Birth Services, an experienced 
midwife providing prenatal and post-partum care alongside home birth and birth center services. 
Also sharing the stage were the Peaceful Street Project’s Antonio Buehler; John van Deusen of 
Austin’s Food is Free Project, which teaches neighborhoods how to line their streets with front 
yard community gardens built from salvaged materials; and Max Elliott of Urban Roots, which 
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provides Austin youth with paid internships to work on the organization’s east Austin sustainable 
farm in east Austin and donates 40 percent of each year’s harvest to local soup kitchens and food 
pantries. Seed funding for the Center was provided by John Ramsey, the 22-year-old Ron Paul 
supporter who became a millionaire overnight when his grandfather passed away in 2010. 
Ramsey directed a part of his fortune into building the Liberty for All super PAC, backing Paul-
endorsed candidates including U.S. Representative Thomas Massey from Kentucky and 
opposing several establishment Republicans. But Ramsey’s interests have increasingly expanded 
beyond the electoral arena to supporting community-based solutions and social entrepreneurship 
— the topic of his own speech at the launch event. 
             Food politics in particular is rapidly gaining a prominent place both in libertarian 
activism and cross-ideological alliances. In 2012, the libertarian magazine Reason recruited 
Baylen Linnekin, the director of Keep Food Legal, to pen a regular column for its website. 
Linnekin’s non-profit organization advocates for “food freedom,” “the right of every American to 
grow, raise, produce, buy, sell, share, cook, eat, and drink the foods of their own choosing” (Keep 
Food Legal 2012). In part, it works toward abolishing all agricultural subsidies and subsidized 
crop insurance as well as defeating restrictive food bans and regulations. Such government 
action, in Linnekin’s view, never favors “the little guy” and disadvantages the production of 
healthy food, a key factor in healthy food accessibility problems faced by low-income areas. He 
further highlights the potential of the issue to foster activist coalitions: 
People on the left and right and in between have a variety of views on any number 
of issues. But when it comes to food, they tend to be united in the idea that it’s up 
to them and families for what they should be eating. A lot of people realize that 
the government and corporations are working hand in hand in keeping them from 
being free to make those choices. 
(Holt 2012) 
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But libertarian activism on this front is not limited to opposing government action. Scores of 
libertarians throughout Texas joined the 2013 March against Monsanto international campaign 
in opposition to the GMO giant. Austinites of all political backgrounds took to the streets in an 
anti-Monsanto march on May 25, 2013, in solidarity with over 400 similar events held that day 
across 45 countries. Following the march, John Bush and other libertarians teamed up with local 
food activists to plan a Grow Your Own action in conjunction with the next march. The event 
brought together volunteers in a day-long effort to help Austin area low-income communities 
grow their own food by sharing skills and assisting with labor.  
             Increasingly, liberty movement participants and fellow travelers stress decentralized, 
small-scale production as an alternative to corporate capitalism. Mutualism proponent Kevin 
Carson is particularly active among libertarians and libertarian-leaning anarchists presently 
collaborating with others in various parts of the world to document emerging variants of mutual 
aid economies. Such a project is fundamentally different from partaking in the ebb and flow of 
various management fads: 
More often, management simply pays lip service to the latest management theory 
fad du jour, which supposedly stresses worker empowerment, while continuing to 
practice Taylorism in actual fact. I used to work in a hospital that brought in 
outside consultants to talk about Deming and “quality circles” and similar bullshit 
out the wazoo. There were three separate offices, side by side, with the word 
“Quality” in the job title on the door. Here’s the funny part: most of the problems 
they sought to address (patient falls, hospital-acquired infections, medication 
errors, etc.) were the result of deliberate under-staffing. Shit happened because 
people working on the floor didn’t have time to slow down, notice things, or think 
about what they were doing. But management’s “solution” was to do everything 
but increase staffing: more “incident review” committees doing “root cause 
analysis,” more “process improvement committees,” more tracking forms for us to 
waste time filling out, more agitprop handouts (“Hey, you stupid people! Don’t 
you know you’re supposed to wash your hands?”), ad nauseam. On a weekday, 
there were probably more middle management people sitting in committees 
thinking up new ways to interfere with our jobs, than there were nurses providing 
direct patient care. All management theories, no matter how theoretically 
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empowering, translate in practice into Taylorism. That’s because they’re 
implemented by bosses! Duh! 
(Carson 2005) 
 
 Supporters of cooperative and employee-owned models of economic organization 
highlight a number of case studies, from the Mondragon cooperative group in the Basque region 
of Spain to the flexible manufacturing networks of the Emilia Romagna region in northern Italy. 
The latter, which in the 1940s counted among Europe’s poorest areas, by 2005 produced the 
highest GDP per capita in the country; in Bologna, the region’s center, 45 percent of the GDP is 
produced by cooperatives, which deliver 85 percent of the city’s social services (Swinney 2005).  
Similarly, anarchist Eugene Plawiuk documents economic development in various parts of Africa 
attained not through large-scale farming but through the collective farming by small villages and 
family farmers — especially inter-village cooperatives developed primarily by women, for 
instance throughout Senegal (Carson 2005). Supporters of the growing cooperative movement 
point to such market models of “self-managed cooperative capitalism” as an alternative to the 
failed monopoly capitalism schemes that have attempted to introduce large-scale, fertilizer-based 
agribusiness operations into the region — schemes that are in fact detrimental to sustainable 
agriculture, mining, forestry, and industrial production. As Plawiuk observes however, such 
cooperative associations require access to both capital and markets. 
             Carson observes that these small-scale, decentralized economic models have much in 
common with the ideas of Kirkpatrick Sale (2007), Barry Stein (1974), Lewis Mumford (1974), 
and Jane Jacobs (1970), as well as Murray Bookchin (2004) and Peter Kropotkin (1906). For 
instance, flexible, multi-purpose machines and factories could meet the full range of local needs 
without requiring large amounts of overbuilt, underused production facilities. As Sale wrote, 
quoting noted agrarian and self-sufficiency experimenter Ralph Borsodi, two-thirds of the 
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manufactured goods we consume could be produced most economically on a small scale. Both 
Jacobs and Stein highlighted the key role of an engaged workforce in the innovation process, and 
particularly the significance of local inventiveness — such as finding creative new uses for readily-
available raw materials, ways to recycle scrap, and ways for one firm to effectively use the 
byproducts of another in its production process. Further, according to Stein, small, local firms 
serving local markets can respond much more effectively to changes in local demand, helping 
insulate the local economy from business cycle fluctuations. 
 
Bitcoin and the Peer-to-Peer Revolution  
 The internet is ablaze with debate about the decentralized digital currency and peer-to-
peer payment system Bitcoin,2 with literally hundreds of thousands of articles and online 
discussion forums analyzing its prospects and limitations. From Bill Gates’ description of Bitcoin 
as “an intellectual tour de force” to Al Gore’s statement of support because “the “regulation of 
money supply needs to be depoliticized,” the innovation is drawing headlines around the world 
despite being perceived as little more than a gimmick until rather recently. In November 2013, 
the market value of all bitcoins in circulation was estimated at US$10 billion. Over 20,000 online 
retailers and thousands of brick and mortar establishments now accept the currency as payment. 
Most recently Overstock.com became the first major retailer to do so, with the company’s CEO 
asserting, “You want money to be based on something that no government mandarin can wish 
into existence with the stroke of a pen.” 
             Yet a mere four to five years ago, few outside of select tech and libertarian circles were 
aware of the development that would soon take the world by storm. First described in a 2008 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Generally, “Bitcoin” capitalized refers to the technology and network whereas “bitcoin” lowercase refers to the 
currency itself. 	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paper published under the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin was introduced as open source 
software in early 2009, when the first bitcoins were issued. It operates on an entirely 
decentralized, peer to peer basis, requiring no third party to protect against double-spending. 
Through various online exchange sites, bitcoins are bought and sold at variable prices against the 
value of other currencies. Bitcoin uses public key cryptography to control the creation and 
transfer of money. Users send payments by broadcasting digitally signed messages to the 
network. Participants known as miners verify and timestamp transactions into a shared public 
database called the block chain, for which they are rewarded with transaction fees and newly 
minted bitcoins. While during the first exchanges 1,309.03 bitcoins amounted to one U.S. dollar, 
over the past several months bitcoins have traded at record high levels, with the exchange rate 
vacillating between $800 to $1000 per bitcoin. 
             Fierce advocates from the very beginning, liberty movement participants continue to 
play a crucial role in promoting the currency and related developments. Austin alone is home to 
at least five Bitcoin groups, all launched by longstanding liberty movement participants. The 
Texas Bitcoin Conference, set for March 2014 at Austin’s Circuit for the Americas, is expected to 
draw thousands of members of the Bitcoin community. Many of Bitcoin’s foremost proponents 
reside in Austin and are well-known members of tech and libertarian circles. Several were heavily 
involved in the 1980s and 90s cypherpunk scene, of which Julian Assange is likely the most 
infamous former affiliate. The heavily anti-statist cypherpunks advocated the widespread use of 
cryptography as a route to social and political change, stressing the defense of privacy in the 
electronic age. 
             The liberty movement heavily supports Bitcoin due to its potential to undermine state 
currencies, with many once-avid gold standard supporters redirecting their energies toward the 
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phenomenon as a superior alternative. Through the lens of Austrian economics, money is merely 
that commodity which best satisfies the properties necessary for useful exchange in an open 
market. Historically, in this view, gold and silver have emerged to fill this role, so long as the 
government stayed out of the way. It is the unique properties of these metals that make them 
excellent money: they are scarce, fungible, uniform, transportable, have a high value-to-weight 
ratio, are easily identifiable, are highly durable, and their supplies are relatively steady and 
predictable. But alongside its ostensible ability to circumvent inflation, capital controls, and 
international sanctions, Bitcoin also means complete ownership of money both in storage and 
transfer, with no one able to prevent people from purchasing or spending it; millions in bitcoins 
can easily and privately be transported across state lines on a USB drive. In turn, for many 
libertarians, Bitcoin, with its specific attributes, is an even better form of money than both 
currency backed by precious metals and what the marketplace currently enjoys — or, in Austrian 
parlance, is forced to use. In the words of one longstanding Bitcoin advocate and ardent 
libertarian, “Every day a more resilient economy is being built, and not at the point of a gun, but 
voluntarily — not by decree of Bernanke, but by spontaneous, self-interested private order.” 
             University of Texas, Austin graduate student and libertarian anarchist Daniel Krawisz 
thus describes the significance of “The Killer App of Liberty” and its relationship to 
libertarianism: 
Bitcoin is an enormous improvement over PayPal, credit cards, banks, and it is 
even superior to gold in many ways. It can be teleported instantly anywhere in the 
world without relying on any institution other than a distributed network of 
computers. A Bitcoin wallet, properly secured, cannot be stolen. Banks are 
obsolete. It is more difficult to create new Bitcoin than to create gold. It would be 
possible to create a machine that makes gold with nuclear reactions. It would be 
much more difficult to convince the Bitcoin community to accept a change to 
their software that would allow their currency to be inflated. Bitcoin is potentially, 
and I believe very probably, one of the greatest inventions in history. It fights 
squarely on the side of libertarians. 
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If Bitcoin becomes money, the government’s control of money will have ended. 
There will be no more banks for governments to collude with. The dark age of 
inflation will be over. Though Bitcoin is only four years old, it has already shaken 
world markets. Almost anything that is sold online can be bought with it. 
Argentinians and Iranians use it to escape capital controls. US regulators are 
openly mocked on television for expressing the possibility of regulating it. Its 
growth is already astonishing, and as it grows, it only becomes more useful. It is 
like the Blob. No one can stop it. 
(N.d.-c) 
 
As noted, Bitcoin operates using public-key cryptography, a prominent topic in numerous new 
online forums under the rubric “crypto-anarchy.” Krawisz thus describes the basic premise: 
Suppose there are two algorithms which are inverses of one another. Both are fast 
to do forward and very slow to reverse. One algorithm can be used to encrypt and 
the other to decrypt. I keep the decryption algorithm secret but let my friends see 
the encryption algorithm. Now they can send me messages but only I can read 
them, and I have not given away any secrets that I cannot afford to have 
compromised. In fact, I can let my enemies see the encryption algorithm too. 
They can do nothing with it but make their own messages to me. The final 
upgrade is that everyone has two algorithms. Everyone keeps one algorithm secret 
and publicizes the other. How can we discover so many algorithms? Typically 
there is a class of algorithms, each of which is specified by a number, or key. So 
we each have a public key and a private key. This is public-key encryption. Now 
any two people can communicate securely even if they do not begin with a secure 
channel . . . 
 
FIGURE 12: Public-key cryptography. Courtesy of Daniel Krawisz.  
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The magic of public-key cryptography comes from the fact that it gives people the 
ability to prove that they have a secret without revealing it. Think about how 
paradoxical that sounds for a moment. Yet it is quite easy to understand now. If I 
wish to verify your identity, I simply send you a message encrypted by your public 
key and ask you to tell me what the message said. Only the holder of the private 
key can answer the question correctly. This seems nonintuitive to us because our 
technology does not rely on it. The fact that we still use such primitive 
technologies today like credit cards, which have their number printed right on 
them, or forms of identification such as social security numbers is backwards. 
They have been obsolete for decades. There should never be a reason to show 
your password or identity number to anyone else, ever.                                   
(N.d.-b) 
In the views of Krawisz and fellow libertarian crypto-anarchy enthusiasts, cryptographic 
communities both embody libertarian social organization and demonstrate its desirability. Such 
organization reduces the need to rely on strength for defense, promoting independence while 
fostering decentralization by decreasing the need to coordinate through third parties: 
A community which combines cryptographic secrecy, public-key authentication, 
and digital signatures is a voluntary community tied together by contracts and 
reputation. It requires no central authority because the records it relies on to 
establish reputation can be stored on many different computers. 
Thus, it is resilient against government attack . . . There is no need to speak in 
abstract terms with people who won’t listen until we turn blue. Just build the 
networks and people will be attracted to them. Once people get used to them, 
they will demand them. 
 (N.d.-b) 
 
 As illustrated throughout this chapter, millennial libertarian practices on the ground — 
projects outside of formal political processes and educational initiatives aiming to disseminate 
libertarian ideas — increasingly transcend political and ideological divides. Such developments 
are further visible in the proliferation of online discussion forums — which libertarians of various 
stripes have either helped launch or widely participate in — organized around promoting 
concrete, applied initiatives. For instance, the Facebook group Resilient Communities Project 
brings together thousands to share knowledge relevant to building decentralized communities 
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“that anticipate risk, limit impact, and bounce back rapidly through survival, adaptability, 
evolution, and growth in the face of turbulent change” (N.d.). Discussion topics range from urban 
and organic gardening and cooperatively-organized caregiving services to open source 
technology. 
             Many such forums expressly eschew platformist bickering. For example, the Facebook 
group Reconstructing Society is dedicated to multi-tendency discussion of various strategies for 
both reforming existing institutions and creating new institutions to conform to the principles of 
individual liberty, social responsibility and environmental conservation. Rather than promoting 
any single set of political ideologies, it aims to serve as a forum for interaction between multiple 
reform movements. Similarly, the Worker Cooperative Effort group brackets discussion of 
political ideologies in favor of discussing the implementation of worker-owned cooperatives and 
to help existing cooperatives meet various challenges. Likewise, the Anti Statist Cease Fire Zone 
group tables political debate in order to focus on “practical projects we can undertake in our 
communities to increase resilience, cooperation, and self sufficiency to reduce dependency on the 
nation state and corporations” (N.d.).	  
              Central to Bitcoin and other developments being discussed and implemented through 
these and a wealth of other spaces is the emergence of peer to peer (P2P) technology. Popularized 
by the file-sharing system Napster in 1999, P2P networking is a distributed application 
architecture that allocates workloads between peers. In contrast to client-server models, P2P 
systems lack a central administrator and peers both consume as well as provide resources, for 
instance bandwidth, storage space and computing power. Increasingly, collaborative P2P systems 
aim to achieve goals beyond conventional file and processor cycle sharing (Bandara 2013). More 
broadly, P2P refers to an ethos permeating discrete movements and projects that do not 
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necessarily consciously identify this commonality. Thus the Amsterdam-based P2P Foundation 
aims to serve as a matrix “to inspire the creation and linking of other nodes active in the P2P 
field, organized around topics and common interests, locality, and any form of identity and 
organization which makes sense for the people involved” (N.d.). The Foundation strives to serve 
as a meeting place for those broadly agreeing, in part, that:  
[T]he “distributed network” format, expressed in the specific manner of peer to 
peer relations, is a new form of organizing and subjectivity, and an alternative for 
many systems within the current socio-economic and cultural-political order, 
which though it does not offer solutions per se, points the way to a variety of 
dialogical and self-organizing formats, i.e. it represents different processes for 
arriving at such solutions; it ushers in a era of “nonrepresentational democracy,” 
where an increasing number of people are able to manage their social and 
productive life through the use of a variety of autonomous and interdependent 
networks and peer circles; that global governance, and the global market will be, 
and will have to be, more influenced by modes of governance involving 
multistakeholdership. 
 
Many proponents view P2P as a new information commons, requiring fundamental changes in 
the intellectual property regime as reflected by, for instance, the free and open source software 
movement. The key distinction between free/open source software and traditional software lies 
in the treatment of source code. Source code refers to the product written by human software 
programmers, which is then translated into object code, only readable to computers and 
expressed in a series of ones and zeroes. Distributors of traditional software, such as for instance 
Microsoft, only include object code with their product, while free and open source software 
includes the source code as well. In turn, any open source software user can not only operate the 
software, but also study, modify and build upon it. 
             The disagreements and differences between free software and open source software 
advocates themselves — particularly with regard to the intellectual property frameworks they 
promote and corresponding justifications — are complex and space does not permit a detailed 
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account here. Perhaps the most popular libertarian tract on the issue is Stephan Kinsella’s Against 
Intellectual Property (2008), which posits that the very existence of patents, including copyrights and 
trademarks, is contrary to a free market. Grounded in anarcho-capitalist analysis, Kinsella’s 
central argument is that all intellectual property regimes use the state to create artificial scarcities 
of non-scarce goods, and are coercive in that they violate both property rights and the freedom of 
contract. Countless liberty movement participants draw upon the framework popularized by 
Kinsella, a frequent speaker at various movement events, in promoting a wealth of emerging 
technologies — from Bitcoin and cryptography practices to open design and 3D printing, 
discussed below. 
             Of course, none of these or related innovations are uniquely libertarian in nature, and 
are promoted by a wealth of advocates across political and ideological lines for various purposes. 
From its inception, however, libertarians maintained a substantial presence in parts of the free 
and open source software movement, and remain actively involved in P2P developments. In this 
vein, the 2011 live-streamed Agora I/O “unconference” featured extensive technology-related 
presentations in a unique format. The event promoted conversations on all visions of liberty — 
I/O means “input/output” in computer terms — “not only by creating a free market in relevant 
knowledge but also by being an experiment in liberty itself. The Agora I/O vision is for an 
anarchic event where order arises spontaneously. We issue the call to action. We create a central 
repository of information. You give presentations. You organize meetups around the country to 
coincide with the Agora I/O unconferences. Anyone can speak and participants can choose 
which speakers they will engage with. Call it coopetition!” (N.d.). 
             The project is organized on an egalitarian, horizontal model whereby online channel-
makers create channels — collections of speaker presentations organized around a topic — 
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through which speakers present 55-minute talks; both can freely sell website ad space and their 
own products as well as solicit donations. Speakers self-select and participants choose which 
speakers to watch. Anyone anywhere can participate for free, and events go on around the clock 
— for a small fee, participants can watch ad-free. Agora I/O also promotes in-person meetups, 
where participants gather in real life while socializing with others online. Technology-related 
talks ranged from building ad-hoc, off the grid secure networks to open design technology, a 
nascent development with potentially profound implications that is widely embraced by the 
liberty movement. 
             Open design applies open source software concepts to the development of physical 
products. In addition to the software that drives the hardware, users are also given hardware 
design — such as mechanical drawings, schematics, list of required raw materials, data needed to 
manufacture circuit boards, integrated circuit layout data, and source code used to describe the 
structure, design and operation of electronic circuits. 
 Users thus design and build the final product themselves. A wide variety of alliances and 
organizations have emerged to develop the potential of open design — in particular, 3D printing, 
the production of a three-dimensional solid object of essentially any shape from a digital model. 
In light of widespread internet access and inexpensive computer technology, 3D printing presents 
a promising avenue for customized sustainable development solutions — local communities 
could easily and economically produce designs from readily available resources to meet their 
needs (Pearce 2010).  
             Numerous companies, alongside various independent enthusiasts, are developing 
affordable 3D printer models for home desktop use. In 2013, 25-year-old market anarchist Cody 
Wilson, a law student at the University of Texas, Austin, caused a media uproar and became an 
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overnight libertarian legend by producing a functional gun using a 3D printer purchased online. 
His non-profit organization Defense Distributed develops open source gun designs, making 
blueprints available online for free to anyone, anywhere, at any time — earning him a spot on 
Wired.com’s list of 15 Most Dangerous People in the World (Beckhusen 2012). Wilson appeared 
on a range of national talk shows and continues to be revered at libertarian group meetings 
focused on 3D printing nationwide. But not all movement participants are equally thrilled about 
his notoriety. A libertarian anarchist student group leader noted,  
Frankly I was really put off by how he [Wilson] presents himself on television, it 
makes the entire movement look crazed and gun-nutty . . . I obviously support 
people’s ability to have guns, but 3D printing has so much potential to help people 
around the world. It completely undermines economies of scale. Things can be 
made extremely cheaply and in massive quantities . . . So many communities 
could produce what they need locally using this technology, even using 
byproducts and things that would otherwise be waste. I would really like to see 
more libertarians talk about that. 
 
3D printing is but one of a range of emerging technologies that libertarians, among others, see as 
key to building a genuinely free society. In a forthcoming book, Krawisz situates the P2P 
framework as a central tenant of libertarian strategy: 
If an entrepreneurial idea is to be adopted, it must be attractive to people who are 
not concerned with government risk. It is unacceptable to propose that people just 
stop putting money in banks and trade only in gold coins, as did both Rothbard 
and Mises. Libertarian entrepreneurship must simultaneously increase the division 
of labor and reduce risk. As successful as the homeschooling movement has been, 
it can never directly challenge the control of the public schools over children. An 
idea that promotes atomism makes everyone poorer. Not an easy sell, and self-
defeating in the end too. Loners stand no chance against the state. 
The strategy, therefore, is to promote decentralization by enabling people to 
coordinate with one another by a shared system of rules or traditions rather than 
through a mediator. Promote independence from particular organizations by 
promoting greater dependence on networks and on society as a whole. 
(N.d.-a) 
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Chapter Five:  
Liberalism Contested: The Liberty Movement’s Tapestry of Intellectual 
Lineages 
 
There would be little or no “tolerance” and “openmindedness” so dear to 
left-libertarians. Instead, one would be on the right path toward restoring 
the freedom of association and exclusion implied in the institution of 
private property, if only towns and villages could and would do what they 
did as a matter of course until well into the nineteenth century in Europe 
and the United States. There would be signs regarding entrance 
requirements to the town . . . (for example, no beggars, bums, or homeless, 
but also no homosexuals, drug users, Jews, Moslems, Germans or Zulus), 
and those who did not meet these entrance requirements would be kicked 
out as trespassers. Almost instantly, cultural and moral normalcy would 
reassert itself. 
 — Hans-Hermann Hoppe (2001a:211), on the anarcho-capitalist society 
 
The writing of economics professor and philosopher Hans-Hermann Hoppe have 
earned him the devotion of many anarcho-capitalists, and the label “anarcho-fascist” in 
other movement spaces. A central figure in the Ludwig von Mises Institute and former 
student of Jürgen Habermas, Hoppe boldly asserts the superiority of monarchy to 
democratic forms of government in building the case for anarcho-capitalism — his own 
preferred mode of social organization, which he somewhat tellingly terms the “natural 
order.” Hoppe brings a unique flavor to the anarcho-capitalist vision. His ideal anarcho-
capitalist society is “characterized by increased discrimination, segregation, spatial 
separation, uniculturalism (cultural homogeneity), exclusivity, and exclusion.” It is 
“distinctly un-egalitarian: ‘elitist,’ ‘hierarchical,’ ‘proprietarian,’ ‘patriarchal,’ and 
‘authoritarian,’ and its stability depends essentially on the existence of a self-conscious 
natural — voluntarily acknowledged — aristocracy” (2001b).  
While Hoppe’s argument regarding monarchic rule and his description of the 
natural order society are intentionally inflammatory, the underlying principles are quite 
consistent with standard libertarian analysis. This particular combination of unapologetic 
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rawness and basic libertarian economic and philosophical concepts has earned him a 
substantial fan following of contrariant young anarcho-capitalists worldwide, with his 
work translated into over twenty languages. In sum, although, in Hoppe’s view both 
monarchy and democracy are deficient, democracy is worse due to the structural 
incentives built into democratic forms of government. While his observations regarding 
actually-existing monarchies and democracies may be subject to empirical challenge, 
Hoppe uses this framework to make his case for an economically stable alternative to 
democracy. Much of his anarcho-capitalist classic Democracy: The God That Failed is 
dedicated to the intricacies of “the natural order,” where “every scarce resource, 
including all land, is owned privately, every enterprise is funded by voluntarily paying 
customers or private donors, and entry into every line of production, including that of 
property protection, conflict arbitration, and peacemaking, is free” (2001b).  
Hoppe, however, goes beyond stressing the key role of private property and 
exchange in libertarian thought, expressly linking libertarianism to social conservatism. 
Contemporary conservatives, he writes, are rightly concerned about “the decay of 
families, divorce, illegitimacy, loss of authority, multiculturalism, alternative lifestyles, 
social disintegration, sex and crime. All of these phenomena represent . . . scandalous 
deviations from the natural order” (2001a:190). In a passage that has perhaps stirred the 
most intense debate in libertarian circles, he writes: 
There can be no tolerance toward democrats and communists in a 
libertarian social order. They will have to be physically separated and 
expelled from society. Likewise, in a covenant founded for the purpose of 
protecting family and kin, there can be no tolerance toward those 
habitually promoting lifestyles incompatible with this goal. They — the 
advocates of alternative, non-family and kin-centered lifestyles such as, for 
instance, individual hedonism, parasitism, nature-environment worship, 
homosexuality, or communism — will have to be physically removed from 
society, too, if one is to maintain a libertarian order.  
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 (2001a:218) 
 
Much has been made of this paragraph, ardently defended by Hoppe’s supporters. He 
may be making the case in his usual provocative manner, they say, but ultimately he is 
simply restating the basic voluntary association principle: anyone can form a covenant 
excluding anyone else from their private property and then treat the excluded as 
trespassers. The passage, however, suggests more than limiting communities to those who 
have mutually agreed to be bound by certain restrictions. Rather, it expressly states that 
tolerating this particular list of undesirables is incompatible not only with protecting 
family and kin, but with maintaining a libertarian order. In this sense, Hoppe’s view is in 
the distinct minority among millennial libertarians. Nevertheless, his biting, heady style 
remains an inspiration to many. Even the debates regarding his more controversial 
assertions in numerous student libertarian group meetings and socials nationwide foster 
the continual building of community spaces where participants nuance their ideas, build 
relationships, and ultimately grow the liberty movement on the ground. As this book has 
attempted to illustrate, the contemporary liberty movement — and its more radical 
spaces in particular — is a complex labyrinth of disparate values and commitments. The 
following pages situate the contemporary movement’s various intellectual lineages in a 
broader historical context.  
Despite the throngs of anarcho-capitalists who revere Hoppe’s writing on 
anarcho-capitalism as groundbreaking radical philosophy, his analysis is simply another 
reincarnation of a longstanding tradition. In 1887, the German sociologist Ferdinand 
Tönnies developed the concepts of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, usually translated as 
“community” and “society,” respectively, to describe a key distinction between social 
systems. Gemeinschaft is thus typified by small-scale, often rural and peasant formations 
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where traditional rules govern simple, face-to-face social relationships. Gesellschaft, on 
the other hand, describes the societies of modernity, marked by government 
bureaucracies, large organizations, and impersonal, indirect human relations.  
The alienation and disenchantment following the rise of industrialization in 
Europe led a vast range of modernity’s critics to romanticize Gemeinschaft. As the oft-
noted false promise of equality under liberalism grew ever more apparent in the post-
Enlightenment era, many have called for the abandonment and rejection of “bourgeois 
right” as hopeless in securing any form of meaningful, substantive equality, even as they 
wrestled with the necessity of liberalism’s rights and liberties framework that, for all of its 
weakness and hypocrisy, is able nevertheless able to secure some set of basic protections. 
Generally, however, critiques of liberalism grounded outside of the modernity paradigm 
itself — rather than in the Enlightenment tradition that makes use of a liberal framework 
to extend beyond it — hark back in some form to critiques of Gesellschaft of the German 
romantic tradition, a conceptual apparatus that emerges in other configurations 
elsewhere, but is particularly striking in German social and political theory. Critiques 
grounded outside of the modernity paradigm highlight the spiritual, aesthetic, and ethical 
degradation of capitalism and its profoundly alienating effects in contrast to a 
romanticized, earlier way of being that stresses communal, even ethnic, ties — easily 
slipping into a base nativism, and, historically, at least a flirtation with fascism. Analyses 
stemming from such a framework proceed along essentially two avenues: Liberalism can 
be rescued, albeit not in a democratic sense but reconfigured as an elitist social order with 
freedom for some set of individuals only. Or it cannot, thus requiring some form of 
radical rupture, a fundamental break the onset of which calls for a charismatic figure able 
to bring it about and leads yet again to, at best, an elitist humanism whereby politics is 
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always the politics of an elite.  
As a result of historical and political developments, critiques of actually-existing 
capitalism in the U.S. are hardly ever associated with the political right. This is far less the 
case in parts of Europe, where the German romantic tradition retains a significantly more 
salient presence. A notable contemporary exception is the U.S. historian and author 
Christopher Lasch who over the course of his life fused a Marxian critique of capitalism 
with cultural conservatism. In his view, 20th century political economic developments 
have reduced social relations into an “amorphous democratic mass”; public life became 
faceless and anonymous (1965:11). Post-war consumerism gave rise to a distinct 
personality type, characterized by, in part, boundless admiration for fame and celebrity, 
fear of aging, of commitment, and of lasting relationships, including religion — a “culture 
of narcissism” (1979). Opposed to divorce and to abortion, Lasch lamented the 
deterioration of the traditional patriarchal family he attributed to this disintegration of 
social cohesion. 
As we have seen, several figures in the history of U.S. conservatism have in fact 
seen the encroachment of market exchange into nearly every facet of life as profoundly in 
tension with strong social cohesion and moral rigor. Like Lasch, they remained most 
concerned by the conservative coalition’s libertarian elements. But these tensions were 
masterfully papered over by the fusionist alliance of the U.S. conservative movement, and 
never took root in U.S. public consciousness at large. Yet the concern remains central to 
many movement conservatives’ skepticism of libertarianism. By coupling his vision of the 
anarcho-capitalist society, grounded exclusively in private property and private law, with 
the restoration of a particular type of deep, communal bonds, Hoppe attempts to appease 
a longstanding concern about the disruptions of capitalism unleashed — a concern for 
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which the German romantic tradition is the age-old remedy. 
 
Toward Mutualist Anarchism 
Advocates of “plumb-line” libertarianism such as Walter Block take Hoppe — 
and left libertarians alike — to task for attempting to link particular norms and values to 
libertarianism. As discussed already in chapter three, this plumb-line view, articulated 
below by a libertarian anarchist in his mid-twenties, insists that libertarianism is entirely 
compatible with any cultural formation that is consistent with the non-aggression 
principle (NAP):  
These libertopia scenarios proposed by different people just show us how 
very different libertarian societies could be. They could be horrific. I 
mean, I sure as hell wouldn’t want to live in Hoppe’s society. Even if his 
Gestapo didn’t have me removed for being a commie or whatever. But 
societies based on the NAP, on private property, could be radically 
different when the emphasis isn’t on excluding and oppressing people, 
which by the way also happens right now all the time, obviously. A 
peaceful and harmonious world where we take care of each other is much 
more feasible when we get the state out of the way. 
 
The constant within the presently dominant, Rothbardian mode of anarcho-capitalist 
analysis is Rothbard’s iconic formulation of the NAP. Rothbard’s anarchism is not a 
critique of Gesellschaft, although it is certainly compatible with such, as Hoppe shows. As 
already discussed in chapter three, Rothbard proceeds from a central classical liberal 
tenet, Locke’s concept of self-ownership: “the Lockean concept of property in oneself can 
be considered the keystone of the Rothbardian intellectual edifice” (Modugno 1998:61). 
Rothbard himself saw his philosophy as the logical extension of classical liberalism, a 
reading embraced by countless libertarian anarchists in this tradition who, like Scott from 
CPAC, describe themselves as “the real liberals.” 
It is Rothbard’s merit to have seen, more clearly than any previous writer, 
what follows from accepting [Locke’s self-ownership concept] . . . If each 
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person owns himself, and no one may aggress against another, no scope 
for involuntary government remains. Once stated, the conclusion seems 
obvious; but prior to the individualist anarchists of whom Rothbard is the 
most thoroughgoing and consistent, this conclusion had escaped notice. 
 (Gordon 1998) 
 
The term “individualist anarchist” used by Gordon in the above passage is not one 
particularly common in the U.S. political lexicon. Anarchism is much more widely 
associated with social anarchism, the broad spectrum of which includes anarcho- 
communism, anarcho-syndicalism and collectivism.1 But alongside the more familiar 
social anarchism first popularized in the early 20th century U.S. by figures such as Emma 
Goldman, classical liberalism provided the point of the departure for another, long-
dormant intellectual lineage that is only recently being revisited. 
Individualist anarchism, deriving from 19th century anarchist thought and 
primarily associated with the U.S., refers to a loose set of philosophies highlighting the 
primacy of the individual will over external formations such as the community, custom, 
the state, morality, and religion. Profoundly influenced by French theorist and organizer 
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, U.S. individualist anarchists of the time included William 
Greene, Benjamin Tucker and Josiah Warren, as well as Ezra and Angela Heywood, 
imprisoned for disseminating birth control information. Moses Harman may have been 
the first to publicly attack marital rape in print in the 19th century, through his 
anarchist/feminist publication Lucifer the Lightbearer; his daughter Lillian refused to change 
her name following her non-state wedding (Presley 2014). Just as the classical liberal 
tradition metamorphosed from an attack on landed aristocracy and chartered monopolies 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  To be sure, providing a systematic overview presents numerous challenges. In light of the wide range of 
 approaches, influences, and cross-pollination, as well as the nature of anarchism as a living theory, 
significant exceptions exist to nearly every generalization. For an introduction to social anarchism and its 
various trends, see McKay (1993). See also, Doherty (2007:427-438), Graham (2001), Guerin (1989), Kirby 
(2012), and Woodcock (2000).	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into a legitimization of the emerging ruling classes in the form of industrial capitalists and 
large corporations throughout the 19th century, the individualist anarchism of the time 
“turned the weapons of free market analysis against the statist props of capitalist 
privilege” (Carson 2007):  
The shift toward reaction was by no means uniform, however. The 
revolutionary and anti-privilege character of the early [classical liberal] 
movement continued in many strands of liberalism. Thomas Hodgskin, 
squarely in the classical liberal tradition and also by far the most market-
oriented of the Ricardian socialists, criticized the power of the industrial 
capitalist in language reminiscent of Adam Smith’s attack on landlords 
and mercantilists — and on very much the same principles. 
(Carson 2007) 
 
While anarchism in the U.S. could be very broadly delineated into its social and 
individualist strains, by the 20th century the latter had faded into obscurity. 
Individualist anarchism only resurfaced with Rothbard, in a rather different form 
and severed from its earlier socialist influences. In turn, many social anarchists 
reject the notion that the individualist anarchism grounded in Austrian or related 
economic theory constitutes a part of the anarchist movement (McKay 
2007:Intro). This is due in large part to steadfast anarcho-capitalist emphasis on 
private property rights and wage labor, and corresponding acceptance of rent, 
interest, and profit as legitimate forms of income. 
The hostility of social anarchism’s proponents toward Rothbardian anarcho-
capitalism is in large part motivated by differing approaches to property. Crucial to social 
anarchism broadly is some form of communal ownership of the means of production and 
the attendant abolition of wage labor. This tends to entail a needs-based distribution 
system based on the self-management of workers, with some social anarchists arguing for 
a moneyless system where the product of labor is freely shared among those contributing. 
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Even non-capitalist markets, in this view, amplify rather than shrink inequities of wealth 
and power over time, while individual ownership of the means of production reproduces 
hierarchical, authoritarian social relations (McKay 2007:A3).  
The contemporary revival of the anarchist philosophy of mutualism, however, has 
stirred debate both among social anarchists and their Austrian-informed counterparts. 
Emergent collaborations and exchanges are spearheading developments and 
realignments on both fronts, with many social anarchists, Rothbardian anarcho-
capitalists, and other market anarchists increasingly pointing to mutualism as legitimate, 
acceptable, or interesting even if they do not adopt the self-identification. It should be 
noted that these developments have taken place predominantly outside of academic 
spaces, and stem from movement participants themselves. 
While at odds with many of anarcho-capitalism’s central tenets, mutualist 
anarchism, or mutualism, warrants attention in any contextualization of the present-day 
liberty movement. In some form, the philosophy informs the analysis of many market 
anarchists and left libertarians described in chapter three — those rejecting any 
association with “capitalism,” understood as the present political economic system. 
Various online discussion forums and social media sites are ablaze with conversations 
between self-identified mutualists and a range of liberty movement participants; 
simultaneously, prolific writers associated with mutualism’s revival — most notably 
independent scholars Kevin Carson and Shawn Wilbur — regularly engage with key 
liberty movement figures as well as social anarchist writers and activists, alongside near-
daily exchanges on the internet’s many discussion spaces dedicated to the philosophy of 
mutualism. In turn, in addition to representing an important revitalization of a long-
dormant tradition, mutualism also plays a significant role in the intellectual and political 
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development of numerous liberty movement participants. As was the case for Christina, 
Carson’s work in particular is a key element in the transition of many millennial 
libertarians away from both Ron Paul-type politics and the heavily propertarian 
approaches associated with Rothbard’s anarcho-capitalism. 
 
FIGURE 13: Facebook Mutualism group banner featuring key figures in the tradition. 
http://BenjaminGodwin.com. 
 
 The question of what, precisely, it means to be a mutualist dominates many spaces 
dedicated to the approach that build on the 19th century individualist anarchist lineage. 
Mutualism’s proponents are today faced with the complex task described by Wilbur (n.d.-
a) thus: 
We are simultaneously recovering a Tradition (which was itself in search of 
its Ideal), distilling our Ideal from that Tradition, and trying to build some 
sort of Movement. That’s a lot to be tackling all at once, and it’s 
complicated by the fact that the differences within the Tradition of 
Mutualism have been arguably a bit more complicated than those facing 
the broader anarchist movement, so that what we have in practice are 
several new Mutualisms, which have different understandings of the Ideal, 
different identifications within the Tradition, and different relations to 
other parts of the Anarchist Movement. 
 
Wilbur describes the mutualist ideal as “reciprocity of the highest order.” But he is careful 
to note that mutualism as such is not a specific social, political or economic system:  
It is — at its core — an ethical philosophy. We begin with mutuality or 
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reciprocity — the Golden Rule, more or less — and then seek to apply 
that principle in a variety of situations. As a result, under mutualism every 
meaningfully social relation will have the form of an anarchic encounter 
between equally unique individuals — free absolutes — no matter what 
layers of convention we pile on it. To the extent that our conventions, 
institutions and norms respect that basic premise, we can call them 
“mutualist.” To the extent that we commit ourselves to viewing our 
relations through this lens, and exert ourselves in the extension of 
mutualistic freedom, we can call ourselves “mutualists.” We don’t take 
anarchy lightly and understand that archic relationships and coercive force 
come in lots of forms, and the exertion matters — if mutuality is reduced 
simply to an outcome of this or that system, mutualism as such almost 
certainly disappears. 
 
Wilbur has spearheaded the project of revisiting mutualism’s historical roots through 
extensive translation and archiving of classical anarchist writing, disrupting the once-
dominant history of anarchism that saw mutualism as a sort of historical sidenote rather 
than a central, formative tenet of the tradition. Through interpretation and expansion of 
mutualist theory informed by deep historical analysis, Wilbur focuses in particular on the 
contributions of Proudhon and their distinction from the work of U.S. individualists such 
as Josiah Warren and Benjamin Tucker. This approach takes mutualist thought in a 
direction different from the “big tent” view adopted by many identifying with the 
philosophy, where mutualism represents either a nebulous middle ground between social 
and market anarchism or a synthesis of social anarchism with a commitment to genuinely 
free market exchange.  
Perhaps the most common contemporary application of mutualism posits a 
stateless market-based system alongside property rights based on Proudhon’s framework 
of occupancy and use. In this view, heavily influenced by Benjamin Tucker, the ultimate 
source of exploitation and inequity is state action and the corresponding privileging of 
elites: state-created monopolies of money, land, tariffs and patents, alongside state 
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enforcement of existing private property rights.2 Land ownership is legitimate only so 
long as it remains in use or occupation, with some mutualists extending this view to 
ownership of capital goods. Many also stress a model where groups of workers, through 
cooperatives and other voluntary associations, jointly own the means of production and 
freely exchange the product with others. Some present-day mutualists are particularly 
interested in building institutions informed by the philosophy, particularly through 
cooperatives and the P2P movement described in the last chapter. These projects draw 
on 19th century proposals such as mutual banks — interest-free banking models that 
would disrupt the monopoly on credit held by banks and benefit participants rather than 
bankers.3 
Wilbur (2012) warns about the dangers of collapsing mutualism into a form of 
market anarchism, noting, for instance, the usefulness of accepting or rejecting market 
arrangements on a much more specific basis. Proudhon, in Wilbur’s reading, offers a 
robust toolkit with which to nuance such analysis, particularly with regard to how markets 
function as emergent orders, and sometimes as virtual, collective agents; Proudhon’s work 
may, in this sense, shed further insight upon the relationship between circulation and 
concentration, in the sense of property and capitalist accumulation. Further, an emphasis 
on markets tends to distract from the conscious application of the principle of mutuality at 
the heart of the philosophy, developed by Proudhon as a kind of reciprocity between 
propertarian and communist poles in social relations. 
This approach is in some ways a departure from the mutualist project of 
integrating elements of Austrian economics into classical political economy, pioneered 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  For the full exposition of this influential view, see Tucker (1911).	  3	  See, e.g., Greene (1850).	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particularly by Kevin Carson. As noted earlier, Carson’s work increasingly serves as the 
“gateway drug” that steers market-friendly millennial libertarians away from anarcho-
capitalism. A 32 year-old one-time anarcho-capitalist summarized her experience this 
way: 
I was doing a lot of antiwar work, and their [libertarian] analysis there is 
really solid. In getting involved more, I really thought of the market 
process and private property as the best way to organize society . . . The 
reason I’m a libertarian is because I care about making the world a better 
place for everyone, to sound cheesy. But I got very disturbed at how rarely 
that seemed front and center. So I had been moving more and more 
toward left libertarianism, reading [Roderick] Long and [Charles] 
Johnson. I always thought that libertarians need to pay more attention to 
structural racism, patriarchal social relations, coercion not always tied to 
the state. But the left has such a weak economic analysis, and a knee-jerk 
reaction against markets. I get that there’s good reasons for this given how 
much the rhetoric of markets is used for policies that hurt people, but it 
doesn’t make for solid economic analysis . . . Kevin Carson’s writing was 
really helpful in getting me to think through the implications of a super 
propertarian system tied to wage labor. I’d never call mysef an ancap now, 
more like some sort of mutualist.  
 
Taking up the Austrian perspective on its own terms, Carson is able to speak to those in 
the Austro-libertarian tradition and articulate points of contention that some have loosely 
identified themselves, but have not seen systematically analyzed in the language of 
political economy. His contributions further help dislodge the view of anarchism as 
socialism’s poor cousin; in developing an anarchistic approach to economic analysis, 
wrote fellow mutualist Larry Gambone (2007) in a review of Carson’s Studies in Mutualist 
Political Economy, “Carson has produced our Das Kapital . . . The most important aspect 
of this book, the one that should overshadow other differences [among schools of 
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anarchist thought], is that the economic analysis of exploitation and capitalism has been 
placed on a solid anarchist basis. We need no longer play second fiddle to the Marxists.”4 
The revival of mutualism further highlights emergent modes of governance 
organized around peer-to peer logic. Carson focuses on the potential of localized, small-
scale economies particularly in The Homebrew Revolution: A Low Overhead Manifesto (2010), a 
study of lean and agile microenterprises from neighborhood workshops and desktop 
production to household enterprises and online, horizontal networks of peer producers 
using open source design. The book traces the historical growth of government to combat 
the corporate economy’s built-in contradictions and destabilizing tendencies, insulating 
giant corporations from market forces that would otherwise lead to their destruction. In 
contrast to this high overhead, profoundly bureaucratized conventional economy marked 
by enormous capital outlays and cost-plus markups, Carson draws on a range of 
conceptual models in describing an emerging alternative economy. The latter, comprised 
of resilient informal and household economies, takes technologies developed in the service 
of corporate capitalism and adapts them to small-scale production, employing material 
inputs far more efficiently than capitalism while simultaneously making use of its waste. 
Decentralized production thus potentially holds the same liberating effects that access to 
the commons offered everyday people prior to their mass dispossession — ultimately 
enabling them to defect from wage labor entirely:  
Large inventories, high capital outlays, and high overhead have the same 
effect on mass-production industry that shit has on a human body bloated 
by constipation. The higher the fixed costs required to undertake an 
activity, the larger the income stream required for a household or firm to 
service that overhead; the enterprise must either get big or get out, and the 
household must have multiple sources of full-time wage income to survive. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  In part, Carson aims to build a practical and theoretical foundation for a mutualist “free market socialist 
economics” by reformulating the labor theory of value in light of marginalist and subjectivist critique.	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The alternative economy, on the other hand, operates with almost no 
fixed costs, so that almost all its revenue is free and clear and it can survive 
prolonged periods of slow business. Because it’s organized stigmergically, 
with modular open-source designs, innovation costs are spread over the 
widest possible product ecologies with a minimum of transaction costs. 
The alternative economy is breeding the rats in the nests of corporate 
dinosaurs. 
(2010) 
 
Mutualism’s revival and its increasing popularity among millennials further illustrates the 
disparate ways through which various parts of the movement confront, reproduce, and 
reconfigure key aspects of the liberal tradition. Indeed, such processes of contestation 
have marked U.S. liberalism — as well as countless other traditions — all along.  
 
Theorizing U.S. Liberalism 
 With the liberty movement at a historical high point, movement participants are 
negotiating their own roles in the movement and struggling to shape its direction. The 
preceding chapters have illustrated a range of libertarian frameworks and approaches. 
Among the more well-known is the advocacy of a “night watchman” state, the role of 
which is limited to protecting life, liberty, and property — a perspective that at times 
overlaps with the tea party phenomenon, although, as discussed in chapter two, 
numerous issues drive a wedge between the liberty movement and the tea party, 
especially across generational lines. Less familiar to outside observers is anarcho-
capitalism, the rapidly growing school of thought particularly popular with significant 
numbers of the liberty movement’s youth. Crucially, however, both of these approaches 
lay claim to the classical liberal tradition — the former through a reverence for a bygone 
era of “limited government” and “individual freedom”; the latter through asserting 
unequivocally that a stateless society grounded exclusively in private property and private 
law is the logical extension of classical liberalism. 
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Approaches tied to the revival of mutualism draw on yet other aspects of classical 
liberal thought, particularly as extended by the individualist anarchists of the 19th 
century. An ethnographic study of the processes through which millennial libertarians 
make and remake the liberal tradition thus informs understandings of how U.S. 
liberalism, among other ideologies, is constituted broadly. This approach illustrates that 
developments in U.S. political culture are best understood not through attempting to 
arrive at some authoritative definition of liberalism itself, but through the contextualized 
study of grounded struggles over its meaning, and the attendant reconfigurations of the 
nation’s peculiar political lexicon. The following pages draw on the contributions of 
anthropology to buttress a particular approach to the understanding of U.S. liberalism 
which sees the formation as constituted by struggles over its meaning — an approach 
equally applicable to other political ideologies and traditions. In turn, the project of 
understanding “what liberalism is” is best served by exploring the complexities and 
particularities underlying key struggles over its meaning and direction in a given context, 
rather than by identifying fixed analytical categories and mapping these across historical 
moments. 
Scholars across disciplines have long engaged the U.S. liberal tradition in 
interrogating the nation’s political identity and the notion of American exceptionalism. 
Perhaps no other work has proved as enduring in capturing the imagination of thinkers 
on these fronts as Louis Hartz’s The Liberal Tradition in America (1955:9), which asserted, in 
sum, that the U.S. is inherently liberal, characterized by a monolithic creed — a Lockean 
“fixed, dogmatic liberalism” — to which all successful political arguments throughout the 
nation’s history lay claim.  
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Hartz’s framework dominated the discourse on U.S. politics and national identity 
throughout the 1960s, and remained influential even as scholars began to vehemently 
challenge its central tenets. The critiques are manifold.5 Abbott (2005) characterizes these 
as falling into two categories: The first line of criticism alleges that Hartz fundamentally 
ignores the diversity of U.S. political thought, especially but not exclusively along racial 
lines. Thus, his analysis is blind to crucial elements of U.S. political culture and alternate 
legacies, from racism, black political discourse, and feminism to feudalism, republicanism, 
and socialism, among others.6  In turn, he fails to grasp the extent to which these and 
other formations both competed with and drew upon U.S. liberalism. The powerful 
ideologies of, for instance, U.S. nativism, racism, and patriarchy all but disappear in a 
historical narrative that declares the nation’s fundamental values to be ubiquitously 
liberal democratic at a time marked by express legal exclusions from the rights and duties 
of citizenship along racial and gender lines. For example, Smith (1993) famously 
examines citizenship laws from the republic’s founding to the progressive era, at each 
historical stage highlighting laws that formally excluded large sections of the population. 
In turn, he identifies an “inegalitarian, ascriptivist Americanism” driving the “inarguably 
illiberal” arguments behind these laws, a tradition that must be disentangled from Hartz’s 
Lockean liberalism (26).  
The second set of criticisms identified by Abbott takes Hartz to task for overstating 
the consensus within U.S. political culture by presenting liberalism as a dominant force 
and neglecting the contested nature of the category itself. Thus, his approach erases both 
competing interpretations of Locke and historically contingent understandings of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  See, e.g., Ericson and Green (1999), Hulliung (2010), Kloppenberg (2001).	  6	  See, e.g., Berthoff and Murrin (1973), McNaught (1974), Orren (1991), Shklar (1991), Smith (1993; 1997).	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liberalism as such: “The degree to which eighteenth and nineteenth century American 
political actors and thinkers would have recognized themselves as fellow participants in a 
tradition properly designated ‘liberalism’ is, at best, a matter of dispute” (Smith 1993:24-
26). In this view, then, Hartz’s thesis ultimately reinscribes a rather recent account of both 
Locke specifically and liberalism broadly. Similarly, other critics point to multiple 
interpretations of even the most robustly circumscribed concepts, charging Hartz with a 
blind spot regarding competing meanings distilled over time from the presumed Lockean 
consensus (Greenstone 1993). 
In another helpful overview of these debates, Stears (2007) organizes criticism of 
Hartz’s thesis into three distinct sets of arguments, the last two of which are not addressed 
by Abbott: The “multiple traditions” thesis, the “liberalism as exclusion” thesis, and the 
“liberal multiplicity” thesis. The “multiple traditions” thesis attacks Hartz for neglecting 
the dynamics of exclusion that shape many of the nation’s cultural assumptions and 
political outcomes — the approach identified by Abbott in his first category. As Stears 
notes, this view illustrates a certain partiality to the liberal tradition that even Hartz 
himself may not have shared, “implicitly acquitting” liberals and their ideals by 
attributing the “good” about U.S. political history to liberalism and the “bad” to a 
competing ascriptivist tradition.  
In response, the “liberalism as exclusion” thesis developed in the years that 
followed lays the blame for much of the less savory, exclusionary episodes of U.S. history 
at the feet of liberalism itself. Building on earlier work in this vein, Katznelson (1999) and 
King (1999), for example, developed accounts of a systematic complicity between 
liberalism and the politics of exclusion: Liberalism either provides the ideological 
legitimation for the existing free market capitalist economic system rooted in self-interest 
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and private property; inherently privileges a particular cultural experience, namely that of 
white middle-class men, by promoting, for instance, distinctly individualist ethics; or some 
combination of these. In all cases, it overlooks the interests of those who cannot flourish in 
such systems. Further, proponents of the “liberalism as exclusion” thesis showed how 
exclusionary policies were often justified in the language of liberalism itself. For example, 
19th-century campaigns to disenfranchise African-Americans in New York were not 
grounded in the ostensible innate superiority of white property holders, but rather on ideas 
borrowed explicitly from Lockean liberalism (Scalia 1998). Arguments for disenfranchisement 
invoked universalistic liberal notions of self-interest to argue that voting should be limited 
only to those who, based on their socio-economic position, would conduct themselves in 
the public interest.  
Advocates of the “liberalism as exclusion” thesis also highlight how self-identified 
liberal political actors often play a key role in maintaining the politics of exclusion, 
illustrating how liberals routinely compromise their commitments to countering exclusion 
in order to attain broader goals, such as legislative majorities or electoral coalitions. As 
Katznelson (2005) argues in his work on the profoundly racially discriminatory elements 
of key New Deal programs, the success of liberal political movements thus often coincides 
with exclusionary outcomes. In the “liberalism as exclusion” view, then, Hartz correctly 
understood the U.S. as distinctly liberal; but the sinister “ascriptivism” identified by Smith 
and other proponents of the “multiple traditions” thesis are in fact in some form or 
another products of liberalism itself. 
The “liberal multiplicity” thesis, however, highlights the complexity of the U.S. 
liberal tradition and the inability of both the “multiple traditions” and “liberalism as 
exclusion” theses to sufficiently capture these intricacies. The work of Foner (1998), 
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Gerstle (1994), and Horton (2005), for instance, shows how liberal ideals have been 
crucial for self-definition, as well as a profound source of contestation throughout the 
nation’s history. Liberalism, in this framework, is not a stable or predetermined concept, 
nor is its history an evolutionary narrative marching toward an imminent goal. Rather, it 
is located within particular historical contexts, remolded through the clash of dissenting 
and dominant voices, produced and reproduced through political struggles. Embodying a 
broad complex of values, liberalism has been claimed by historically embedded actors for 
a wide range of — at times contradictory — purposes. Invoked to both dissent from and 
justify the status quo and to express a gamut of grievances, hopes, and fears, it is lived and 
experienced across space and time in ways that dismantle any neat scholarly definitions.  
Thus,  
The liberalism of our own time, with its emphasis on racial equality, 
minority rights, and expansive notions of individual freedom, differs 
substantially from the liberalism of the interwar years, which was focused 
on taming capitalism; further, both liberalisms differ from Progressivism. 
All three represent a substantial departure from the classical liberal 
program of limiting the government’s right to interfere with the economic 
and political liberties of its citizens.   
 (Gerstle 1994:1045) 
 
Abbott (2005) ultimately makes a case for a return to Hartz, arguing that the 
analytic concepts Hartz employs in his treatment of U.S. political development — liberal 
reform, liberal enlightenment, the American democrat, the liberal Thermidor — can in 
fact offer a plausible interpretation of more recent events.  Applying these concepts to the 
turmoil of the 1960s, he argues that Hartz’s thesis — all the blind spots and missing parts 
critics correctly identify in his historical analysis notwithstanding — remains the most 
compelling analysis of U.S. political development. Abbott, in his 1960s test case, thus 
aims to illustrate how Hartz’s central analytical categories can help explain the sudden 
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emergence of 1960s protest and cultural experimentation; their rapid escalation; as well 
as the decade’s “stalemated” end (103). Using Hartz, these developments can be 
understood as struggles over the meaning and direction of U.S. liberalism that in many 
ways parallel earlier contests over liberal identity.  
Such a reading first appears as a formulation of the “liberal multiplicity” thesis, 
raising the question of whether that approach is in fact not novel, but rather itself a return 
to Hartz — an updated Hartzean liberal society view of the sort offered by Abbott, with 
much more attention to disparate forms of exclusion and struggles among various 
ideologies and lineages that constitute U.S. liberalism. Abbott does not address this issue 
in his piece, which does not engage the “liberal multiplicity” scholarship. But the “liberal 
multiplicity” approach and Hartz’s liberal society thesis, even in Abbott’s updated form, 
differ in key ways. Hartz did indeed note the significance of “domestic conflict,” of 
arguments within the liberal tradition itself, in ways at times downplayed by critics 
(1955:20). But such conflict, in his analysis, took place upon a “terrain” (20), one that does 
indeed frame U.S. political arguments and discourse, but does so rather narrowly. 
Approaches stressing the protean character of U.S. liberalism highlight how that terrain is 
reconfigured, time and time again, through the very struggles that constitute it.  
Stears identifies a different challenge for proponents of the “liberal multiplicity” 
thesis, one related to the boundaries of U.S. liberalism:  
If American liberalism is now to be understood as a variable creed — a 
tradition best approached through a series of arguments about the 
meaning and implications of shared ideals — then we need a clearer 
recognition of where liberalism stops and other political traditions start. 
Otherwise, the very idea of liberalism will cease to add any analytic value 
to our search for political explanations. 
(2007:98) 
 
	   204	  
The section that follows draws on the contributions of anthropology to show that, contra 
Stears, it is precisely the imperative to arrive at a bounded definition — some set of 
criteria that one can use to discern whether a formation is or is not “liberal” — that adds 
little analytic value to the quest of understanding political development. Thus, Foner 
understands “freedom,” a keyword deeply embedded in U.S. political identity, as “‘an 
essentially contested concept,’ one that by its very nature is the subject of disagreement.” 
(1998:xiv). Numerous examples illustrate this contribution. Activists in the civil rights 
movement mobilizing in the name of freedom, for example, soon found that very 
powerful concept reappropriated by their opposition, which asserted their freedom of 
association. On the academic front, recent scholarship on emergent modes of governance 
directs attention to the coercive powers of freedom, highlighting how new technologies of 
governance instill self-regulation rather than rely on interventions by experts whose 
specialized knowledge authorizes them to govern others (cf. Miller and Rose 2008; Rose 
1993, 1999). In yet another context, Marx famously wrote that capitalist production 
renders workers “free in the double sense” — free to sell their labor power and free from 
the means of production (1976:272). In this way, of course, he aimed to highlight how the 
capitalist economy divorces producers from the means of producing commodities 
themselves, compelling them to sell their labor through necessity. The contemporary 
usage of the term “economic freedom” to legitimize any number of political economic 
developments of the past few decades is, at least on its face, far less steeped in irony. 
To be clear, none of this should be taken to mean that such “essentially contested 
concepts” are somehow useless or devoid of meaning. Millions around the globe have 
won very real, material gains as a result of popular struggles waged in the name of, for 
instance, freedom and related liberal concepts. Far from being meaningless, such 
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concepts have been and remain central to social and political economic transformation. 
Precisely as a result of this, attempting to arrive at some authoritative definition, a “real” 
meaning, of inherently contested concepts is a futile endeavor from an analytical 
perspective (while in political mobilization, insisting on a particular meaning in a specific 
context is of course tremendously useful). Rather, deeply entrenched notions such as 
freedom, and liberalism itself, can serve as helpful guides in understanding developments 
in U.S. political culture and the nation’s peculiar political lexicon: “What is important is 
not so much the evolution of a single definition as the multiple purposes to which the idea 
. . . has been put, and the broader belief systems these usages illuminate” (Foner 1998:xv).  
 
Bringing Anthropology In 
 The “liberal multiplicity” approach shows how liberalism has been a force for 
both inclusion and exclusion at different times in U.S. history, serving the cause of 
egalitarian and inegalitarian efforts alike. Thus struggles about who is entitled to the full 
rights and duties of citizenship have themselves helped shape U.S. character and identity. 
This analytical approach is one with which anthropologists are very familiar.  
Anthropologists of democracy, for instance, have routinely noted that “political 
forms are not neatly differentiable but rather complexly intertwined, and the discourses 
labeling certain regimes as democracies are strategically deployed by groups with strong 
interests in particular definitions and contested by others differently situated in relations 
of power” (Paley 2002:471). One of the central contributions of the anthropological 
approach, then, is recognizing the constitutive nature of such struggles, rather than 
establishing an a priori definition of democracy: “Such an analysis of manifest (false) versus 
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latent (true) content does little to explain either the power of the state or the many effects 
of contestatory practices” (Nelson 1999:102).  
Early studies of democracy following the global transitions of the 1970s were 
predominantly conducted by political scientists concerned with political institutions, 
formal regime shifts, and comparative country studies. Yet, over time, democracy has 
emerged as a prominent theme in the work of anthropologists as well. Drawing on the 
ethnographic method, these approaches looked beyond official political transitions to the 
local meanings, circulating discourses, multiple contestations, and changing forms of 
power accompanying the installation of new political regimes. Alongside a range of 
contributions of political theory and other fields with an ethnographic sensibility, such 
perspectives also began to inform analysis of places such as the U.S., the governments of 
which had not been subject to massive regime shifts and institutional change (Agamben 
2000; Brown 1995; Escobar and Alvarez 1992; Fraser 1997; Honig 2001; Keck and 
Sikkink 1998). 
Anthropologists thus began to identify dissonances between discourses of 
democracy and practical manifestations on the ground. Even ostensibly clearly 
antidemocratic beliefs were revealed to be otherwise, as ethnographers challenged 
universalist assumptions of Western democratic practices themselves. Thus, the 
Comaroffs argue that support for a one-party state in Botswana is not a rejection of 
democracy, but rather the supplanting of a procedural democracy by a substantive 
democracy that entails both deliberation over policy matters and accountability by those 
who govern (1997). 
Of particular relevance to this book is anthropological work that locates contested 
definitions of democracy both in state discourses and national self-understandings. For 
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example, Aihwa Ong (1999) shows how in parts of Asia, democracy is presented less in 
terms of individual rights than as the state’s ability to provide welfare benefits to citizens. 
Thus, Singapore “prides itself on being a ‘home-owning democracy’” (208) in that 
citizens expect the state to secure “universal home ownership, high-quality education, and 
unending economic expansion” (208). Rather than reifying an “Asian” cultural essence, 
such approaches gesture toward meanings of democracy other than elections and 
individual liberties.  
Craig Calhoun (1994:237-60) directs attention to strategic deployment of the term 
democracy and competition over its meanings, its myriad manifestations in institutions 
and social arrangements, and how attendant discourses circulate within and among 
countries. Anthropologist of eastern Europe Katherine Verdery understands democracy, 
along with “Europe . . . civil society, and nation as key symbolic operators, elements in 
ideological fields, rather than as organizational realities” (1996:105). Matthew Gutmann 
posits that “democracy’s very multivalence is a key reason for the zeal with which so 
many people have employed the term to dramatically different ends in recent history” 
(2002:11). As these observations suggest, meanings of  “democracy” are fiercely contested 
among differently situated groups with vested interests in disparate outcomes. 
In another seminal work of anthropology, Fernando Coronil (1997) illustrates how 
democracy took on a profoundly disparate set of meanings for actors unevenly situated in 
relations of power in Venezuela. Through a historical analysis, he shows how, over time, 
meanings ranged from universal suffrage to the population’s partaking in the benefits of 
massive public works projects while being excluded from political rights such as freedom 
of expression and participation in political parties under a military dictatorship. Here, 
military regimes claim the term democracy to legitimate their rule. In other contexts, 
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militaries exercise their power through procedural democracy itself, with the armed forces 
remaining a key player in the emergent “democracy” even after official regime transitions 
(Warren 2000). Such embeddedness of the military is quite literally the case in post-
dictatorship Argentina, where former officers of the Dirty War have run for office and 
been elected to positions of political power (Taylor 1993).  
While in some such cases the term “democracy” seems substantively inapplicable, 
Diane Nelson (1999:102) has warned against seeing democracy as nothing but a “mask 
for military rule.” Aiming to avoid an understanding of the state and civil society as 
separate, enclosed entities, “one corrupt and repressive, the other noble and liberatory,” 
she instead argues that they are interpenetrated at every point. The work of Jennifer 
Schirmer (1998) on Guatemala thus illustrates the centrality of the armed forces to the 
shape of democracy — and, conversely, the utility of democracy to the armed forces. She 
illustrates how the repressive structures of the Guatemalan military are enacted and 
perpetuated through, rather than in spite of, civilian rule:  
Rather than naked military rule based on emergency measures, juntas, 
and coups — instruments of power that have lost their legitimacy 
internationally — it is the appropriation of the imagery of the rule of law, 
of the mechanisms and procedures of electoral democracy, that is perilous 
to the human rights of Guatemalans . . . After decades of naked military 
rule, the Guatemalan military have crafted a unique Counterinsurgent 
Constitutional State in which State violence has been reincarnated as 
democracy.” 
(2, 258) 
 
Just a cursory overview of several seminal ethnographic studies illustrates the 
relevance of this scholarship for understandings of U.S. liberalism and for how political 
ideologies are constituted broadly. Situated in myriad contexts across space and time, 
these perspectives highlight the limitations of aiming to understand inherently contested 
concepts by imposing a priori definitions from above. Rather, it is the historically 
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grounded, contextualized processes of struggle that themselves constitute the meanings of 
these concepts. Close, careful attention to these processes begins to shed light upon the 
broader belief systems and political developments in which such concepts are invoked 
toward disparate ends. The liberty movement’s internal dynamics, and its disparate 
claims to and departures from the liberal tradition, represent one series of such processes. 
More broadly, the contemporary resurgence of libertarianism has ushered forth a new set 
of political struggles, contestations powerfully reshaping U.S. political culture. At stake — 
yet again — is no less than the very meaning and direction of U.S. liberalism itself.  
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Conclusion 
 The implications of libertarianism’s resurgence, and particularly its popularity 
with growing numbers of millennials, are profound. Spanning electoral politics and policy 
interventions; direct action and educational initiatives geared at changing hearts and 
minds; and independent projects aiming to build resilient, self-sufficient communities and 
meet their needs, the multifaceted constellations that comprise the contemporary liberty 
movement represent a central struggle over the meaning and direction of U.S. liberalism. 
 In the arena of electoral politics and policy, these developments have unsettled the 
longstanding conservative/libertarian political coalition and immersed the Republican 
Party in turmoil for the time being. As a result, parts of the liberty movement are 
successfully consolidating a libertarian wing of the GOP — represented by figures such as 
U.S. Senators Ted Cruz and Rand Paul as well as U.S. Representatives Justin Amash and 
Thomas Massie. As discussed in chapter two, tens of thousands of millennial libertarians 
are highly involved in the project of forging a libertarian political establishment, 
motivated especially by the serious predicaments of growing economic insecurity as well 
as escalating militarization and surveillance. Seeing an overreaching, out of control 
federal government as the primary source of a wide range of contemporary problems, 
politics-oriented movement participants view the Republican Party mainstream as 
hopelessly hypocritical, and aim to elect representatives genuinely committed to strictly 
limited government. Simultaneously, many Republicans have taken to identifying as 
libertarian without substantively altering their positions, striving to benefit by allying with 
the popular movement; some consider the public “conversion” to libertarianism by Fox 
commentator Glenn Beck to be one such instance. Further, as Republican politicians 
increasingly attain office with the aid of libertarian efforts, candidates stress their 
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commitment to limited government on the economic front while downplaying their 
socially conservative positions — numerous “pro-liberty” Republicans ultimately find 
common cause with the Party’s mainstream on issues such as abortion and same-sex 
marriage.  
 Political libertarian efforts are likely to exacerbate rather than decline over the 
coming years. Especially in light of the lack of organized political alternatives with 
popular appeal, we can expect additional high-profile electoral campaigns in this vein — 
forthcoming presidential bids by Sen. Rand Paul, the more traditional conservative-
leaning son of movement figurehead Ron Paul, and Sen. Ted Cruz, a darling of many 
limited government libertarians, would be unsurprising in the least. While many 
movement participants support such efforts with the genuine objective of challenging 
state power to improve the situation of everyday people, there is little reason to expect 
outcomes substantially different from similar political developments in the past. The 
popularization of market-based approaches undertaken by parts of the movement not 
invested in formal political processes too risk being harnessed in the service of particular 
political projects. In the arena of policy, such contributions are more often than not taken 
up piecemeal and applied without regard to context. Especially in light of the concessions 
and compromises inherent in the world of politics, the project of “shrinking government” 
quickly translates into the rollback of social services, anti-poverty programs, and related 
social safety nets, alongside initiatives that disproportionately burden the vulnerable and 
marginalized — not, for instance, into curbing corporate welfare, militarization, or mass 
incarceration. In this sense, the movement’s impact on everyday lives may prove powerful 
indeed, although not by disrupting state power or dislodging the state-sponsored elite 
privilege that concern numerous movement participants.  
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 By coupling a commitment to market-based solutions as the best remedy for 
pressing social and economic questions, with, for instance, support of LGBT communities 
and fierce opposition to the wars on terror and drugs, escalating militarization broadly, 
and increasing global surveillance, millennial libertarians exemplify the complex processes 
through which political ideologies and traditions are constituted. An ethnographic 
engagement with the movement’s many spaces illustrates how young people are making 
their own series of claims on the liberal tradition, shaping the meanings and futures of 
libertarianism and the U.S. liberal tradition alike. Across disparate locales and virtual 
spaces, millennial libertarians draw on a wide range of intellectual and political traditions 
they have inherited as they struggle with the quintessential notions of freedom and the 
individual at the core of western political thought; wrestle with questions of status, 
privilege, and structural inequality; and negotiate competing understandings of “the free 
market” and the role of the state in facilitating existing political economic arrangements. 
The stories of young people inspired by the libertarian resurgence that first swept across 
the country in the early 2000s illustrate how circulating discourses about deeply held U.S. 
ideals have served to rationalize and entrench disparities along axes of class, race, and 
gender. Yet these notions are being continuously interpreted, contested, and 
reappropriated to both challenge and reinscribe relations of power.  
 The libertarian resurgence represents a crucial struggle over the very meaning 
and direction of U.S. liberalism in our historical moment. These dynamics simultaneously 
illustrate that U.S. liberalism, like other political traditions and ideologies, cannot be 
understood as a fixed, bounded concept. The incredible gravity of appeals to liberalism as 
the basis for social and political legitimacy in the U.S., alongside the array of ideologies 
and movements staking a claim within its auspices, present a strong temptation for 
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scholars to develop and impose a priori definitions — to focus on delineating the 
boundaries of liberalism in the sense of identifying abstract ideological configurations and 
specific practices as characterizing liberalism itself. But ethnographic approaches illustrate 
the limitations of such a method, revealing how the messy, complex struggles on the 
ground over the meanings and implications of the liberal tradition shape that very 
formation. Such struggles are themselves constitutive of liberalism and its varied 
manifestations across time and space. To be clear, this understanding of liberalism as a 
protean, contested formation is anything but a deconstructionist argument. Rather, an 
approach that focuses on the existing struggles over the direction and meaning of 
liberalism — the actors involved, their motivations, grievances, analyses, and strategies — 
reframes the question of the boundaries of liberalism, from what criteria demarcate 
liberalism as such, to who benefits (and who does not) under existing conditions, and how.  
 A significant part of an entire generation, gravely disenchanted by a world 
embroiled in economic crisis and the heavily militarized systems of governance of the 
security state, has turned away from state-based solutions in confronting the challenges of 
our day. While many millennial libertarians aim to implement their visions of freedom by 
restricting government through formal political processes, other parts of the movement 
increasingly eschew formal politics and policy, instead directing energy toward 
educational efforts geared at changing “hearts & minds,” as well as collaborations across 
ideological lines. The liberty movement presents one key site of the present antistate 
moment. But the salience of this moment is by no means limited to the liberty movement, 
where its expressions already differ substantially as participants adopt a range of often 
clashing interpretations of their world and disparate approaches to social transformation. 
Much has transpired since David Graeber lamented in 2004 that, although “anarchism is 
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veritably exploding right now” (2) academia has failed to keep up. While a growing and 
important scholarship is exploring contemporary forms of disparate anarchist traditions 
and organizing across the globe, these developments also indicate a need for further 
research directed toward the subjectivities and everyday practices emerging in a moment 
that gives rise to such mobilization. How does the antistate moment manifest in the 
practices of individuals and communities not expressly involved in these mobilizations, 
and to what ends? How does it vary across time and space? What are its different 
representations throughout popular culture and other cultural and political formations? 
What new coalitions and convergences does it inform? In what ways is it already being 
appropriated toward other ends and political projects, and with what results? 
 Substantial parts of the liberty movement strive toward social transformation not 
in the halls of formal political power, but by participating in coalitions and projects across 
ideological boundaries focused on, for instance, anti-war and police accountability 
organizing; “off the grid” alternative economies; promotion of emerging technologies 
such as 3D printing, open design, secure communication methods, and other distributed, 
open-source projects; as well as a swath of cooperative organizational models and DIY 
community efforts. Although these projects illustrate the compatibility of at least some 
libertarian frameworks of social organization with those of other traditions, none are the 
exclusive domain of libertarianism as such. As discussed in chapter four, the notion of 
peer-to-peer distributed networks with equipotential rights of participation increasingly 
refers to an ethos permeating movements and projects that not only aim to achieve goals 
far beyond conventional file and processor cycle sharing, but work outside of 
technological frameworks entirely. These dynamics signal a mode of governance 
embodied in autonomous and interdependent networks and peer circles, highlighting the 
	   215	  
need for research beyond analysis of neoliberal governance at work, approaches that 
direct attention to novel, emerging practices and their attendant subjectivities. The 
prospects of future trends and formations informed by this organizing logic are highly 
contingent, uncertain, and manifold — much like those of millennial libertarians, who 
continue to make their own history, albeit under circumstances existing already, given 
and transmitted through the past. 
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